druidical priesthood, and such energy to the mandates of the Papal see. It would be an extensive application of a measure sometimes resorted to with great effect by a single state.

It is now a common practice for a government that feels itself aggrieved and insulted, to cut off at once all intercourse with the offending state; to renounce all alliance, call home her ministers, close up her ports, and treat the offender as though she had no existence. Such a measure, in consequence of that necessity to which we have before alluded, and shall soon more particularly notice, is sometimes sufficient to prevent recourse to the severer redress of open hostility.

Now let the nations represented in the proposed Congress unite in the determination of pursuing this system of non-intercourse in relation to every state which, after having submitted its controversy to the action of the Congress, shall disobey its decree; or which, contrary to its own express undertaking, shall declare war with any nation represented in the Congress, without first submitting to its decision the question in debate. Can any person devise a more powerful or certain method of compelling, without resort to arms, the submission of the refractory, of preserving unbroken peace? It is true that such a Congress as we propose could merely recommend and not enforce this penal measure. But as the recommendation would be made to the several sovereignties represented in the Congress not parties to the offence, and as these powers would perceive that they must either act in accordance with the

recommendation, or lose all the benefits of the association, there would be little doubt as to their

course.

Cut off from the society of nations, utterly denied every form of international intercourse,-branded, as it were, and avoided as an outcast,—no state under heaven could long remain refractory. The extensive commercial relations of modern times, of which we have already spoken,* and which are numerous beyond the conception of a partial observer, have made a free and intimate intercourse with sister states essential to the prosperity and even existence of all civilized nations. Any measure by which this intercourse should be destroyed, would be a deathblow to the public comfort and prosperity of the proscribed state; and consequently not even the terrors of that Papal bull of interdict and excommunication, which once carried trembling to the hearts of kings, nor of that druidical "ban of food and fire," which drove its victim from all human aid and sympathy, could so effectually crush the spirit of obstinacy, as a measure like this.

The wants of a people, suffering under such an interdict, would imperatively demand of their government such concessions to the authority of the Congress, or rather such a regard for their own good faith, as would be needful to restore commerce, revive business and resuscitate their national vitality. Until the government should comply with those

* Ante, ch. i.

popular demands, their ships must rot in idleness, their storehouses remain closed, their markets empty, and all trades and employments inactive. Thus would the ordinary fountains of revenue be dried up, and consequently an enormous amount of direct taxation be added to those other causes of general discontent and distress. The whole land would lie like a besieged and blockaded city, and a universal paralysis would pervade both people and ' government, so that neither war could be sustained nor peace endured.

An instrument of authority like this would give to the recommendations of such a Congress an efficacy far greater than would be derived from the right of armed interference,-far greater than now belongs to any species of law, whether municipal or national, and far more cogent than has been possessed by any treaty or compact whatsoever.

But tremendous as such power might become in its plenary exercise, we need not fear thus to entrust it with such a tribunal. There would be small danger of its perversion or abuse. The more reasonable apprehension would be, that the associated states would shrink from enforcing it. Their reluctance to do this would arise partly from the fact, that they must each, in a certain degree, sympathize and suffer with the offender, in the loss of markets, and of marketable articles ordinarily received from the delinquent. They would be slow, also, to establish, without adequate cause, a precedent that might one day be used against themselves, though each should feel certain

of the poor favor conferred by the Cyclops on Ulysses to be the last devoured.

None but questions strictly international would come within the scope of such a tribunal as is contemplated by this Essay; for we wish to be distinctly understood to protest most emphatically against the right of any such Congress, or of any alliance whatever, to intermeddle with the internal and domestic affairs of an independent state. The doctrine of interference we regard with that unmingled abhorrence which forms so conspicuous a tenet in the creed of republicans.

And of this important class of questions, none but such as were prescribed by treaty, would be brought under consideration in a Congress of Nations: so that with all these safeguards and limitations, the compulsory process, above described, would be seldom resorted to, and never in cases of a trifling or improper character.

Other sanctions might, in process of time, be discovered by the light of experience, which, after all, teaches the most valuable lessons to individuals and to states.

To the above project an ingenious adversary might, doubtless, bring forward still further objections. The imagination of a timid politician is like a haunted house, full of idle and unreal terrors. We shall not delay, for the purpose of answering, in this Essay, every conceivable argument, and of removing every fanciful obstacle. Our purpose is not so much to delight the imagination, by ingenious speculations, as

to present a brief outline of our plan for an international tribunal whose design shall be to promote the peace of man, and the harmony of governments.

From a Congress of Nations thus constituted,composed of such materials, established for such benign purposes, possessing the jurisdiction and authority herein described, and exercising its powers in accordance with the wise and benevolent principle of a highly civilized and Christian age,―mankind would certainly have little to fear and every thing to expect, and to its establishment they may well look forward with high hope and ardent desire. Impressed as we are with a deep feeling of the wants of our age, -a strong conviction of the rapid extension of the principles of peace, and a full faith in the fitness of such a Congress to give increased efficiency to those principles, we cannot believe that our favorite scheme is unreasonable, nor that the reflecting friends of their race will long continue to regard that scheme as a hopeless vision of fantastic philanthropy.

It will be seen that our thoughts have dwelt in this chapter, upon a permanent body of delegates, with regular sessions and adjournments, and clothed with a jurisdiction quite broad and general. But this form of the tribunal is by no means an essential part of the pacific scheme. Instead of such an institution, we might suppose a substitute somewhat as follows, namely:

1. A commission, consisting of members appointed by the several and respective sovereignties, which should unite in the plan, for the special purpose of