That is, they suppose, if sinners will seek and pray, use the means of grace, and do the best that person's under their circumstances, and having such hearts as they have, may do; God will not be wanting on his part, or leave them to perish: That if they exert all the strength, and make a good improvement of all the assistance they have, they shall have more and more given them; till in the end they are enabled to obtain mercy, and to lay hold on eternal life. That although there are no absolute promises to such earnest and sincere, though feeble efforts of the unregenerate, yet certainly there are many very precious encouragements; which may indeed, securely enough be relied on. So that, on the whole no sinner is under any real impossibility, of any kind, of obtaining salvation. For every one, let his impotence be as great as it may, can certainly do what he can. And if upon his doing this, God will not fail to help, as to what he cannot do; then every one may be saved, whatever sin and weakness, or depravity he labours under, notwithstanding. Nor do they see how we can vindicate the divine justice, or fairly cast the blame of the sinner's perdition on himself, without supposing such a universal sufficiency of grace as this.

Now, if this can be made out to be really the case, that all are actually, and in every view, enabled to do those things which are certainly connected with eternal life, there will be no difficulty, perhaps with any cne, to see that the ways of the Lord are equal. For according to this there seems to be no respect of persons with God, even in the distribution of his freest favours, any more than in his judicial proceedings. The difference between him that is saved, and him that perisheth, not originating from any inequality in the bestowment of divine grace; but solely from the better

improvement one sinner makes of the same grace, than another does.

But, I am afraid, it will be as hard to reconcile this way of solving matters with the scriptures, and with the truth of fact, as it is the former, with reason. Certainly the scriptures seem to speak a language quite different from this. In them we are taught, "That it is God that maketh one man to differ from another, for the better, and not he himself. That it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy," and "that he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy; and whom he will he hardeneth." And in our text, our Saviour accounts for the murmuring and opposition of the unbelieving Jews, by making this observation to his disciples upon it; "no man can come unto me, except the Father who hath sent me, draw him." By which he evidently meant to intimate, that the conduct of his opposers, considering what human nature was, was not to be wondered at.

That they acted no otherwise than all other men would, if left to themselves as they were. That those who now followed and obeyed him, would never have come to him, or become his disciples, had it not been for a gracious divine influence upon their minds, which was not granted to those murmurers and opposers; had they not been effectually drawn by him in whose hand are the hearts of men, and who turneth them as rivers of water are turned. We are plainly taught in this text, taken in the connection in which it stands, as we are also in a multitude of other places, that men do not first distinguish themselves, by hearkening to the calls of the gospel; but it is God that makes one to differ from another, in this respect, by his sovereign and distinguishing grace. The point of

doctrine, therefore, that I shall insist upon from the words is this:

That none are able to comply with the gospel, but those who are the subjects of the special and effectual grace of God; or those who are made willing, and actually do comply with it.

What I have in view, in the following discourse, is not only to confirm this doctrine, but to endeavour to set it in such a light as to obviate the forementioned difficulty, of salvation's being offered on impossible conditions, and men's being condemned for not doing that which they are incapable of. And, after what has been said, I think there is no way of attempting to clear up this mystery left, but by showing that there are two essentially different senses, in which men are said to be incapable of doing things: or, by having recourse to the distinction of natural and moral inability. Accord ingly, the method I propose, is,

1. As clearly as I can, to state and illustrate this distinction.

2. To show, that men certainly labour under one, or the other, of these kinds of inability to comply with the gospel, until they are made the subjects of effectual divine grace.

3. More particularly to consider and evince the moral impotence of sinners. And,

4. Endeavour to make it appear, that there is ordinarily no other incapacity in sinners, to comply with the gospel, but that which is of the moral kind.

1. Then, It is to be observed, for the clearing up this subject, that there are two very different kinds of inability; so different, that the one, however great, does not lessen moral obligation in the least; whereas the other, so far as it obtains, destroys obligation, and takes away all desert of blame and punishment entirely.

These two kinds of inability, as I hinted, have commonly been distinguished, by calling one a natural, the other a moral inability. Which distinction may be briefly stated thus. Moral inability consists only in the want of a heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing. Natural inability, on the other hand, consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or whatever may prevent, our doing a thing, when we are willing, and strongly enough disposed and inclined to do it. Or, in fewer words, thus: Whatever a man could not do, if he would, in this, he is under a natural inability; but when all the reason why one cannot do a thing, is because he does not choose to do it, the inability is only of a moral nature. This distinction takes place equally with regard to both evil and good actions. Thus, for instance, the divine Being cannot do evil; not because he wants opportunity, or understanding, or strength, to do, with infinite ease, whatever he pleases; but only because he is not, and it is impossible he ever should be, inclined to do iniquity. He is so infinitely and immutably holy, wise, just, and good, that it is impossible he should ever please to act otherwise, than in the most holy, righteous, and best manner. Hence though we read that "with God all things are possible," and that he can do every thing; yet elsewhere we are told, "he cannot deny himself;" and that it is impossible, "for God to lie."

On the other hand, satan is incapable of doing right, or of behaving virtuously, in any one instance, or in the least possible degree. But this is not because he wants natural abilities; for undoubtedly in that respect, he is far superior to many that are truly virtuous. His being incapable of any thing but infernal wickedness,

is altogether owing to his being of such an infernal disposition.

And it is not uncommon to speak of incapacity in mankind, both as to doing good and doing evil, in this two-fold signification. Some persons we say are incapable of doing a mean thing. Not that we think it is above their natural capacity; but it is beneath them; they abhor, or they would scorn to do it. Others are incapable of several sorts of villainy, not through any want of good will to do it: they only want a convenient opportunity, or sufficient ingenuity.—And just so it is in regard to doing good. Some have it not in the power of their hands; others have no heart to do it. One is of a truly generous spirit, and nothing but his own poverty keeps him from being what Job was, a father to the poor, the fatherless, and him that has none to help him. Another is rich, and might be a great benefactor and blessing to all around him; but he has no heart to devise liberal things. He is deaf to the cries of the poor, blind to their wants, and dead to all the generous feelings of humanity and compassion.

Some are so feeble and infirm that they can do scarce any bodily labour; though they are extremely free and willing to lay themselves out to the utmost that their strength will bear, and often go beyond it. Others are strong and healthy enough, and might get a good living, and be useful members of society; but such is their invincible laziness, that their hands refuse to labour, and they can hardly get them out of their bosoms.Some are effectually kept from shining, or being very useful, in any public sphere in church or state, through the weakness of their heads: Others, as effectually, by the badness of their hearts. Some are incapable of being taught, by reason of natural dulness: others only because they are of an unteachable spirit, and full of