Furthermore, there has developed almost everywhere throughout Europe, apart from Germany, and we may add apart also from Japan, the idea of the collective political responsibility to Parliament of the ministers of the Crown. The cabinet system of government, which has grown up as a result of its application, originated, as is well known, in Great Britain. The history of its development in that country will be taken up when we come to consider the organization of the legislature. All that is necessary to say here with regard to it is that it would appear to be a somewhat spontaneous, extraconstitutional evolution. Cabinet government would appear to have been resorted to as a means of preventing conflict between a Crown, which is still theoretically sovereign, and a Parliament without whose concurrent action the Crown cannot actually govern.

Apart from France, European written constitutions do not expressly provide for such a system. It has, however, been evolved from the personal responsibility which some minister must, through his countersignature, assume for every act of the Crown, and from the power which almost every Parliament has to refuse its consent to the expenditure of money by the Crown. Where ministers have lost the confidence of Parliament the Crown has in most instances, outside of Germany and Japan, found it advantageous to dismiss them and appoint those who may be expected to secure that confidence.

In Great Britain, where this method of securing harmony between the Crown (the executive) and Parliament (the legislature) finds its origin, and where it has received its highest development, the loss of confidence by Parliament is expressed in a somewhat formal way by the refusal to pass a measure which the government

considers to be important. In such case the Crown may either dissolve the House of Commons, which has now practically all powers in this regard, or may dismiss the ministry. In the former case a new election is held, and if the majority is adverse to the ministry they resign; if it is favorable they continue in office. If the Crown dismisses the ministry he "sends for" the leader of the opposition and requests him to form a govern

ment.

The development of this system of Cabinet government has made it really unnecessary to attempt to fix with precision the content of the executive power, for the reason that its exercise is always subject to the control of the Parliament. The members of the Cabinet, who exercise it in the name of the Crown, are in reality a committee of the Parliament. The successful attempt made by the adoption of Cabinet government to harmonize the Crown and Parliament has really resulted in large measure in the abandonment of the attempt to keep the exercise of the legislative and executive powers in different hands. It is probably for this reason that in some countries in which the Cabinet system has been adopted the Parliament shows no uneasiness when the Crown exercises very wide powers of legislation either based upon the power it has, similar to that of the French President, to watch over the execution of the laws, or upon the delegation of power to it by Parliament of a real power of legislation. This, for example, is the case in Italy.

In the German Empire with its states, in Japan, and in the United States with the states of the American Union, Cabinet government has not, however, developed.

Its failure to develop may not be said to be altogether due to the presence in the constitutions of the states concerned of insurmountable obstacles. It is true that in Germany and Japan the power of the legislature over expenditures is not so clearly expressed nor so great as in most European states. Thus in the German Empire the constitution provides that all income and expenses must be estimated for a year, and set forth in the imperial budget, which before the beginning of the fiscal year is to be regulated by a law; but it subsequently states that expenses, while regularly to be provided for annually, may nevertheless in special cases be voted for a longer period. Somewhat similar provisions are to be found in the Prussian constitution. In Japan a number of provisions in the constitution would seem to evidence the intention to give to the Crown the power to conduct the government without obtaining for the necessary expenditure of money the consent of the legislature. This consent is required only in the case it is desired to extend the sphere of governmental activity. The Japanese constitution thus provides that the expenditure and revenue require the consent of the legislature to be given in an annual budget, and that all expenditure exceeding the appropriations shall require legislative approval, but it also provides that estimates for expenditures necessary to satisfy the legal obligations of the government, and such as may be based on a law, shall not be reduced or rejected by the legislature without the approval of the Emperor, and that when the budget proposed by the government is rejected, the government.shall carry out the budget of the preceding

year.

The United States, on the other hand, specifically

provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury except in consequence of appropriations made by law," but that "no appropriation of money" for the support of the army "shall be for a longer term than two years.' This provision subjects the President to the control of Congress, which may, if it sees fit, make all its appropriations for yearly periods. Congress, however, in practice makes a considerable number of permanent appropriations or appropriations for periods longer than a year. Similar conditions exist in the American states in the matter of appropriations.

In both Germany and Japan provision is, however, made for responsible ministers. The imperial German constitution provides a Chancellor to be appointed by the Emperor, who must countersign all his orders and decrees, and assume responsibility therefor. What is the nature of his responsibility, and how it is to be enforced are not, however, stated. The responsibility of ministers in Japan is just as ill-defined, and the methods of its enforcement just as unclear. It must, however, be said that in case of neither Germany nor Japan is ministerial responsibility more vague or more unenforceable than it is in many European countries where it has been made the basis of the development of Cabinet government. Such, for example, is the case in Italy.

In the United States, as we have seen, there is no provision for ministerial responsibility. There was believed to be no need for it, since the President is not declared to be irresponsible. But the United States Constitution itself expressly provides that the appointment of all important officers, among whom are to be included the members of what has come to be called

the President's Cabinet, must receive the approval of the Senate.1

It may therefore be said that the control possessed by Congress over appropriations, and the power possessed by the Senate over the appointments of the President, could have been made the basis for the development of Cabinet government in the United States national government had that form of government been deemed desirable.

In the United States, however, almost every attempt which has been made to subject the President to the effective control of Congress over what are regarded as his constitutional powers has met with the disapproval of the people.

The Constitution of the United States provided that the President should be elected by what are called presidential electors, who are to be appointed in each state as the legislature of that state provides. The present method of appointment provided by the states is election by popular vote. In the early history of the country the attempt was made to influence the action of the presidential electors by securing in advance of the election the nomination of candidates for the office of President by the members of the various parties in the Congress who met in what came to be called a "Congressional caucus." As the presidential electors were elected on the understanding that they would vote for the candidate of the party by whom they were elected, this method of action gave Congress a large control over presidential elections. This method was

1 In the states of the United States it is to be remarked, however, that commonly the most important state officers are, like the governor, elected by the people.