removed. However desirable it may be to have more than-this, they can only get what the law allows and a satisfaction of the original has not been provided for.

It is said, however, that the New County Act has been repealed and that seems to be the case, root and branch. Act June 27, 1895, P. L. 395. If this prevents proceedings on mortgages effecting lands in this county, the records of which still remain in Luzerne in the manner provided for in the section quoted, it is to be deplored, and until we adjust ourselves to the situation and discover the proper means for overcoming it, it may raise impediments to their enforcement. It is possible that those concerned in such mortgaes, whether as mortgagors or mortgagees, by the passage of the act secured vested rights under it which its repeal cannot defeat or destroy, and it is to be hoped that such may be found to be the case. But whether it shall or not, the argument none the less remains that no provision is to be found outside of the act for the satisfaction of a mortgage where a county has been divided, and the mortgaged premises are in the new county while the record remains in the old; and if the repealing of the act prevents a further resort to it, the party is simply in the same predicament that he would have been in if no statutes on the subject of the satisfaction of mortgages had ever been passed. We are not prepared to say, however, that he is entirely without remedy. There is nothing that we can see to prevent a re-entry of the mortgage in this county as though it had never before been recorded, and then proceed upon it as the law provides. If the satisfaction is obtained in that way in this county, it will undoubtedly discharge the premises, from the lien of the mortgage wherever else recorded, and that is all that can be legally asked for.

This question is an important one bearing, as it does, on matters of lien, searches and titles, and we have endeavored to give it the attention which it deserves. It is not new having been decided a number of years ago in this court in the same way that we now decide it. In re petition of F. E. Swartz, No. 344, January term, 1885. The decision there made was followed in practice for a time, but having never been reported has evidently been lost sight of. It is to be hoped that the present case will settle the procedure either by the acquiescence of the pro

fession in the opinion now expressed or its affirmance or reversal on appeal to the courts above us.

The petition and all proceedings thereunder are dismissed for want of jurisdiction without prejudice.

The several statutes relating to the satisfaction of mortgages in Pennsylvania are as follows:

Act May 28, 1715, sections 9 and 10, 1 Smith's Laws 95, requiring a mortgagec who has been paid, to satisfy the record on notice under penalty; Act March 31, 1823, 3 Smith's Laws 131, where a mortgage has been paid for two years and the holder has died or removed from the state without satisfying; Act of April 3, 1851, section 14, P. L. 871, allowing the mortgagor to pay into court the money due and obtain satisfaction; Act April 11, 1856, P. L. 304, authorizing the recorder to satisfy on production of the mortgage duly marked satisfied attested by two witnesses, and allowed by the president judge of the district; Act April 3, 1860, P. L. 630, where the judgment obtained on the accompanying bond has been satisfied, the recorder is to satisfy the mortgage on production of a certificate to that effect from the prothonotay; Act March 27, 1862, P. L. 192, where a duly recorded mortgage is alleged to have been forged, the court, on petition, may bring in the parties and award an is-ue to try disputed facts or decree a satisfaction in the first instance if satisfied of the truth of the petition; Act June 11, 1879, P. L. 141, in all cases where payment in full has been made for six months, the court may decree a satisfaction on petition of the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises. But there must have been an actual payment to entitle the party to a decree. Felt vs. Cook, 95 Pa. 247; Riddle's Appeal, 104 Pa. 171; Act June 10, 1881, P. L. 97, where presumption of payment has arisen by a lapse of twenty years the court, on petition, may order a scire facias or direct satisfaction if undisputed; Act June 20, 1883, P. L. 138, where the hol'er resides without the state and the mortgage debt is overdue by expiration of the time limit therein and not by simple default of interest-the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises may pay into court the amount due with interest and obtain an order of satisfaction; Act May 25, 1887, P. L. 270, where the mortgage by its terms remains due for a year or more and a dispute has arisen as to the amount payable thereon in order to fully satisfy it, the court may require a scire facias to be issued or in default may allow the amount admitted to be due to be paid into court and satisfaction thereupon be entered; and Act June 22, 1897, P. L. 184, where a mortgage has been given to secure the performance of any act of duty, or to return any property held as agent, factor, trustee or bailee, or to save harmless or to indemnify any person, and its terms are alleged to have been comp ied with, the court may, on petition, bring in the holder and decree a satisfaction, or, where there are disputed facts, may award an issue to try them. In any case not provided for by some one of these statutes, the only remedy would seem to be by bill in equity.

Commonwealth vs. J. Price Wetherill and Wm. T. Elliot.

Q. S. Monroe County, September Sessions, Nos. 1 and 2.

Fish Laws-Act May 22, 1889, P. L. 267—Use of Landing Net in Fishing. Landing nets are not ejusdem generis with seines, drift-nets and fykenets, and cannot be included in the phrase, "nets of any other description." The legislature did not mean to prohibit the use of landing nets in fishing for game fish.

STAPLES & ERDMAN, for commonwealth.

STORM & PALMER, for defendant.

CRAIG, P. J., Nov. 15, 1899.-This is a proceeding under section 1 of the Act of Assembly of May 22, 1889, P. L. 267. It was conceded at the argument that the decision of the case rests with us, without the intervention of a jury: Com. vs. Waldman, 140 Pa. 89.

