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This case, then, is one where the call for the natural monument, the lake, must be disregarded; for the admitted facts show that it is an impossible call, and that, if it is rejected, the courses and distances and the meander line will exactly close, and give to the plaintiff the precise quantity of land bought from the government and paid for. It falls within the rule that a meander line is not, as a general proposition, a boundary line; yet the boundaries of fractional lots will not be indefinitely extended where they appear 108 by the govern ment plat to abut on a body of water which in fact has never existed at substantially the place indicated on the plat. In such exceptional cases, the supposed meander line will, if consistent with the other calls and distances indicated on the plat, mark the limits of the survey, and be held to be the boundary line of the land it delimits: Horne v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 988; Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U. S. 300, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124; Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 52 Am. St. Rep. 380, 44 N. E. 286; Whitney v. Detroit, 78 Wis. 240, 47 N. W. 425; Grant v. Hemphill, 92 Iowa, 218, 59 N. W. 263, 60 N. W. 618; French etc. Co. v. Springer, 35 Or. 312, 58 Pac. 102.

The last case cited was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States, and its decision in that case seems conclusively to establish the rule we have stated. In that case the government plat showed that the fractional lots in question were bounded on the north by the meander line of Malheur lake. The land in controversy lay outside the meander line, but adjoined the lots. The plaintiff claimed that the lake, at the time of the survey and for some years thereafter, was a continuous body of water up to the meander line, but that from year to year, for some time, its waters receded, leaving the disputed land bare. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that there never was a lake in front of the lots; that Malheur lake was a well-defined body of water lying northeasterly from the lots; that if the lines of the lots were extended north indefinitely, they would never intersect the lake; that the lake never extended to the supposed meander line; and that there had never been any recession of the waters, so as to constitute the land in controversy reliction in front of the lots. The questions of fact so presented were tried and found in favor of the defendant, and, upon plaintiff's appeal, the supreme court of Oregon, in affirming the decision of the trial court, said: "The real question of carainai

and pivotal concern arises upon the urgent and strong contention and argument of counsel for plaintiff that the official survey of the lake, the approval thereof, and the official plats and maps made thereunder, showing the lake and the meander line thereof, conclusively establish the fact and location of the lake so far as the rights of riparian grantees are concerned, and the government and its grantees are estopped to 107 deny the supposed fact as represented to the purchasers of abutting land.

If there never was a lake in front of plaintiff's lots, or if one did exist there at the time of the survey, then there was no natural object or monument marking the north boundary of said lots; hence resort must be had to the secondary evidence, viz., the courses and distances which are ascertainable from the plats and surveys, and they must prevail. The result is natural, and the land conveyed would be just what a mathematical calculation would produce from the field-notes of the survey of the fractional sections and the supposed meander line."

The cause was brought into the supreme court of the United States by writ of error sued out by the plaintiff, and he there cited, in his brief, Murphy v. Kirwan, 103 Fed. 104, and urged, among others, this point: "The patents in this instance, on their face and when read in connection with the plats, conveyed all public land up to the line of Lake Malheur. If, by reason of any error or fraud, the survey improperly included or omitted any public land, then the obviously proper mode of correction was a bill in equity putting directly in issue the supposed error or fraud. To allow the apparent purpose and legal effect of the patents to be defeated upon proof of error in the plats does not differ, in principle or practical result, from canceling the patents in a suit at law." The court, however, affirmed the decision of the state court, and in doing so said: "If, indeed, there had been a lake in front of these lots at the time of the survey, which lake had subsequently receded from the platted meander line, the claim of the owner of the lots to the increment thus occasioned might be conceded to be good if such were the law of the state in which the lands were situated. But if there never was such a lake-no water forming an actual and visible boundary-on the north end of the lots, it would seem unreasonable either to prolong the side lines of the survey indefinitely until a lake should be found, or to change the situs of the lots laterally in order to adapt it to a neighboring lake. The jury having found that

the facts under this issue were as claimed by the defendant in error, the conclusion must be that the rights of the plaintiff in error must be regarded as existing within the 108 actual lines and distances laid down in the survey and to the extent of the acreage called for in the patents, and that the meander line was intended to be the boundary line of the fractional section": French-Glenn Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563.

Our conclusion is that the trial court in this case was correct in holding that the boundary line of the plaintiff's lots was the line appearing on the government plat as a meander line.

Judgment affirmed.

A Meander Line is not ordinarily regarded as a boundary: Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 53 N. W. 1139; monographic note to Allen v. Weber, 27 Am. St. Rep. 59. But if the land outside of the meander line is so grossly in excess of that sold that it is apparent that there is fraud or mistake in the survey, such excess is not included in the grant, and the meander line is the boundary: Fuller v. Shedd, 161 Ill. 462, 52 Am. St. Rep. 380, 4 N. E. 286.

