ing the rights of private individuals or classes of individuals." There can be no liberty, protected by government, that is not regulated by such laws, as will preserve the right of each citizen to pursue his own advancement and happiness in his own way, subject to the restraints necessary to secure the same right to all others. The fundamental principle upon which liberty is based in free and enlightened government is equality under the law of the land. It has accordingly been everywhere held that liberty, as that term is used in the Constitution, means not only freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint, but is deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free in the use of his powers and faculties, and to adopt and pursue such avocation or calling as he may choose, subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare. Frorer v. People, supra; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389; Live-Stock, etc. Ass'n v. Crescent City, etc. Co., 1 Abb. (U. S.) 388; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179. Property, in its broader sense, is not the physical thing which may be the subject of ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession, and power of disposition which may be acquired over it. And the right of property preserved by the Constitution is the right not only to possess and enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any lawful mode, or by following any lawful industrial pursuit which the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guaranteed, may choose to adopt. Labor is the primary foundation of all wealth. The property which each one has in his own labor is the common heritage. And, as an incident to the right to acquire other property, the liberty to enter into contracts by which labor may be employed in such way as the laborer shall deem most beneficial, and of others to employ such labor, is necessarily included in the constitutional guarantee. In the Frorer Case, we said: "The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right, and if A. is denied the right to contract, and acquire property in the manner which he has hitherto enjoyed under the law, and which B., C., and D. are still allowed by the law to enjoy, it is clear that he is deprived of both liberty and property, to the extent that he is thus denied the right to contract;" and quoted with approval: "The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of the property in the manner permitted the community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his or their pursuit of happiness." Cooley, Const. Lim. 393.

It is undoubtedly true that the people in their representative capacity may, by general law, render that unlawful, in many cases, which had hitherto been lawful. But laws depriving particular persons or classes of persons of rights enjoyed by the community at large, to be valid, must be based upon some existing distinction or reason, not applicable to others, not included within its provisions. Id. 391. And it is only when such distinctions exist that differentiate in important particulars, persons, or classes of persons from the body of the people, that laws

having operation only upon such particular persons or classes of persons have been held to be valid enactments. In the Millett Case we held that it was not competent, under the Constitution, for the legislature to single out operators of coal mines and impose restrictions in making contracts for the employment of labor which were not required to be borne by other employers. And in the Frorer Case, a law singling out persons, corporations, or associations engaged in mining and manufacturing, and depriving them of the right to contract as persons, corporations, and associations engaged in other business or vocation might lawfully do, was in violation of the Constitution, and void. So in Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, "An Act to provide for the Weighing in Gross of Coal hoisted from Mines," approved June 10, 1891, was held unconstitutional and void for the same reason.

The Act under consideration applies not to all corporations existing within the State, or to all that have been or may be organized for pecuniary profit under the general incorporation laws of the State. There is no attempt to make a distinction between corporations and individuals who may employ labor. The slightest consideration of the Act will demonstrate that many corporations that may be and are organized and doing business under the laws are not included within the designated corporations. No reason can be found that would require weekly payments to the employees of an electric railway that would not require like payment by an electric light or gas company; to a corporation engaged in quarrying or lumbering that would not be equally applicable to a corporation engaged in erecting, repairing, or removing buildings or other structures; to mining that would not exist in respect of corporations engaged in making excavations and embankments for roads, canals, or other public or private improvements of like character: that will apply to a street or elevated railway that will not make it equally important in other modes of transportation of freight and passengers. The public records of the State will show, and it is a matter of common knowledge, that very many corporations have been organized and are doing business in the State which necessarily employ large numbers of men that are not included within the Act under consideration.

The restriction of the right to contract affects not only the corporation, and restricts its right to contract, but that of the employee as well. We need not repeat the argument of the Frorer Case upon this point. An illustration of the manner in which it affects the employee, out of many that might be given, may be found in the conditions arising from the late unsettled financial affairs of the country. It is a matter of common knowledge that a large number of manufactories were shut down because of the stringency in the money market. Employers of labor were unable to continue production for the reason that no sale could be found for the product. It was suggested in the interest of employers, as well as in the public interest, that employees consent to accept only so much of their wages as was actually necessary to their sustenance, reserving payment of the balance until business should revive, and thus

enable the factories or workshops to be open and operated with less present expenditures of money. Public economists and leaders in the interest of labor suggested and advised this course. In this State, and under this law, no such contract could be made. The employee who sought to work for one of the corporations enumerated in the Act would find himself incapable of contracting as all other laborers in the State might do. The corporations would be prohibited entering into such a contract, and, if they did so, the contract would be voidable at the will of the employee, and the employer subject to a penalty for making it. The employee would, therefore, be restricted from making such a contract as would insure to him support during the unsettled condition of affairs, and the residue of his wages when the product of his labor could be sold. They would, by the Act, be practically under guardianship; their contracts voidable, as if they were minors; their right to freely contract for and to receive the benefit of their labor, as others might do, denied them.

