Scientific Theism

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Little, Brown,, 1885 - 219 páginas
 

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Página 186 - But this I do say, and would wish all men to know and lay to heart, that he who discerns nothing but Mechanism in the Universe has in the fatalest way missed the secret of the Universe altogether. That all Godhood should vanish out of men's conception of this Universe seems to me precisely the most brutal error, — I will not disparage Heathenism by calling it a Heathen error, — that men could fall into. It is not true; it is false at the very heart of it.
Página 209 - ... conception of the universe which naturally flows from the philosophized scientific method. 1. Because the universe is in some small measure actually known in human science, it must be in itself both absolutely self-existent and infinitely intelligible; that is, it must be a noumenon because it is a phenomenon. 2. Because it is infinitely intelligible, it must be likewise infinitely intelligent. 3. Because it is at the same time both infinitely intelligible and infinitely intelligent, it must...
Página 47 - How this inference is justified, how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of itself, I do not pretend to say ; I need not untie a knot which the world has cut for me long ago. It may very well be that I myself am the only existence, but it is simply ridiculous to suppose that anybody else is. The position of absolute idealism may, therefore, be left out of count, although each individual may be unable to justify his dissent from it.
Página 66 - Even the primary facts of intelligence,— the facts which precede, as they afford the conditions of, all knowledge, — would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of natural or necessary beliefs.
Página 51 - Ferrier puts it in his Remains: " To know a thing per se, or sine me, is as impossible and contradictory as it is to know two straight lines enclosing space ; because mind by its very law and nature must know the thing cum alio, ie, along with itself knowing it". The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, therefore, is a truism so far as it asserts the co-essentiality of subject and object to the relation of knowledge; it is a falsity and absurdity so far as it asserts the non-knowableness of the...
Página 1 - We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved around the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest.
Página 2 - by a paradoxical but yet true method,' to seek the observed motions, not in the heavenly bodies, but in their observers. Not less 'paradoxical' must it appear to the sluggish mind of man, when Kant lightly and certainly overturns our collective experience, with all the historical and exact sciences?
Página i - E se il mondo laggiù ponesse mente Al fondamento che natura pone, Seguendo lui, avria buona la gente. Ma voi torcete alla religione Tal che fia nato a cingersi la spada, E fate re di tal ch' è da sermone; Onde la traccia vostra è fuor di strada.
Página 2 - ... the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge.
Página 59 - Whatever can be an object of belief, or even of disbelief, must, when pnt into words, assume the form of a proposition. All truth and all error lie in propositions. What, by a convenient misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, means simply a True Proposition ; and errors are false propositions.

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