question pertinent to the matter under inquiry: Cunningham v. Schley, 41 Ga. 426. Entries in the books of a person, since deceased, madə by him, admitting or declaring facts at the time against his interest, such, for example, as charge him with sums of money in favor of other parties, are, upon the ground of being against his interest, admissible in actions between other parties: Rand v. Dodge, 17 N. H. 343. A written memorandum, made by an officer against his interests, in respect to a matter pertaining to his official duty, is, after his death, evidence as well of the fact against his interest as of other incidental facts and circumstances contained in it, and is admissible irrespective of the question whether any privity exists between the officer and the party against whom it is offered: Living. ston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 507. Thus in an action to enjoin the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, evidence by plaintiff that prior to the purchase of such property he was informed by the deputy treasurer, since deceased, that such taxes had been paid, is properly admitted as being declarations against the interest of such officer and relating to a fact about which he possessed competent knowledge: Keesling v. Powell, 149 Ind. 372, 49 N. E. 265. Such declarations to be admissible must be made in the line of the declarant's duty, and a written memorandum by a person, since deceased, relating to the position of a house, which position is a point in controversy, is not admissible against a third person when not made in the course of the declarant's business or duty: Jacob Tome Institute v. Davis, 87 Md. 591, 41 Atl. 166.

d. Knowledge of the Declarant.-To authorize the admission of the declarations of a deceased person against third persons, on the ground that they were made against his interest, it should appear that he had peculiar means of knowledge of the subject matter of the declarations. There should be a presumption of actual knowledge arising from his immediate connection with the transaction or from a duty to know the fact. A mere inference from the evidence that he might have known, or very probably would have known, will not suffice: Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St. 418. The cases generally maintain that to make such declarations admissible they must be of a fact or facts in relation to a matter concerning which the declarant was immediately and personally cognizable: County of Mahaska v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 96; Baker v. Taylor, 54 Minn. 73, 55 N. W. 823; Hinkley v. Davis, 6 N. H. 210, 25 Am. Dec. 457; McDonald v. Wesendouck, 30 Misc. Rep. 605, 62 N. Y. Supp. 764; Cruger v. Daniel, McMull. Eq. 157.

e. Declarant must have no Motive to Falsify.-In order that declarations made by persons, since deceased, may be admissible against third person, it is necessary, in addition to the foregoing prerequisites, that the court should be satisfied, under the circumstances of each particular case, that there was no probable motive to falsify the fact

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declared, as where the declaration was made ante litem motam or at a period so remote as to preclude any suspicion that it was manufactured for the occasion: County of Mahaska v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 96; Baker v. Taylor, 54 Minn. 73; Hinkley v. Davis, 6 N. H. 210, 25 Am. Dec. 457; McDonald v. Wesendouck, 30 Misc. Rep. 605, 62 N. Y. Supp. 764. To render such entry or declaration admissible against a third person, it must appear to have been made without any interest to falsify the fact: Gilchrist v. Martin, Bailey Eq. 492. If the declarant is shown to have been in a position to know the truth of his declarations, and to have been without interest or motive to declare anything but the truth, and his declarations were anciently made, they are admissible against third persons: Lewis v. Burgess, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 253, 54 S. W. 609.

III. Declarations as to Matters of Public Interest.

Another exception to the rule excluding the declarations of third persons as hearsay exists in the case of declarations of third persons or persons supposed to be dead, showing reputation as to matters of public or general interest, and the rule prevails that matters of a public or general interest may be proved by the declarations of persons since deceased, who were in a situation to have knowledge of them: Wooster v. Butler, 13 Conn. 309; Southwest School Dist. v. Williams, 48 Conn. 504; Lawrence v. Tennant, 64 N. H. 532, 15 Atl. 543; McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206; Borough of Birmingham v. Anderson, 40 Pa. St. 507; Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412; Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151. This rule is applied when it is sought to establish a boundary of public interest: Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 152. Thus declarations of persons since deceased are admissible to prove the original location of a highway: Wooster v. Butler, 13 Conn. 309; Lawrence v. Tennant, 64 N. H. 532, 15 Atl. 543. Declarations on the question of the boundary of an estate or a highway, of a person since deceased, who was in a situation to be acquainted with the matter, and who was at the time free from any interest therein, are admissible against third persons, whether the boundary is one of general and public interest, or is between the estates of private proprietors. Their admissibility is not affected by the fact that they were reduced to writing and made under oath in another judicial proceeding, nor is their admissibility affected by the fact that they were not part of the original res gestae: Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 275; Cornwall v. Culver, 16 Cal. 424; People v. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457; Adams v. Stanyan, 24 N. H. 405; Stroud v. Springfield, 28 Tex. 649. In such cases the declarant must be shown to have had a knowledge of the matter. Thus, where the boundary line of a county can be proved by reputation, the proof must be confined to the declarations of persons having knowledge of the matter and who are since deceased: Lay v. Neville, 25 Cal. 546; McKinnon v. Bliss, 21 N. Y. 207. It is

