101 The outer meander line on this map represents the one marked on the official plat as shown by the field-notes of the surveyor, and the inner meander line represents the lake as it actually exists, and did exist when the field-notes were made and filed. The land involved in these actions lies between those lines, and is and has been since 1892 in the possession and actual occupancy of the defendants, who have made permanent and valuable improvements thereon, and claim that it is subject to homestead entry.

Between December, 1879, and March, 1887, all of the lots here in question were patented and conveyed by the United States, pursuant to the laws relating to the disposal of public lands, and by patents containing the usual clause, "according to the official plat of the survey of the said lands returned to the general land office by the surveyor general." By divers mesne conveyances from the patentees, the title to lots 3, 5, 6, and 7, containing, according to the plat and to the patents therefor, the following quantities of land, respectively: Lot 3, fifty and thirty-seven hundredths acres; lot 5, thirty-four and seventy-five hundredths acres; lot 6, thirty and five-tenths acres; and lot 7, twenty-five and twenty-five hundredths acres-became vested in

the plaintiff in the year 1891, and prior to the commencement of these actions; and the plaintiff is still the owner thereof, and, as such owner, has within the boundaries of the lots as shown upon the plat, and within the meander line of the lake described in the field-notes, the full quantity of land above described as contained therein. The title to the government lots 1 and 8 (which are the only lots in the east half of section 4 apparently bounded by the lake) was conveyed by government to certain patentees, and the patent title thereafter became vested in Simon J. Murphy and others, by whom a quitclaim deed was executed and delivered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of these actions, purporting to grant and quitclaim to the plaintiff that part of the southeast quarter of section 4 lying southerly and westerly of a line drawn from the center of the section to the southeast corner thereof, and also all the interest of the grantors in the west balf of the section. At the same time, the plaintiff executed and delivered to Mr. Murphy and others a quitclaim deed purporting to convey to them that part of the east half of section 4 lying northerly and easterly of a 102 line drawn from the center of the section to the southeast corner thereof.

The trial court found, as a conclusion of law, that the plaintiff is the owner of government lots 3, 5, 6, and 7 in section 4 of township 57 north, of range 17 west, in St. Louis county, Minnesota; and that the pretended meander line of the lake, as the same is described in the purported field-notes of the surveyor, and as delineated upon the plat, is the boundary line of the land owned by plaintiff in such lots. And, further, the defendants are not, nor is either of them, in possession of any part of the land in section 4 belonging to the plaintiff; nor do the defendants, or either of them, withhold from the plaintiff any land of which it is the owner, or to the possession of which it is entitled.

Do the facts found by the court sustain this conclusion? The claim of the plaintiff is that all patentees of lots which by the government plat were shown to abut upon the lake took their respective titles by reference to the plat, and thereby acquired, not only each as against the government, but each as against the other, the right to a frontage upon the lake; that in the direction of the lake each of these lots has only cne boundary, the lake itself, and that the meander line is not a boundary line for any purpose. In support of this claim, counsel invokes the well-settled general rule that a meander line

is not a boundary line, but that the water whose body is meandered is the true boundary, whether or not the meander line in fact coincides with the shore line, for the latter, being a natural monument, must control courses and distances.

The first and leading case in this court upon this question is that of Schurmeier v. St. Paul etc. Ry. Co., 10 Minn. 59 (82), 83 Am. Dec. 59, which involved simply a question of riparian rights. In that case the meander line was actually run along the Mississippi river, and was substantially the same as the shore line thereof. The land in dispute was a sand-bar island lying in the river, and the controversy was whether a fractional government lot, confessedly bounded by the river, stopped at the water's edge, or extended to the navigable waters of the stream, so as to include the island. The fact that plaintiff was a riparian owner was conceded, and only 103 the extent of his riparian privileges and estate was in controversy. The contention was made that the meander posts on the bank marked the boundary of the land owner, but the court held that the river, and not the meander line, was the boundary line of the lot, and that the patentee thereof took title to the land be tween the meander line and low-water mark in the river, which included the island in question. The case was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States: Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, 7 Wall. 272.

