for divorce which existed before the agreement was entered into remain the same.

As was said in Eby vs. Eby, 17 Pa. C. C. Reps. 269: "It is simply an agreement to live apart, containing the usual provision for the support of the wife and child, and declaring the payment thereof may be enforced in the same manner as if a decree from bed and board with alimony had been entered. The agreement is not a bar to a proceeding by either party for an absolute divorce." We think also it is not a bar to a proceeding for a divorce a mensa et thoro, and that a party has a right to have her alimony secured by a decree of the court, but we think the amount of alimony should not be changed, provided the court is of opinion that the agreement was entered into in good faith, with a full knowledge on her part of all the facts now appearing in evidence, and that there was no fraud or deception practiced on the libellant at the time the agreement was entered into.

Under all the evidence in this case, we find that at the time this agreement was entered into by her there was no fraud or deception practiced upon her, and that she knew all the facts now in evidence, and it was signed by her without any coercion or compulsion of her husband. We also find that there has been no change in the circumstances of her husband which would justify us for that reason in increasing this aliniony, if we could do so under the contract. The amount of the alimony, in our judgment, is sufficient, and, without reference to the contract, all that we feel at liberty to allow her under the evidence and the circumstances of this case.

The next question is, if entitled to divorce, whether she should be allowed any alimony for the support of the child, Tacy Marie. In an opinion filed on April 19, 1896, when this question arose upon an application for alimony pendente lite, we refused to make any allowance for the support of the child, and we now, in view of the evidence in this case, refuse the allowance of such alimony. The contract between the parties in this case itself seems clearly to mean that the libellant was not to receive anything for the support of the child, but that she was to support the child only for such time as the child would live with her, and that no deduction for the amount of alimony

provided for in said, agreement should be made when the child was away from her. It was clearly never intended that she should receive anything from the respondent for the maintenance of this child as long as he was willing to maintain it. There is no doubt from the evidence in this case that he has always been willing to maintain and support the child. He has repeatedly offered to do so, and is now supporting and educating it, and has been doing so for some time. The child is now about seventeen years of age, and we will not by any order disturb the relations now existing between it and its father. It is true the evidence does not show this fact, that he is at present supporting and educating the child, but it is a fact that has been admitted by counsel in this case, and by them brought to the attention of the court. But the evidence does show, to our mind, that he not only never refused to support, and maintain the child, but that he was always anxious to obtain its custody, and that he in good faith desired to provide for it and educate it. We will, therefore, not allow her any alimony for the support of this child.

We come now to the question of whether the divorce should be granted as prayed for. As already stated by us, we think the agreement is no bar to a proceeding for a judicial separation on the ground mentioned in the libel. We have only considered it on the question of alimony, and, as stated, we think that would have been sufficient and all we would have allowed if no agreement between the parties was produced. Though his income. may be $3000 a year, this is only the gross income, and the burden of educating and supporting at least two of the children is still on him.

If there were no other ground alleged but that of adultery, we would be compelled to refuse this divorce, for the evidence clearly shows a condonation of this offence on her part. She lived and cohabited with him after she had a full knowledge of the facts in evidence. But when we come to the second ground for divorce, which is the offspring of such indignities to her person as to render her life burdensome and her condition intolerable, we take a different view from what we do where the charge is adultery. In the case of indignities to the person, these must consist of a series of insulting and cruel acts, long continued,

until they become unbearable. And hence the mere fact of living with her husband after she became aware of certain acts of cruelty and indignities would not be a condonation of these acts, unless, perhaps, they entirely ceased. But the evidence in this case convinces us that the insults and the acts of cruelty complained of continued up until the very day of the separation of the parties, and therefore, if they are of such a character as to entitle her to a divorce, there can be no defence of condonation interposed. The evidence is of such a character that we do not desire to discuss it. We wish to avoid as far as possible putting on record the character of these insults and cruel acts, as many of them are indecent and extremely vulgar. Some of the acts which were not of such an indecent character were as follows: That he forced her to associate with men and women of low and immoral character; that he made her work far beyond her strength and beyond what her physical condition would allow; personally abused her by laying violent hands upon her, and repeatedly threatening to knock her down; holding her while her daughter hit her in the face; absenting himself from his home and leaving her without means of support, so that she had nothing to eat; and lastly, laying hold of her until her cheeks and arms were black and blue, and other acts of cruelty, which, as we said, we do not care to specify, the whole consisting of such a series of insults and cruelties up to the time. of their final separation that her life became intolerable and burdensome, and that she was forced to leave his home and family.