only of comparatively late years that the declarations of a person since deceased have been admitted to prove matters of private interest or boundaries, as the earlier cases show no relaxation of the rule that such declarations were not admissible as to matters of mere private interest respecting which it was said no trustworthy reputation was likely to arise: Chapman v. Twitchell, 37 Me. 59, 58 Am. Dee. 773; Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412.

IV. Declarations as to Private Boundaries.

a. Generally.-As a general rule, the declarations of a third person, since deceased, on a question of boundary between the estates of private proprietors, is admissible in a controversy between them, provided the declarant was at the time in a situation to be acquainted with the matter and was free from any interest therein. Such evidence is admissible as hearsay from the necessity of the case. In other words, the declarations of deceased persons as to private boundaries, though not made upon the land, are admissible on an issue between parties not privy in estate to them, if the declarants had means of knowledge as to such boundaries and no apparent interest to misrepresent: Morton v. Folger, 15 Cal. 275; Whalen v. Nisbet, 95 Ky. 464, 26 S. W. 188; Lawrence v. Tennant, 64 N. H. 532, 15 Atl. 543; Hartzog v. Hubbard, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & B.) 241; Sasser v. Herring, 3 Dev. 342; Scoggin v. Dalrymple, 7 Jones, 46, 52 N. C. 46; Halstead v. Mullen, 93 N. C. 252; Caufman v. Presbyterian Congregation, 6 Binn. 59; Bender v. Pitzer, 27 Pa. St. 333; Evans v. Hurt, 34 Tex. 111; Smith v. Russell, 37 Tex. 247. On questions of private boundaries, declarations of persons since deceased "who were in a position to possess information on the subject and who were not interested, are admissible in evidence, even when the declarations were not part of the original res gestae. At common law such evidence was only admissible in cases involving questions of general or public interest, but was not allowed for the purpose of establishing the boundaries of private estates. The tendency of American decisions has been to disregard this distinction, and to admit such evidence on questions of private as well as public boundaries. This tendency is the result of the necessity of resorting to this character of evidence occasioned by the constant destruction of landmarks in this country, in consequence of the perishable nature of their materials and of the settlement and improvement of the lands, by reason of which it is indispensible in many cases that hearsay or reputation should be received to establish old boundaries': Stroud v. Springfield, 28 Tex. 650. The declarations of a person since deceased is admissible to establish a corner tree, which was not in view at the time of the declaration, but the position of which was so described by the declarant as to enable the witness, to whom he made the declaration, to find it: Scoggin v. Dalrymple, 7 Jones, 46. And it is competent

to prove the statements of persons since deceased as to where corner or line trees, which are gone, originally stood: Whalen v. Nisbet, 95 Ky. 464, 26 S. W. 188. The declarations of a person, since deceased, touching the locality of a boundary line between adjoining owners are admissible when such declarant was an adjoining owner, who pointed out the line at the time: Bender v. Pitzer, 27 Pa. St. 333. An exception to the above rule exists in some jurisdictions, and these maintain the doctrine that in order to make declarations of a person since deceased, evidence as to private boundaries between third persons, the declarant must at the time of making the declaration have been the owner or in possession of the land. Hence, these cases assert that in questions of private boundary, the declaration of a person since deceased of particular facts, as distinguished from reputation, is not admissible against third persons, unless it is shown that the declarant had knowledge of that whereof he spoke, and was then on the land as owner, or in possession of it, and was pointing out and marking the boundary or discharging some duty in relation thereto: Chapman v. Twitchell, 37 Me. 59, 58 Am. Dec. 773; Bartlett v. Emerson, 7 Gray, 174; Long v. Colton, 116 Mass. 414; Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 408; Connecticut v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333. In Whitney v. Bacon, 9 Gray, 206, 69 Am. Dec. 281, it was held evidence of declarations as to boundaries is inadmissible unless made by a person when in possession and claiming as owner, and unless the boundary line was pointed out at the time the declarations were made. Where made by one since deceased, who had previously occupied, but never owned the land, and who had ceased to occupy it at the time of the declarations, they are inadmissible against a subsequent owner. And in Curtis v. Aaronson, 49 N. J. L. 68, 60 Am. Rep. 584, 7 Atl. 886, it was also held that declarations as to boundaries by a person since deceased, who was never the owner of the premises, and not made in the performance of any act in respect to such boundaries, are inadmissible in evidence: See the note to this case collecting the cases and containing a discussion of the subject; Curtis v. Aaronson, 60 Am. Rep. 589-591.