ST. PAUL, MINNEAPOLIS AND MANITOBA RAILWAY COMPANY v. OLSON.

[87 Minn. 117, 91 N. W. 294.]

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Prevention of Suit by Paramount Authority. If a person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by some paramount authority, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred his right. (p. 696.)

PUBLIC LANDS-Jurisdiction.-In the absence of some specific provision of law to the contrary, all matters affecting the disposition of government public lands, the adjusting of all private claims thereto, and grants therefor under congressional legislation, are committed to the general land office, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, and while such matters are pending in such department, the courts have no jurisdiction thereof. (pp. 696, 697.)

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Public Lands-Adverse Possession.—If while one person claims public land under a grant, another goes into possession thereof, and after denial of his application to enter it as a homestead keeps the matter in litigation by successive appeals in the land department of the United States for a long period

and until it is decided against him, such time is not to be counted against the grantor in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred his right to the land, and whether his adversary has established title thereto by adverse possession. (p. 698.)

J. Lind and A. Ueland, for the appellant.

T. R. Benton, for the respondent.

118 START, C. J. The plaintiff, on May 16, 1901, brought this action in the district court of the county of Otter Tail to recover from the defendant the possession of the east half of the northeast quarter of section 17, township 131 north, range 43 west. The answer put in issue the plaintiff's alleged title, and set up title in the defendant by adverse possession. On the trial in the district court at the close of the evidence. both parties asked for a directed verdict, and the court directed a verdict for the defendant. On the motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, the court made its order granting a new trial, from which the defendant appealed.

The evidence and admissions given and made on the trial established these facts: The land here in question was embraced in the patent issued to the state of Minnesota by the United States on February 19, 1901, under the acts of Congress granting land to the state to aid in the construction of the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Paul and Pacific Railway Company, and was embraced in the deed issued to the plaintiff by the governor of the state on behalf of the state on April 8, 1901. A map in due and proper form, and duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior, fixing the definite and permanent location of the railroad from East St. Cloud to St. Vincent, known as the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, was filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office at Washington, on December 19, 1871, by the governor of the state of Minnesota. The land is within the primary or ten-mile limit of the grant made by the Congress of the United States in aid of the construction of the railroad, as shown by the map fixing the definite location of the route of the railway. The entire extension was completed and equipped prior to January 1, 1880, and on January 9, 1880, the gov ernor of the state of Minnesota 119 certified to the Secretary of the Interior that the whole of the extension was completed and equipped as required by the several acts of Congress and of the legislature of the state relating thereto, which certifica

tion the Secretary of the Interior accepted as satisfactory evidence of the construction and completion of the line of railway in accordance with the terms and requirements of the several acts of Congress and of the legislature of the state. The defendant took actual possession of the land in 1880, and has ever since been in the open, exclusive, and continuous possession thereof. He took and held such possession believing and claiming that it was public land, subject to entry under the land laws, and that he had the right to be in possession, and had the right to acquire title from the United States, He was assessed and paid taxes on the improvements as "improvements on United States lands" every year after 1881. In September, 1887, he applied to the local United States land office to enter the land under the homestead act, but the application was rejected, and from this decision he appealed to the commissioner of the general land office. From the commissioner's decision, dated March 6, 1889, affirming the decision of the local land office, he appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, who affirmed the commissioner's decision on May 10, 1898. The cost of surveying the lands so granted to the plaintiff was not paid by it until December 26, 1900, and the cost of conveying them was not paid until February 15, 1901. The defendant here claims that, although the patent for the land was not issued until February 19, 1901, yet the plaintiff became the owner in fee thereof with the right of possession, so that it could have maintained ejectment therefor, when the map fixing the definite location of the railway was filed December 19, 1871, or, at all events, when the certificate of the completion thereof was filed, January 9, 1880, hence he now has title by adverse possession. On the other hand, the plaintiff's contention is to the effect that the defendant's possession of the land was not adverse, and the statute has not run, because: 1. The legal title remained in the United States until the patent was issued to the state, and, further, if this be not so, the legal title was in the state until April 8, 1901, when it executed a deed of the 120 land to the plaintiff; 2. The United States retained the legal title to secure the cost of surveying and conveying the lands; 3. The defendant took possession of the land in subordination to the admitted title of the United States, which he sought to obtain; 4. The running of the statute was suspended from 1887 until 1898, while the title to the land was in litigation before the land department of the United States, and the courts had no jurisdiction of

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