system extremely similar to that which has been recently adopted, and a real and cordial peace with France.

This tract seeks to draw attention to certain plans for meliorating human affairs which are disclosed in the other works of Dr. Edwards, and on which, in his present anonymous character, he here bestows high praises. He is of opinion that, in order to remedy our social ills, to remove our interior grievances, to stand well abroad, and to be a flourishing and happy people at home, we have only to give due consideration to the counsels to which he thus refers, and to unite all hearts and hands in order to reduce them to practice. Faith and works

are required of the disciples of this new gospel. They must believe in the efficacy of the plan, and in the infallibility of its founder; they must hold it to be their first duty and their highest honour to co-operate in what is here called the art of practical improvement,' in order to introduce and establish what is denominated the system of general welfare,' or the kingdom of God;' or in other words that political and spiritual order of things which Dr. Edwards has a mission to unfold and recommend.

Though the changes which the new faith contemplates are very considerable, they appear rather to affect the sentiments and pursuits of individuals, than political and social arrangements; the relations of men, it would seem, are to continue much the same, while the motives and views which actuate them are to undergo an entire revolution; -- monarchs are not to be stripped of their crowns,-the privileged orders are not to be divested of their rank,-the senate, the church, the professions, and the several classes of active life, are still to retain their appellations, though their exertions are to assume new directions. Of the functions assigned to the monarch we highly approve but, if heaven does not impart the necessary wisdom to the individual on whom the crown devolves, we fear that the system of general welfare' will be endangered. The Houses of Parliament are to discard, as pernicious and puerile, the flourishes and displays about which they are at present occupied, and to become schools in which the art of practical improvement' is to be exclusively pursued. The church is to form men to that religious and moral purity, which is essential to the prevalence and continuance of the system of general welfare.' The profession of the law is to assist in devising the best legislative regulations, and in advancing the real ends of justice. Commerce is to rise above jealousies, and to derive its interests from the abundance which is to be consequent on universal prosperity. Medicine is to inform itself still farther in regard to the nature and causes of diseases,

diseases, in order to soften and diminish the physical ills which beset humanity.

In the new system, general philanthropy is not pursued to the disregard of patriotism, but they are represented as perfectly consistent; the apostle of this new order of things, however, confines the most voluminous of his works to the care of Great Britain alone. The substance of his advice to his countrymen, as here disclosed, is to have faith in his plan of general welfare; to trust alone to this, and not to ministers, nor to any man or set of men: since, according to him, the several successions of ministers which we have witnessed, by pursuing the maxims of former times, by following precedents, by moving in the routine of office, by engaging in wars, and by imposing intolerable burthens, have brought on the declension of liberty and a vast accumulation of misery. We are told that we are in the sure road to destruction, and advancing in the course with accelerated velocity: but, if we are bent on the salvation of the empire, we must have recourse to men who, by the art of practical improvement,' will introduce the new and perfect dispensation developed and proclaimed by Dr. Edwards.

Bulky as this pamphlet is, it only announces and panegyrizes the labours of the apostle of the new gospel. Within the same compass, the marrow of the system might have been given; and it certainly would have been more gratifying than lamentations over ills which all admit, and invectives against abuses which none can deny, accompanied by endless repetitions of assurances that, in certain works, efficacious remedies are pointed out, and extravagant praises of those remedies. In this way, the greater part of the tract is occupied. The writer appears as if he were afraid to make too free with the wonderful treatises to which he refers us, and to disclose too much of the systems which they teach.-In the visions of reformers, however, and the schemes of projectors, the wise and the ju dicious often discover ideas by which they may profit; and we are of opinion that, on this ground, the lucubrations before us may not disadvantageously occupy a few hours of the lei sure of sober men.

ART. XI. The Dangers of the Country. By the Author of War in Disguise*. ¿vo. PP. 227. 5s. Butterworth. 1807. ΤΗ HIS author is master of an eloquent pen, writes in an excellent temper and from the most pure motives, and

* See Rev. Vol. xlviii. N. S. p. 417.

is

is possessed of various and important information. Of the present pamphlet, however, the first part is not, we think, composed in his happiest manner; it has not his usual animation, it dwells too much on suppositions which are revolting, and it displays a sang freid in treating of them for which we are at a loss to account. We would not be understood to dispute the important nature of the considerations which, even in this division of his tract, he submits to the government and people of this country: they doubtless well merit their attention but we object to the mode in which they are conveyed. These pages exhibit the picture of Great Britain as a province of France. If it were allowable to sketch such a painting, only the outlines and leading features ought to have been given, and all that was minute and particular should have been excluded. Let us collect together all the horrors which have attended the subjugation of countries in past times; and we may rest assured that they will be realized, if ever Great Britain be subdued by its present relentless and implacable enemy. The gigantic evil should have been alone held up to view the minor mischiefs serve to weaken and not to heighten the effect. While, however, we thus state our own feelings, on perusing this part of the author's labours, let it not be thought that we are wanting in respect to the patriotic views and upright in tentions, which so honourably distinguish the performances of this gentleman.