b. Prerequisites to Admission.- Declarations of persons since deceased, who had actual knowledge as to the location of an ancient boundary between individual proprietors, or who had peculiar means of knowledge, so that it may fairly be inferred that they had actual knowledge, made at a time when they had no interest to misrepresent, and made when upon or in the immediate vicinity of the line, and when pointing it out, may be received as to the location of such line, when from lapse of time there can be no reasonable probability that evidence can be obtained from those who had actual knowledge on the subject: Barrett v. Kelly, 131 Ala. 378, 30 South. 824; Wood v. Willard, 37 Vt. 377, 86 Am. Dec. 716. To render admissible the declarations of persons as evidence, other than the owner who was

in possession at the time of making the declaration, for the purpose of showing ancient boundary lines between third persons, it must be shown that the declarant is dead and that he had an opportunity to know and prima facie had the knowledge whereof he speaks and had been on the land at the time of making the declarations, or was in possession of it when he made them: Barrett v. Kelly, 131 Ala. 878, 30 South. 824. In order to lay the foundation for the introduction of the declaration of a person since deceased, as to a boundary in an action between third persons, it must be shown that the declarant is dead, and that he had actual knowledge of the fact de clared, or that he had means from which such knowledge could be inferred: Miller v. Wood, 44 Vt. 378.

c. Declarations Must be Made Before Suit Brought.-In order that declarations made by a person since deceased concerning a private boundary, may be admissible between third persons, such deelarations must have been made ante litem motam, and by a person who has since died: Barrett v. Kelly, 131 Ala. 378, 30 South. 824; Choate v. Spear, 3 McCord (S. C.), 227, 15 Am. Dec. 627; Daney v. Sugg, 2 Dev. & B. 515; Bethea v. Byrd, 95 N. C. 309, 59 Am. Rep. 240; Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 364. But the declarations of a disinterested person since deceased, made before a controversy has arisen in reference to private boundaries, are admissible in evidence against third parties: Whitehurst v. Pettipher, 87 N. C. 179, 42 Am. Rep. 520; Moul v. Hartman, 104 Pa. St. 43. Evidence of declarations made ante litem motam to show private boundaries, proceeding from aged and disinterested persons, since dead, are admissible: Smith v. Headrick, 93 N. C. 210. In an action of ejectment the declarations of deceased persons, as to the location of a corner, or boundary of land, made previous to the commencement of the litigation, is competent evidence, when pertinent to the issue between third persons: McCloud v. Mynatt, 2 Cold. 163. Evidence of declarations of an old inhabitant since deceased in respect to the location of boundary lines made ante litem motam, cannot be impugned by evidence of later inconsistent declarations made by him after the controversy between the parties to the suit had arisen, although before any suit was brought, and without knowledge of any dispute regarding such boundary line: Hamilton v. Smith, 74 Conn. 374, 50 Atl. 884.

d. Knowledge and Want of Interest Prerequisites.—One of the conditions upon which the declarations of deceased persons in relation to the location of boundary lines and monuments are received in evidence, is, that it shall be shown that they had knowledge of such lines and monuments at the time of making the declarations to be proved. Such knowledge cannot be shown by what they said, it must be proved by other means: Hadley v. Howe, 46 Vt. 142. But in Smith v. Headrick, 93 N. C. 210, it was held that it is not necessary to show the knowledge or means of information of such deceased