It is charged that the defendant violated the law in using a net, an appliance other than rod, hook and line, whilst catching trout. The uncontradicted evidence is, and we so find from the testimony, that the defendant did, on April 15, 1899, fish for trout in McMichael's creek, Monroe county, Pennsylvania, using rod, hook and line, with fly and reel, and, after hooking a trout, further employed a landing net for the purpose of lifting it from its natural element, and bringing it to shore, and putting it into his physical possession. Is this the catching of a fish by making use of a net, or any other appliance except rod, hook and line, within the meaning of the Act of Assembly.

The language of the Act of Assembly is this:

"That, hereafter, no person or persons shall cast, draw, fasten, or otherwise make use of any seine, drift-net, fyke-net, or net or nets of any other description, or use any other appliance for the chatching of fish, except rod, hook and line. in any rivers, streams or waters of this commonwealth," etc.

Manifestly, if we interpret the words, "rod, hook and line," within the limitation of their literal import, then it would be obnoxious to this act to use a reel, or fly, or bait, or bob, or sinker, or squid in connection with rod, hook and line, when fishing for game fish; for these are appliances for chatching fish, in the general sense of the terms. Such interpretation would be contrary to the legislative intent, for it would practically defeat all catching of game fish, sui haeret in litera, haeret in

cortice. Such a construction would lead to absurdity; and it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended their own stultification. Hence it is held that, when the language of an ct is susceptible of two senses, the sense will be adopted which will not lead to absurd consequences: 23 Aner. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 362; Endlich on Iterp. of Statutes, section 225

At the argument it seemed to be conceded by the commonwealth that the appliances we have named could be used in connection with the rod, hook and line in catching game fish without violating the statute. But the stress of the contention was made to rest upon the use of the landing net by the defendant, in getting physical possession of the trout after it was hooked, or, as the commonwealth put it, in catching the fish by using a landing net in connection with rod, hook and line. Much argument was expended on the question, was the fish caught when hooked, or was it not caught until it was put into the physical possession of the defendant by means ɔi a landing net? At first blush this seems a question worthy of the best days of the school men. Happily, we are relieved from. the niceties of words and abstract ideas by the testimony of experts in fishing. These were judges and lawyers and doctors and fish commissioners, and public officials, and men of large and small affairs, who had had long practical experience. The preponderating weight of their evidence is, that a game fish is caught when hooked, and that the landing net is used, either conveniently or necessarily, for bringing the fish into 'the physical possession of the fisherman. Accordingly, we find the fact to be as thus testified to.

The argument is largely concerned with the definition of the word "catch." In construing it we are to take the ordinary and popular meaning: 23 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 326; Endlich on Iterp. of Statutes, sec. 76. But here we are not without perplexity. There are few words in the English lan-. guage which have such a variety of meanings as the word catch. Webster's Internat. Dictionary gives fifteen shades of meaning, one of which is, "to take captive, as in a snare or net or on a hook, as to catch a bird or fish." The Century Dictionary gives twenty-two meanings of the word, one of which is "to take captive, as in a snare or trap; to take with a lure or bait, as to

catch a fish." The Standard Dictionary furnishes thirteen meanings, one of which is "to take by trapping or snaring; to take with a bait or by stratagem, as to catch fish, game," etc. So, if we appeal to popular usage, as reflected in lexicons, we are left in uncertainty as to what the exact meaning of the word "catch" is in the act. A bear, or a skunk, or a rat, captured alive in a trap, under these definitions, may be said to be caught in the ordinary and popular meaning, although not in the physical possession of the trapper. So, a trout may be said to be caught when held by the hook, as well as when in the landing net or creel.

In constructing this act we must not forget that it is penal in its character, and therefore subject to general rule of trict consruction; that "where an act contains such an ambiguity as to leave reasonable doubt of its meaning, it is the duty of the court not to inflict the penalty; that where it admits of two constructions, that which operates in favor of life or liberty is to be referred: English on Interp. of Statutes, sec. 330. This rule would compel us to construe the doubtful phraseology of the act against the infliction of the penalty, and in favor of the liberty of the citizen. As we have already shown, that to catch a trout may mean either when it is hooked or when it is landed with a landing net, it follows that under the rule applicable to penal statutes, we must adopt the construction most favorable to the defendant.

But, according to our view, it is not necessary to employ this rule of construction in the decision of this case. The phrase "rod, hook and line" is a very old one. In A Treatyse of Fyshynge Wyth an Angle, by Dame Julian A. Berners, edition 1496, we read as follows: "The bese to my symple dysercion wyche is fishynge, called anyglynge with rodde and a lyne and an hooke." And we find our legislature using this same phrase, in which appears a technical sense, in the Acts May 16, 1878, P. L. 57; June 3, 1878, P. L. 160; June 10, 1884, P. L. 92, and Acts of May 22, 1889, P. L. 261, 264, 267 and 270, and Act of May 20, 1891, P. L. 92. This phrase, "rod, hook and line," is applied to the catching of all kinds of game fish in these various acts, and to all the waters and streams of the commonwealth, including the waters of Lake Erie, bays, ponds