Friends to peace, we own that we lend an unwilling ear to those who press on us the unwelcome proposition, that it is in present circumstances more to be deprecated than desired. Yet, when we find a writer of the grave and serious turn, and of the respectable character, which belong to this author, inculcating so afflicting a sentiment, we cannot decline to give it our most anxious attention; and if we have not in this instance been convinced, we have been so far impressed as to deem it a duty to lay before our readers a few of the leading passages which relate to this subject. In entering on this topic, he expresses himself in the following modest and becoming terms:

To censure a great political measure of the present able and enlightened cabinet, is perhaps presumptuous in a private individual; and is a work which I perform with regret. I am conscious that the awful considerations which may weigh in the choice between a pacific or warlike system, cannot be perfectly known to the public at large; and the distinguished talents now united in the ministry, certainly challenge the strongest general confidence in the wisdom of our counsels. Yet I dare not suppress at this awful conjuncture, a very sincere, though perhaps erroneous opinion, that

peace

peace with France, if accomplished by the late negociations, would have heen fatal to the security of the Country.'

1 he true objections to the measure then, as well as at the present more aful crisis, apply to the unavoidable nature and effects of any treaty that could be proposed; not to its particular terms; yet we heard of" a good peace," and "an honourable peace," as proper to be treated for with France. For my part, if the possibility of a safe Peace can be shewn, I will heartily admit, be its articles what they may, that it is good for my country in these evil times; and not dis honourable to her, but glorious to those who may make it. But while no such peace is to be hoped for, I would not treat; because I would not lead the people of England into the dangerous error of supposing, that peace with France. in her present attitude, is compatible with their safety; nor would I lead the people of Europe, and America, to believe that England is of that opinion.'

The writer thinks that Bonaparte will again offer us the uti possidetis, but with this he is not contented; and nothing short of the status quo ante bellum for ourselves and our allies will satisfy him.

But this, (says he) it may be exclaimed, it would be preposterous to expect at present from France. I admit it; and therefore it would be preposterous to expect at present a peace safe for Great Britain. The impossibility consists in this, that France will not relinquish her new pos sessions on the continent; and that therefore Great Britain cannot safely relinquish her undivided possession of the sea. We cannot do so, not only because we should, by opening the sea to our enemy, enable him soon to become a formidable maritime power, but because his usurped Empire on shore would become far more terrible and irresistible than it is, were its commercial communications restored. We dare not give him back his navigation, and let him keep all his new territory too.

These principles, in any day but the present, would have needed no demonstration If we can safely make peace with France in her present most alarming attitude, we have been fighting since 179, and even in all our wars since the treaty of Ryswick, not only without necessity, but upon the most irrational and extravagant views that ever governed the policy of a nation.'

Granting the premises, this reasoning is forcible: but the ineligibility of a peace on any other terms than those of the status quo ante bellum must first be proved; and who can point out a period at which such extreme terms are likely to be obtained? The consequence, then, must be permanent war.

In the following passage, the author suggests an idea which, it is exceedingly to be regretted, was not sufficiently considered before it was too late :

There was a time perhaps, when it might have been more prudent to open the sea to France, leaving her in a state of great continental aggrandizement, than to risque her pushing her conquests

still further, if that could have been prevented by any pacific con. ventions that we had power to make, for ourselves and our allies; but if there was ever a proper season for such policy, it plainly exists no longer; and this, not only because our enemy has shewn that no confidence can be placed in any treaty which opposes his thirst of universal empire; but because it may now fairly be doubted, whether any further increase of his dominions would really add to his

power.

The writer next expresses a sentiment that has been before advanced, but on which we cannot too frequently reflect:

The

For my own part, however singular the opinion may seem, I should have less apprehension of danger from the arms of Napoleon, if the remaining territories of Prussia, and Austria, and even the immense domains of Russia, and Turkey, were added to his conquests, than I feel at the present moment. At sea, the acquisition of every bottom still friendly to this country, would not now enable him to cope with us; and on shore, he has power enough already for our destruction, when it can be brought into action against us. momentum of the vast machine, on its present scale, is more than we can hope finally to resist but every enlargement of its dimensions, and multiplication of its intricate movements, increases its tendencies to interior derangement; and therefore, without adding to our im mediate peril, improves our chance of escape. Buonaparte has hitherto been so astonishingly prudent, or fortunate, that we naturallybegin to doubt whether there be any thing too difficult for him to accomplish; but his power is already composed of so many discordant elements, that their cohesion is truly wonderful: and as he proceeds, he is gaming at double or quits. Even the large armies, which he has to station in so many conquered countries will soon be very diffi. cult to govern they, or their generals, will probably recollect, that the Roman legions bestowed the purple, as well as kept the provinces in subjection; and revolutions in this extraordinary age move with a celerity of which history has no example.'

It is the opinion of this author that, if peace be made, hostility will still be continued by the enemy against our com

merce:

It is impossible, (he observes,) when we consider Napoleon's maxims of commercial policy, to doubt that he will avail himself, as soon as the sea is open, of all his enormous power and influence, to exclude us by means of treaties, and of municipal laws, not only from France, but from every other country in Europe, to the Government of which he can dictate. With a sincerity unusual to him, he has already pretty plainly intimated that such will be his pacific system, by protesting, in limine, when he began to negociate, against every stipulation in favour of our commerce. He would have no commercial treaties with us whatever.

And here I must own myself quite at a loss to comprehend the views of those, who regard the interests of our commerce and manufactures, as considerations on the side of peace. That such is not the REY. MARCH, 1807.

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