Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

fifth amendment to the Constitution, which inhibits the taking of private property for public use, without just compensation. He insists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so construed as to restrain the legislative power of a State, as well as that of the United States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.

The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much difficulty.

The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established a Constitution for itself, and, in that Constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their situation, and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.

If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as applicable to the States. In their several constitutions they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments as their own wisdom suggested: such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further than they are supposed to have a common interest.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the Constitution was intended to secure the people of the several States against the undue exercise of power by their respective State governments; as well as against that which might be attempted by their general government. In support of this argument he relies on the inhibitions contained in the 10th section of the 1st article.

We think that section affords a strong if not a conclusive argument in support of the opinion already indicated by the court.

The preceding section contains restrictions which are obviously intended for the exclusive purpose of restraining the exercise of power by the departments of the general government. Some of them use language applicable only to Congress; others are expressed in general terms. The third clause, for example, declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." No language can be more general; yet the demonstration is complete that it applies solely to the government of the United States. In addition to the general arguments furnished by the instrument itself, some of which have been already suggested, the succeeding section, the avowed purpose of which is to

restrain State legislation, contains in terms the very prohibition. It declares that" no State shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law." This provision, then, of the 9th section, however comprehensive its language, contains no restriction on State legislation.

The 9th section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the limitations intended to be imposed on the powers of the general government, the 10th proceeds to enumerate those which were to operate on the State legislatures. These restrictions are brought together in the same section, and are by express words applied to the States. "No State shall enter into any treaty," &c. Perceiving that in a constitution framed by the people of the United States for the government of all, no limitation of the action of government on the people would apply to the State government, unless expressed in terms; the restrictions contained in the 10th section are in direct words so applied to the States.

It is worthy of remark, too, that these inhibitions generally restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the general government, or in which the people of all the States feel an interest.

A State is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making power, which is conferred entirely on the general government; if with each other, for political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the Constitution. To grant letters of marque and reprisal, would lead directly to war; the power of declaring which is expressly given to Congress. To coin money is also the exercise of a power conferred on Congress. It would be tedious to recapitulate the several limitations on the powers of the States which are contained in this section. They will be found, generally, to restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the government of the Union, in which the citizens of all the States are interested. In these alone were the whole people concerned. The question of their application to States is not left to construction. It is averred in positive words.

If the original Constitution, in the 9th and 10th sections of the 1st article, draws this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers of the general government, and on those of the States; if in every inhibition intended to act on State power, words are employed which directly express that intent, strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the amendments, before that departure can be assumed.

We search in vain for that reason.

some

Had the people of the several States, or any of them, required changes in their constitutions; had they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended encroachments of their particular governments; the remedy was in their own hands, and would have been applied by themselves. A convention would have been assembled by

the discontented State, and the required improvements would have been made by itself. The unwieldy and cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation from two thirds of Congress, and the assent of three fourths of their sister States, could never have occurred to any human being as a mode of doing that which might be effected by the State itself. Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several States by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.

But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revolution which established the Constitution of the United States was not effected without immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which the patriot statesmen, who then watched over the interests of our country, deemed essential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general government, not against those of the local governments.

In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in Congress, and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them.

We are of opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States. We are therefore of opinion, that there is no repugnancy between the several Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland, given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that State, and the Constitution of the United States. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the cause; and it is dismissed.

CORFIELD v. CORYELL

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PENNSYLVANIA.

[+ Wash. C. C. 371.]

1825.

THIS was an action of trespass for seizing, taking, and carrying away, and converting to the defendant's use, a certain vessel, the property of the plaintiff, called the "Hiram." Plea not guilty, with leave to justify. The case, as proved at the trial, was as follows: . . . [Here it is stated that the plaintiff was owner of the "Hiram," a vessel licensed as a coaster, which, being let to one Keene, proceeded from Philadelphia in May, 1821, to certain oyster beds in the waters of New Jersey, and was there seized while dredging for oysters; and was condemned and sold by judicial proceedings under the laws of New Jersey. The defendant acted as "prize master" in the seizure.]

WASHINGTON, J., after stating to the jury the great importance of many of the questions involved in this cause, recommended to them to find for the plaintiff, and assess the damages; subject to the opinion of the court upon the law argument of the facts in the cause.

Verdict for $560, subject, &c.

This case was argued, on the points of law agreed by the counsel to arise on the facts, at the October term, 1824, and was taken under advisement until April term, 1825, when the following opinion was delivered:

The points WASHINGTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court. reserved present, for the consideration of the court, many interesting and difficult questions, which will be examined in the shape of objections made by the plaintiff's counsel to the seizure of the "Hiram," and the proceedings of the magistrates of Cumberland County, upon whose sentence the defendant rests his justification of the alleged trespass. These objections are,

[ocr errors]

First. That the Act of the Legislature of New Jersey of the 9th of June, 1820, under which this vessel, found engaged in taking oysters in Morris River Cove by means of dredges, was seized, condemned, and sold, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States in the following particulars:

1. To the eighth section of the first article, which grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

2. To the second section of the fourth article, which declares, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

3. To the second section of the third article, which declares, that the judicial power of the United States should extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

In case the Act should be considered as not being exposed to these constitutional objections, it is then insisted,

Secondly. That the locus in quo was not within the territorial limits of New Jersey. But if it was, then

Thirdly. It was not within the jurisdiction of the magistrates of Cumberland County.

Fourthly. We have to consider the objection made by the defendant's counsel to the form of this action.

The first section of the Act of New Jersey declares, that, from and after the 1st of May, till the 1st of September in every year, no persou shall rake on any oyster bed in this State, or gather any oysters on any banks or beds within the same, under a penalty of $10.

Second section. No person residing in, or out of this State, shall, at any time, dredge for oysters in any of the rivers, bays, or waters of the State, under the penalty of $50.

The third section prescribes the manner of proceeding, in cases of violations of the preceding sections.

The two next sections have nothing to do with the present case,

The sixth section enacts, that it shall not be lawful for any person, who is not, at the time, an actual inhabitant and resident of this State, to gather oysters in any of the rivers, bays, or waters in this State, on board of any vessel, not wholly owned by some person, inhabitant of, or actually residing in this State; and every person so offending, shall forfeit $10, and shall also forfeit the vessel employed in the commission of such offence, with all the oysters, rakes, &c., belonging to the same. The seventh section provides, that it shall be lawful for any person to seize and secure such vessel, and to give information to two justices of the county where such seizure shall be made, who are required to meet for the trial of the said case, and to determine the same; and in case of condemnation, to order the said vessel, &c. to be sold.

The first question then is, whether this Act, or either section of it, is repugnant to the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce? . . . 2. The next question is, whether this Act infringes that section of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States "?

The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their natüre, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every

« AnteriorContinuar »