ing else is.... Cervantes says: "Everyone is the son of his own works." This is more emphatically true of an instrument of government than it can possibly be of a natural person. What it takes to itself, though at first unwarrantable, helps to make it over into a new instrument of government and it represents at last the acts done under it.

In other words, a written constitution is only a proposed plan of government set forth in one document.. It does not necessarily exhibit the actual form of government of the country. It is like the rules of a game. If the game as actually played is not played according to the rules, then the rules as set forth do not give an accurate idea of the game as played. So if those living and acting under a written constitution play the political game according to the rules, and it may perhaps be said they seldom do this for a long time-the written constitution may give a fair idea of the actual governmental system. If, however, they do not thus play the political game, then the student of government must, if he would know the political system, find out how the political game is actually played.

What has been said with regard to the effect of written constitutions has not, however, been said in order to minimize the importance of a written constitution. It has been said rather to emphasize the point that written constitutions are not nearly so rigid and inflexible as some would seem to think that they are. The remark is attributed to a President of the United States, that the United States Constitution is to the country what a coat too small in size is to a man. If he buttons it up in front he splits it ope behind. Such a characterization of the American Constitution is, however, hardly justified by an examination of the constitutional development i the country. For this cannot fail to corroborate

the statement just quoted of Judge Cooley, who had this very development in mind when he made the statement which has been attributed to him.

It is, however, true that it is a mistake to make the process of amending a written constitution too difficult. For conditions in almost every country are continually changing and a constitution must change as conditions change. If provision for a reasonably easy amendment is not made, either the constitution will become out of harmony with conditions as they exist or else changes will be made in the actual system of government by a strained interpretation of the constitution. This was probably what the American President who has been quoted had in mind when he compared the Constitution of the United States to a coat that was too tight.

If, therefore, we sum up the case for and against the written constitution we are probably justified in saying. that the almost universal experience of the European world is in favor of this method of determining the principles of constitutional government. We may add that the argument of inflexibility and rigidity, which is often used against it, is justified only partially and only to that extent where the methods of amending the constitution are made unreasonably difficult.

The general principles may perhaps be laid down that the process of amending a written constitution should permit an amendment to be made when it is the opinion either of somewhat more than a majority of those in control of the government, or of the majority of the people voting upon the question that the amendment is desirable. The necessity of large majorities or of long delays in order that constitutional amendments may be made tends to foster revolutionary rather than gradual

change, or brings about a strained interpretation of the constitution on the part of those who may be intrusted with the power of interpretation.

The doctrine of popular sovereignty has had for one of its effects in the United States the submission of the original state constitutions as well as amendments thereto to the voters of the states. Such submission to the people in the case of constitutional amendments is not required by the United States Constitution nor by most of the written constitutions of the world. The ordinary method of amendment is through the process of legislation, but with the necessity of a greater than ordinary majority vote, and the observance of special formalities. Thus in France an amendment of the constitutional laws of 1875 is made as follows: Each of the two chambers of the legislature determines by a majority of all its members that amendment is necessary. After both chambers have thus separately reached this decision they unite in a joint assembly. The decisions of this joint assembly for amendment must be made by a majority of the members forming the assembly.

If we may judge from the experience of European nations, we may conclude that the ordinary country having constitutional government should have a written constitution, and that this constitution should be amendable in some such way as are the French constitutional laws of 1875.

II

THE PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

HISTORY would seem to show that almost all mod

ern states owe their existence to the combination or union of smaller communities, which at some earlier time enjoyed a greater or less degree of political independence. England thus originated in the union under one king of old Saxon or Danish kingdoms. When Scotland was added to England the new state formed by the union of the two kingdoms was called the Kingdom of Great Britain. When Ireland was added to Great Britain the existing state, called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, came into being.

Thus again modern France has resulted from the extension of the power of the former dukes of Ile de France over a series of districts such as duchies, counties, etc. These districts were finally under the reigns of the Bourbon kings, and as a result of the French Revolution consolidated under one government, now known as the French Republic.

In the case of the French Republic the consolidation of the former independent communities was complete. One government and one law are in force everywhere throughout the country. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, however, Scotland still has its own law and its own courts, while the Irish Home

Rule Act will, when put into operation, accord still greater independence to Ireland.

In other words, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is still, to an extent, at any rate, an imperfect union. The imperfect nature of the union which is thus characteristic of the United Kingdom is still more noticeable in the case of other countries, where we find, on the one hand, a central government with certain powers, and, on the other hand, state or provincial governments, to which the exercise of other powers is intrusted.

The determination of the position of such a central or imperial government, and of that of the states or provinces which have been joined together but do not as yet form a perfect union, and the fixing of the relations which shall exist between such a central government and these state or provincial governments, become questions of supreme importance, however, only in a country whose geographical situation and historical traditions have brought about great diversity in local conditions. As a rule such diversity is found only in a country of great extent. Exceptionally, however, it is the case that this diversity will exist in a country of comparatively small size. Where such diversity is to be found under these conditions it is due to the peculiar geographical situation of the country. Thus in the case of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Ireland is an island and is separated from Great Britain by a body of water large enough to make communication between it and Great Britain somewhat difficult. Ireland's consequent isolated situation has resulted in the development within it of conditions which are quite different from those obtaining in Great Britain. Dif