In Everson v. City of Waseca, 44 Minn. 247, 46 N. W. 405, the meander line and the actual shore line of Loon lake in Waseca were not at all points coincident. Fractional government lot 2 was delineated as lying on the south side of, and as bounded by, the lake, but the meander line at this point was in fact run some distance from the shore of the lake, leaving a tract or point of several acres of dry land between it and the shore. It was held, following the Schurmeier case, that the patentee of lot 2 took title to such point. The case of Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 53 N. W. 1139, was one involving a question of riparian rights only for the meander line, and the actual shore lines of the lake meandered were substantially the same at the time the survey was made The lake in question was a shallow and non-navigable one, comprising about three hundred acres, and after the survey, and before the litigation arose, the waters of the lake gradually receded, and the lake had practically ceased to exist. Thereupon the land department of the United States caused a survey to be made of the former bed of the lake, and issued patents

therefor. The plaintiffs claimed title thereto by virtue of their ownership of the land abutting on the lake when the original survey was made. The defendants claimed that the patent, according to the original survey through which plaintiffs claimed title to the former bed of the lake, only conveyed the land to the margin of the lake as it existed when the survey was made. Hence there was no question in that case as to any discrepancy between the meandered line and the actual shore line of the lake, but, as said by the court, the question was: What rights in or to the soil under water does the patentee of land bounded by a meandered inland lake acquire by his patent? The court held that such patentee took title to the 104 center of the lake, and, therefore, the subsequent patent was void.

In Olson v. Thorndike, 76 Minn. 399, 79 S. W. 399, the meander line purported to coincide with the bank of the Minnesota river, but in fact it did not do so, and a point of land fifty-one rods long by twenty-six rods wide at one end, running to a point at the other end, lay between the meander line and the river. This court held, following the Schurmeier case, that the point of land lying outside of the meander line was a part of the fractional lot which abutted on the river according to the official plat. The court, however, in its opinion, said: "There may be cases in which the error in the government survey is so gross that the purchaser of the fractional or supposed fractional subdivision of government land will not take to the shore of the stream or lake, although the plat of the subdivision calls for such shore as one of the boundaries. It was held that Whitney v. Detroit, 78 Wis. 240, 47 N. W. 425, presented such a case. That case is cited in Lamprey v. Mead, 54 Minn. 290, 40 Am. St. Rep. 328, 55 N. W. 1132. But there is nothing in the record from which it can be held that this is such a case.'

In the cases of Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838, and Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, 840, the general rule announced in the Schurmeier case was followed. But in those cases, as well as in the cases in this court to which we have referred, there was in fact a stream or lake to be meandered, and the shore line of the body of water and the meander line substantially coincided except where tongues or points of land extended out into the body of water beyond the meander line, or the waters

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 94-44

had receded; and the question was one of riparian rights strictly.

No such questions are involved in this case, for the question here is as to the boundaries of the fractional lots owned by the plaintiffs. If in this case there was in fact, or ever had been, a lake upon which any part of the several fractional lots abutted, the general rule would apply, and their boundary would be the lake. But such is not this case, for there was in fact no lake at or within any reasonable distance of the meandered line or any part thereof, and never had been, to which the meander line might be found referable. It also appears from the court's findings of 105 fact and Exhibit “B” that the side lines of some of the lots would have to be extended from one-half to one mile to reach the lake; that, as to others, if their side lines were extended at right angles they would miss the lake entirely; and that, if the side lines of all of the fractional lots were so extended, they would overlap each other in inextricable confusion. And further, that if the socalled meander line be accepted as a boundary line, it will give to the patentees or their grantees the full quantity of land bought and paid for by them, but if they are permitted to extend their lot lines through the adjacent forest to the lake, they will obtain more than three times as much land as they purchased and paid for. In short, this is not a case where the surveyor, in running a meander line, has made a fair and honest attempt to follow the sinuosities of the shore line of an actual body of water, and by exclusion or inclusions of irregularities of contour has produced an average and approximately correct result, but one where the existence, at any time, of a lake upon which any part of the fractional lots in question could abut, is a pure fiction. Such being the case, it is not within the general rule as to meander lines; for the far-away lake is an impossible boundary for all of the lots in question, and could never have been intended by the government and the patentees as the boundary of the lots. official plat was only intended to be a picture of the actual conditions on the ground; but the fraudulent mistake in the plat in this case was so gross that no man actually viewing the premises could possibly be misled, or believe that the shore line of the lake was intended as the boundary line of the lots. He would understand at once that the meander line as traced on the plat was the actual boundary line of the lots.

The