enforce the same in his name as trustee with like force and effect as such holder might have done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.

"d" Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, and for a present consideration which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be effected by this act.

"f" That all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as part of the estate of the bankruptcy, unless the court shall, on due notice, order that the right under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, shall be preserved for the benefit of the estate, and thereupon the same may pass to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as aforesaid. And the court may order such conveyance as shall be necessary to carry the purposes of this section into effect: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall have the effect to destroy or impair the title obtained by such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, of a bona fide purchaser for value who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable cause for inquiry."

It would appear in reading these several clauses that they are somewhat inconsistent, but it is not necessary for us to harmonize them in order to decide the present case, because we hold that clause "f" compels us to decide this case in favor of the trustee of the bankrupt. "All levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens obtained against a person who is insolvent at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt." This language is explicit and peremp

tory. It leaves no room for discussion. Therefore we direct that the property in the hands of the garnishee levied upon by virtue of the attachment execution issued in this case, be and the same is hereby wholly discharged and released from said attachment execution. The property in question belongs to the trustee in bankruptcy, who has a right to take it for the benefit of the estate of the bankrupt.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION.

EDWARDS, J., March 25th, 1899.-Since the foregoing opinion was written and when it was about to be handed down counsel for the plaintiff called our attention to a case reported in 91 Fed. Reporter 510, from the District Court of Massachusetts, and decided by Judge Lowell. As the opinion is short and is not in full accord with ours, we quote it here in full:

"De Lue was adjudicated bankrupt on his own petition, filed December 21, 1898. His trustee seeks to enjoin the sale of his real estate on execution, and to dissolve the lien created by the attachment thereof. The suit in which the execution was obtained was begun in December, 1897. No attachment was made therein until November 2, 1898, when an attachment of the real estate in controversy was made by virtue of a special precept issued in accordance with Pub. St. Mass., c. 161, 85. The application for the precept was made upon the day upon which it was issued. The levy was made December 19th, the notice being posted on that day. Section 67 of the bankrupt act reads, in part, as follows:

"A lien created by or obtained in or pursuant to any suit or proceeding at law or in equity, including an attachment upon mesne process or a judgment by confession, which was begun against a person within four months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, by or against such person, shall be dissolved by the adjudication of such person,' etc.

"The date put in question by this provision is not the date at which the lien was created, but the date at which the suit or

other proceedings was begun, in which the lien was obtained. The counsel for the petitioner contends that this suit or proceeding is to be taken to be the application for the special precept, and not the principal suit. The construction contended. for, as it seems to me, is strained and unnatural. The act does not look to the date of the petition or other proceeding which is specially related to the attachment (the petition for the special precept, the precept itself, or any of the sheriff's acts thereunder), but to the date of the suit itself. The provisions of Section 67f, being limited to involuntary bankrupts, have no application in this case. Petition for injunction and for dissolution of lien denied."

We shall first examine clause "c." It is evident under this clause that a lien obtained in a proceeding which was begun four months before bankruptcy should be dissolved. In the case just quoted the suit or proceeding was begun one year before the adjudication in bankruptcy. It was probably a suit in assumpsit or debt. When or how a judgment was obtained in the suit was not disclosed, but an execution was issued, apparently by leave of court, within the four months period. The levy was on real estate. We consider this proceeding analgous to that in our courts where a suit is proceeded with to judgment, an execution issued and a levy made on real estate. According to the Massachusetts decision, this execution, although issuing within four months of bankruptcy, cannot be disturbed, because the suit in which execution was obtained was commenced a year before bankruptcy. Whether this be correct or not the ruling is questionable when applied to an attachment execution. The judgment against Mitchell was entered long before the beginning of the four months period. If there was any real estate the judgment was a lien upon it when entered of record. But the lien secured upon the money in the bank by virtue of the attachment execution, which went forth shortly before bankruptcy, is virtually a proceeding begun within the four months period, as we view clause "c" of section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act.

Whatever construction may be finally placed upon clause "c" we are satisfied that clause "f" is decisive of the rights of

The construction placed upon

the parties in the present case. this clause in the Massachusetts case is in our judgment narrow and unreasonable. It must be construed as including voluntary as well as involuntary cases. There is no reason for any distinction between the two classes of bankrupts. What difference can it possibly make in the distribution of a bankrupt's estate and the rights of creditors therein whether the bankruptcy was voluntary or involuntary? We see no reason to change our opinion in this matter and we still think that the attachment execution of the plaintiff is null and void.

Catharine Sweeney vs. The Scranton Traction Co.

Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 201, November term, 1895. Crossing Tracks-Damages-Contributory Negligence.

In an action against a street railway company to recover damages for personal injuries, it appeared that the plaintiff attempted to cross the company's tracks about 50 or 60 feet west of an intersection of the streets, and where foot passengers are not expected to cross, and where the high speed of the street cars would necessarily expose her to greater danger. She testified that she looked in the direction from which the cars came and saw nothing. From the testimony of the other witnesses her statement was incredible: Held, that if she had used her senses and acted upon the information which they would certainly have given her, she would not have gone directly in front of a moving car to be struck by it, and her action in the matter was sufficient to convict her of contributory negligence.

Rule to take off compulsory non-suit.

T. P. HOBAN, M. H. MCANIFF for rule.

WARREN & KNAPP, JESSUP & JESSUP, contra.

MCPHERSON, J., 12th Judicial Dist., specially presiding, July 14, 1898.-The essential facts of this case are uncontradicted, and clearly establish the plaintiff's contributory negligence. She chose to cross Lackawanna avenue, not at the intersection of Washington avenue, where she would probably have passed over safely, but about fifty or sixty feet west of the intersection, where foot passengers are not expected and

where the higher speed of the street cars would necessarily expose her to greater danger. The fact that she was crossing the street at such a point would not of itself be sufficient to convict her of contributory negligence, but it helps to explain how she came to be injured. Her own testimony makes the course of events plain. Seeing the street sufficiently clear of vehicles to afford her a pathway, she stepped from the curb, walkd briskly toward the other side, supposed she could pass safely in front of an approaching car, miscalculated her own speed or the speed of the car, and was struck as soon as she stepped upon the track. It is true that she also declared positively that she looked in the direction in which the car came and saw nothing, but this is certainly not true. There was nothing between her and the car, and if she looked she could not have failed to see. Immediately after the trial, I visited the scene of the accident, and my observation confirmed the inference I had already drawn from the testimony-that her account was incredible. The case undoubtedly belongs to the numerous class of which Nugent vs. Traction Co. 181 Pa. 160, is perhaps the latest example. It may be properly said of the plaintiff here, as was said of the plaintiff there: "The testimony leaves no room to doubt that if she had used her senses and acted upon the information which they would certainly have given her, she would not have gone directly in front of a moving car to be struck by it."

The motion to take off the non-suit is refused.

Monaghan's Cumulative Annual Digest of Pennsylvania Decisions for 1899 by James Monaghan, Esq. Published by Soney & Sage, Newark, N. J.

If this publication fulfills the promise of the initial number, the publishers will have rendered the profession of this state a genuine service in giving them a convenient and ready guide to the current Pennsylvania decisions. The cumulative plan of