to them is not necessary." The only case cited by defendants' counsel is that of the Com. vs. Lykens Water Co., 110 Pa. 391. This is not authority on the question now before us. The proceedings in that case were by writ of quo warranto instituted by the commonwealth itself.

Now, therefore, this 21st day of December, 1899, this cause having been heard at a regular term of equity court and having been duly considered, we order and direct that a permanent injunction issue against the defendants in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's bill and that the defendants pay the costs of these proceedings.

In Re Petition of Catherine Ollendike for Satisfaction of

Mortgage.

Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 556 September Term, 1899. Mortgage-Satisfaction-New County-Statutes relating to satisfaction of Mortgages in Pennsylvania.

A mortgage was recorded in the County of Luzerne before the creation of Lackawanna County; the mortgaged premises formed a part of the latter county after the division. Upon application being made to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County to direct the Recorder of Deeds of Luzerne County to enter satisfaction of record of said mortgage, payment of the same in full having been made; Held, that the petition and all the proceedings thereunder must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that the record of the mortgage was not in this county, and except where it is otherwise specifically and specially provided, the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas is confined to persons and things within the county in which it is located.

Held further: That in a case of this character the record of the mortgage must first be removed to this county, in accordance with the 14th section of the Act of April 17, 1879 (P. L. 17) commonly known as the new County Act, or if by the repeal of that Act no further resort can be had to its provisions, by a re-recording of the mortgage in this county.

In the several Acts relating to the satisfaction of mortgages, the provision that satisfaction where ordered is to be eutered by the recorder "of the proper county" means no more than the recorder of the county in which the proceedings are pending.

The New County Act of April 17, 1879, (P. L. 17) having been repealed by the Act of June 27th, 1895, (P. L. 395).

Query: Whether those concerned in mortgages recorded in the old County, either as mortgagors or mortgagees secured vested rights under it which its repeal could not defeat or destroy.

Petition for the satisfaction of a mortgage.

GEORGE D. TAYLOR for the petitioners.

ARCHBALD, P. J., January 1st, 1900. The record of the mortgage which we are asked to order satisfied is not in this county but in Luzerne, where it was entered May 23, 1866, before the division of the county. If that be so, we do not see how we have any authority over it. It is true the property mortgaged is in this county, and therefore, under the statute, prɔceedings to satisfy must be instituted here; but the record of the mortgage is in another county where we cannot reach it and where any order we might attempt to make would have no binding force or effect.

Except where it is otherwise specially and specifically prɔvided, the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, of this as of every other county, is confined to persons and things within the county. As to anything beyond its bounds, without express legislative sanction, our writs, orders and decrees amount to nothing, and no one is required to heed them. This principle is recognized by the petitioner's counsel and is a bar to the order asked for unless the statute under which the proceedings are had expressly authorizes it. This, it is contended, it does; the court has jurisdiction of the proceedings because the land mortgaged lies within the county and to make them effective whatever is necessary impliedly follows; when, then, the statute provides for an order of satisfaction to be entered on the record of the mortgage "by the recorder of the proper county" this includes, as it is said, the recorder of another county where the original record of the mortgage exists, as though specifically mentioned; and the argument is enforced, it is claimed, by the distinction made between the county where the mortgaged premises lie as the place where the application for the order to satisfy must be made, and the recorder of the proper county as the one to execute it; by this means only, it is further urged, can a satisfaction be secured in immediate connection with the original record which must. otherwise remain forever open and uncancelled. We would be glad to adopt this construction of the act if we felt that it was open to us, but, unfortunately, we do not think it is. To reach out into another county and make orders affecting its public officers and records is a broad stretch of authority not to be ·lightly assumed, and to take it by implication would entirely disregard the principle already alluded to that no such power exists

except by express legislative sanction, In view of our familiar relations with the county of Luzerne, from which we immediately sprang, it may not seem of much account to make an order which is to run into that county. But suppose, as we may, that the record of a mortgage upon lands in this county lay unsatisfied in Northumberland, Northampton or Bucks, which stand successively back of Luzerne as parent counties, will it be held that our orders could have any effect in one of these?

