and the peace of which they have said so much, is that which Tacitus so forcibly described, when he said, "tyrants mistake for peace the stillness of desolation."

From alliances of this kind, whether holy or unholy, we trust that our country will ever recoil. We concur most heartily in the sentiments of Washington, so forcibly expressed in his Farewell Address to the American people: "The great rule of conduct for us," said he, "in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?"

But, it seems to us, that such a tribunal as we have herein described, involves in its formation no principle or practice which the illustrious "father of his country" would condemn. Such a Congress would not entangle us in the toils of foreign ambition, or caprice;-nor interweave our destiny with that of any other state. It would lead to no bloodshed, no waste of treasure, no risk of our national independence. It would create no perilous friendships nor deadly hostilities. It would simply furnish one additional means of preventing the effusion of human blood; one new mode of adjusting national quarrels without recourse to arms; one new agent in the production of general and enduring peace.

With a jurisdiction limited as we have described, and without direct executive power, such a Congress, whether it be a permanent body, or an assembly chosen as the emergences of nations demand, threatens no danger to the institutions or interests of any existing government; presents no probability of becoming "a conspiracy of the governments against the nations." It would leave governments every where as liable to change, or as certain of permanence, as they now are;-thus encouraging neither innovation nor conservatism. The radical reformer and the rigid legitimist" might alike join undisturbed in its deliberations. Nothing would be thereby subjected to a momentary check, or a particle of change, save only the fierce impulse and bloody career of national hostility.

This short historical sketch, if it furnish us with no arguments in defence of our project, is enough to satisfy us, that the experience of the past cannot be brought into the scale of opposition. It is sufficient to vindicate the novelty of the proposed arrangement, and encourage us to rely more confidently on those arguments in favor of such a scheme, which are drawn from general reason and the abstract principles of convenience, justice and humanity.

And now let us, in brief, recapitulate the topics contained in this Essay.

We have, at the outset, endeavored to show the reasonableness of the expectation that wars shall

eventually cease; that their frequency may, at no distant period, be greatly diminished, and that the friends of peace are thus furnished with a broad and solid basis of good sense and sound philosophy, for their philanthropic efforts and expectations. We have devoted considerable space to this preliminary topic, because if our views in regard to it are incorrect, it is but labor lost to reason upon a Congress of states, or any other form of pacific action or organization. We have shown that the imagination of the poet has loved to dwell in the bright visions of a peaceful age; that philosophers have delighted to muse upon the theme of a race living together in harmony; and that the eye of the prophet, penetrating the veil of futurity, has discerned the advent of an era when men shall learn war no more. We have endeavored to prove, by an examination of his higher sentiments and nobler affections, as well as of his understanding, that the very nature of man revolts at the evils of war; that his humanity recoils from the contemplation of its miseries and curses, and that his intellect denounces the scheme of warfare as one of gross prodigality,— -as an absurd mode of procuring security and quiet, and as the most fruitful source of political mischiefs. We have also illustrated this point by arguments drawn from the peculiar condition and circumstances of the present age; such as the elevation of the mass of society, by various means, but particularly by modern inventions and discoveries, at once to increased intelligence, and to new and extraordinary importance in a political view; the vast

extent and strength of commercial ties and relationships, and the increasing dependence of any given state upon all other nations, arising from the increased wants of man and his demands for the productions of every portion of the world; and the active spirit of voluntary combination and associated effort, scientific and benevolent, which has already wrought out such marvellous results.

These arguments might have been extended and increased; and no task could be more delightful, than to set forth the thousand facts and proofs, throngingall around us, which demonstrate the triumphs of the spirit of peace, and the approach of that period when strife and contention shall become strangers to the destiny of nations. But while we deemed it important not to neglect this chapter of our subject, we felt constrained to remember, that it was still only preliminary, and so deny ouselves a too unlimited indulgence.

Proceeding in our task, we have endeavored to exhibit a simple view of the rules of conduct and modes of intercourse by which nations are now directed, in both peace and war;-expecting, by an account of the origin, formation and present imperfect state of international law, to show the necessity of revising and perfecting that code, and the probability that this desirable result might be accomplished by the plan proposed; and hoping, by a glance at the existing modes of diplomatic intercourse, to make manifest the superior advantages of our plan for adjusting nice and delicate points in national relations.

We have then considered in what manner the projected tribunal could be called into being; whether in the ordinary course of establishing treaties, or by a special exertion: how it should be composed;—whether of members chosen for that general purpose and forming a permanent body, with regular sessions and adjournments, or of special commissioners elected for special emergences:- what subjects shall come within its cognizance;-whether the formation of a perfect code of international law, or the decision of particular points of dispute and questions of perplexity, as the same actually arise to embarrass the conduct of governments, or both these classes of subjects:and, finally, what shall be the nature and extent of its powers, and the sanctions attached to its decisions; -whether it shall have executive authority, or the mere advisory power; whether its decisions shall merely be binding in good faith, and in this respect stand on the same footing with treaties, or shall be enforced by the peaceable methods herein suggested. These various divisions of our subject presented, as we advanced, a variety of incidental, yet not unimportant, topics, that need not now be mentioned, the result of the whole examination being a full conviction of the practicability and safety of a project similar to that considered in the Essay.

And, finally, we have endeavored, by reference to history, to show that the proposed international tribunal bears no resemblance, in constitution, powers or purposes, to any of the Councils, Leagues, Unions, Alliances or Congresses of ancient or modern times,