We therefore find that the facts alleged as ground for divorce in the fifth paragraph of the libel and the amendment thereto have been sustained, and that she is entitled to a judicial separation by virtue thereof. It is true that a great many acts to which we have not referred rest upon her uncorroborated testimony, but the facts to which we have referred are all or nearly all of them corroborated by the testimony of her daughter. If we were to exclude from our consideration every fact testified to by the libellant in which she is not corroborated, there would still be left abundant testimony as to a sufficient number of acts of cruelty and indignities offered to her person, in which she is corroborated by her daughter, to entitle her to

the divorce asked for. There is also some slight corroboration of her testimony in that of the physician.

Lastly, arises the question of costs and expenses in this proceeding. We think that the fee allowed counsel in this case on the rule for the allowance of counsel fees and alimony pendente lite should be now taken into consideration, and should be deducted from the claim made for fees in this case, and that $200, in addition to the amount already allowed, would be a reasonable fee for her counsel. We think the stenographer's fee, $53, claimed is reasonable. We also think the fee of the master, who was regularly appointed in this case and acted in good faith, and neither party objected either to his appointment or to his acting in the premises (in fact it was upon their agreement that the court appointed him, and we are therefore of opinion that his fee should be paid. We think, however, that $200 would be amply sufficient to pay him for his services under the circumstances in this case.

Therefore, now, to wit, June 26, 1899, the court having heard this case on libel, amended libel and evidence taken and produced before the court, and having fully considered the proceedings to determine the same as to law and justice appertains, and having given the case full consideration, we now order, adjudge and decree that the said complainant, May E. Bloom, and respondent, William H. Bloom, be separated from bed and board; and it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the respondent, William H. Bloom, pay the libellant, May E. Bloom, the weekly sum of $8 from the date of this decree, in weekly payments, for her support and maintenance( and that this allowance shall be in lieu of the allowance provided for by the contract of said William H. Bloom, respondent, and the said May E. Bloom, libellant, and A. M. Champion, trustee of said May E. Bloom, dated Sept. 14, 1894; and that the said respondent give such security as this court may approve of for the payment of said weekly allowance. And it is further ordered that the minor, Tacie Marie Bloom, be and remain in the custody of her father, there to remain until the further order of this court, with the qualification that the mother shall have the right to visit the said child, Tacie Marie Bloom, at all proper times. and that the said Tacie Marie Bloom shall have the right to visit

her mother at such times as she may desire to do so; but the said mother shall not be entitled to receive from the respondent any payment for such time as the said Tacie Marie shall remain. with her mother, unless a special agreement be made with the respondent for such payment. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said respondent, William H. Bloom, pay the costs of this proceeding, including the master's fee, to wit, $200; the stenographer's fee, to wit, $53, and an allowance of $200 to the libellant for counsel fees; this to be in addition to the amount allowed for such fees on the rule for counsel fees and alimony pendente lite.-Dist. Reps.

Commonwealth vs. Richard Little and M. J. O'Toole. Quarter Sessions of Lackawanna County, No. 245 October Sessions, 1899.

The charge of the court upon the trial in this case being such a clear elucidation of the law upon the points involved, at the request of a number of the members of the bar the same is published in full. (ED.)

CRIMINAL LIBEL.

Charge of the Court delivered by Hon. H. M. Edwards 'October 18th, 1899.

Gentlemen of the Jury: The indictment in this case charges the defendants with publishing of and concerning the prosecutor, Ezra H. Ripple, a malicious and defamatory libel. The articles complained of appear in a newspaper called the Scrantonian. They appeared on Sunday, July 30, this year.

reason.

The case is of considerable importance for more than one It is important to the defendants because it may result in the imposition upon them of a fine or imprisonment, both or either at the discretion of the court. It is important to the commonwealth to secure a vindication of the law if it has been transgressed. It also concerns the community at large, because the principles involved in the trial of a case of this character concern the rights of individuals, the limitations with which the law surrounds the public press, and the general peace and welfare of society.

It is the duty of this jury, as it is the duty of all juries, to give the defendants a fair and impartial trial. This they are entitled to under the law. You must decide the case according