Nor is any great stress to be laid upon the circumstance that the order of satisfaction is to be entered by the recorder— as it is expressed-"of the proper county." In the connection in which it is found this means no more than the county corresponding to that in which the order is made. Take the similar phrase in the Act of April 11, 1856, P. L. 304, where satisfaction of a judgment or mortgage which has been paid may be entered on production of the same duly satisfied in the presence of two witnesses accompanied by the certificate of the president judge "of the proper county" allowing it. Will it be contended that the latter expression means anything more than the judge of the county where the satisfaction is to be effected, or that on the order of the president judge of this county the record of a judgment or mortgage in Luzerne could be interferred with? So under the Act of June 10, 1881, P. L. 97, where provision is made for proceedings to procure the satisfaction of a mortgage presumptively paid by the lapse of twenty years; the act directs that the owner of the mortgaged premises may apply to the Common pleas of the county where they lie and after due proceedings had to bring in the holder, he may, by rule, be required to sue out a writ of scire facias to the next quarterly or monthly return day to enforce the mortgage; and in default the court being satisfied of the truth of the petition may order satisfaction to be entered "on the record of the mortgage by the recorder of the proper county." Here it is plain that the recorder referred to is none other than the recorder of the county where the proceedings are had and where the record of the mortgage is, which must also, by the direct provisions of the act, be the county where the mortgaged premises lie. Under the act, if the record were in Luzerne and the premises here, how would the counsel for the present petitioner have us pro

ceed? Could this court, on an appearance by the holder of the mortgage, direct him to sue out a scire facias in the Common Pleas of that county, the record of the mortgage being there; or, how, on the other hand, could he sue out such a writ without anything in this county on which to base it? Manifestly in some way he must first get the record removed from that county into this, or, perhaps, re-record the mortgage here, and then he is in shape for anything that may be required. So, under the Act of March 27, 1862, P. L. 192, where there is a mortgage on record which is alleged to have been forged; or, under the Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 270, where there is a dispute as to the amount due upon a mortgage in order to satisfy it; or, again, under the Act of June 22, 1897, P. L. 184, where a mortgage is given to secure performance of an act, the return of property, or to indemnify a party, and its conditions are alleged to have been complied with; in each of these intsances, to be effective the proceedings of necessity require the record of the mortgage to be in the county where they are to be instituted, which by the express provision of these several statutes is to be the county in which the mortgaged premises are situated. The local character thus given in their inception to proceedings under each of these acts which are in pari materia, and therefore to receive a similar construction is naturally to be maintained throughout; it is absolutely necessary that this should be so in some of them and by analogy it should be in all. If this be so, the idea of any extra territorial power is effectually dispelled, and the recorder who is to satisfy, whether spoken of as the recorder "of the proper county" or, as in the Act of 1897, as the recorder "of the said county," can mean none other than the recorder of the county where the proceedings are pending, who is within the reach and subject to the authority of the court whose jurisdiction is invoked.

This brings us to the position to which, as we think, the argument has necessarily tended. Under the several acts on the subject of the satisfaction of mortgages, it must be recognized that no express provision is made for any such case as that with which we have to deal. It was probably not within the experience of either of the draftsmen who framed these acts, and therefore was not provided for, Relief from the lapse in the law so

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existing must come if at all from the provisions of the Act of April 17, 1879, P. L. 17, commonly known as the New County Act. By the 14th section it is declared "the lien of all mortgages, judgments, mechanic's liens, verdicts and records which shall have been made and entered in the original county shall not be affected by the establishment of said new county, but to proceed thereon certified copies thereof shall be made by the prothonotary or other proper officer which shall be entered by the like officer of the new county and like proceedings had as in the original." Under this act, in order to proceed upon a mortgage originally entered in the mother county, the mortgaged premises being in the new county, a certified copy of the record must be obtained from the recorder of the one and filed with the recorder of the other. This applies where the intended proceding is to enforce the mortgage by scire facias, and why not also where its purpose is to procure the satisfaction of it? One is just as much a proceeding on the mortgage as the other. and the term is broad enough to include both. Each is dependent on the record as the basis of the action to be taken. the one being to enforce its terms and the other to establish that they have been complied with. In a case arising directly out of a condition created by the satute, it is no stretch of construction to hold that it expressly applies.

It is no argument to say that this does not give a satisfaction of the original record of the mortgage, which is thus left apparently opened and unaffected. We appreciate the desire of parties for a clean sheet, but this is not the only case in which under similar circumstances it is not obtainable. Suppose a mortgage entered in Luzerne were removed to this county and proceeded on to judgment and execution and enough realized on a sheriff's sale to pay the mortgage, how is the original record to be disposed of? On a certificate from the prothonotary, under the Act of April 3, 1860, P. L. 630, the record of this county to which the mortgage has been transferred would, no doubt, be bound to make the proper entry of satisfaction; but what provision is there for having it entered elsewhere? Interested parties in such a case must content themselves the same as here with the legal effect of a satisfaction obtained on the record as