But, treating the restrictions as affecting the corporations only, it is insisted that the reservation of authority by the General Assembly in section 9 of the General Incorporation Act (chapter 32, Rev. St.) authorized the passage of the Act in question. That section provides: The General Assembly shall at all times have power to prescribe such regulations and provisions as it may deem advisable, which regulations and provisions shall be binding on any and all corporations formed under this Act." It is said this section entered into and formed a part of the contract under which the grant of the corporate franchise was conferred upon appellant company, it having been organized under the general law. It was expressly held that the reservation of the right to alter, amend, or repeal the charter entered into and formed a part of the contract between the State and the corporation chartered under the Constitution of 1848, and that the power reserved might be constitutionally exercised. Butler v. Walker, 80 Ill. 345. And undoubtedly the same construction should be placed upon the reservation of power in the section quoted. But by section 1, art. 11, of the Constitution it is provided: "No corporation shall be created by special laws, or its charter extended, changed or amended, . . . but the General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization of all Corporations hereafter to be created." The manifest intention of this provision of the Constitution was to require not only the creation of corporations, but amendments to charters of those existing, to be made by general laws, applicable alike to all occupying like circumstances and existing under the same conditions; and it necessarily follows that special Acts, applying to particular corporations only, and not to the general body of corporations created under the Act, would fall within the prohibition of this section.

By the general incorporation law appellant company was granted the right to contract as a corporation in and about the business for which it was organized. A restriction of its right to thus contract is necessarily

an amendment or change of its corporate powers and functions of its charter. If, therefore, the restriction is held to fall within the power reserved in section 9 of the Act, it must, in view of the constitutional provision, be construed as reserving the power to prescribe such regulations and provisions as the legislature may deem advisable by general law. The Act under consideration, not being a general law, is therefore not a warranted exercise of power.

We need not extend this opinion by further discussion. The right to contract necessarily includes the right to fix the price at which labor will be performed, and the mode and time of payment. Each are essential elements of the right to contract, and whosoever is restricted in either as the same is enjoyed by the community at large is deprived of liberty and property. The enactment being unconstitutional, there is no law authorizing the judgment of the County Court, and it will accordingly be reversed.1

1 And so Leep v. St. Louis, &c. Ry. Co., 25 S. W. Rep. 75 (Ark. Feb. 1894), but allowing such legislation as against corporations.

In Ramsey v. The People, 142 Ill. 380, BAILEY, C. J., for the court, said "In the recent case of Frorer v. People (Ill. Sup.), 31 N. E. Rep. 395, we had occasion to consider another statute passed by the same legislature, and involving, in the main, the same constitutional principles as the one now before us, and reached the conclusion that the statute in question in that case is unconstitutional and void. That statute made it unlawful for any person, company, corporation, or association engaged in any mining or manufacturing business to engage in, or be interested, either directly or indirectly, in the keeping of a truck store, or the controlling of any store, shop, or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to his, its, or their employees, while engaged in mining or manufacturing. We held that said statute was a prohibition, not only upon the employer engaged in mining or manufacturing, but also upon his employees, and took from both the right and liberty belonging to all other members of the community to enter into such contracts, not contrary to public policy, as they may see fit; that the legislature had no power to deprive one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like conditions; that the privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a property right, protected by that provision of the Constitution which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law; and that if one person is denied the right to contract and acquire property in the manner which he has hitherto enjoyed under the law, and which is still allowed to other members of the community, he is deprived of both liberty and property, to the extent that he is thus deprived of the right of contract. We are of the opinion that the same rule, in substance, laid down in the Frorer Case applies here, and we need therefore do little more than refer to what is said in the opinion in that case. The statute now before us, in like manner with the one under consideration there, attempts to take from both employer and employee, engaged in the mining business, the right and power of fixing by contract the manner in which such wages are to be ascertained. The statute makes it imperative, where the miner is paid on the basis of the amount of coal mined, whatever may be the wishes or interests of the parties, that the coal shall be weighed on the pit cars before being screened, and that the compensation shall be computed upon the weight of the unscreened coal. In all other kinds of business involving the employment of labor, the employer and employee are left free to fix by contract the amount of wages to be paid, and the mode in which such wages shall be ascertained and computed. This is justly regarded as a very important right, vitally affecting the interests of both parties. To the extent to which it is abridged, a property right is taken away. There is nothing in the business of coal-mining which renders either the employer or employee less capable

Dysart & Mitchell and Lee, McKeighan, Ellis, and Priest, for appellants.

BLACK, C. J. This is an information in two counts, filed by the prosecuting attorney of Macon County against the three defendants, engaged in carrying on the business of mining coal in that county. The first count avers that the defendants did unlawfully issue and circulate in payment of wages a certain order, check, etc., payable to P. Daniels otherwise than in money, without being payable, at the option of the holder, in merchandise or money. The second count states, in substance, that defendants unlawfully failed to redeem a certain order, check, etc., issued to P. Daniels in payment for wages, the same having been presented for payment thirty days from the date of the delivery thereof. The information is based upon sections 7058, 7060, of the Revised Statutes of 1889. [These sections are given in the note.2]

of contracting in respect to wages than in any of the other numerous branches of business in which laborers are employed under analogous conditions. There is no difference, at least in kind, so far as this matter is concerned, between coal-mining, on the one hand, and other varieties of mining, quarrying stone, grading and constructing railroads, and their operation when constructed, manufacturing in all its departments, the construction of buildings, agriculture, commerce, domestic service, and an almost infinite variety of other avocations requiring the employment of laborers, on the other hand. Upon what principle, then, can those engaged in coal-mining be singled out, and subjected to restrictions of their power to contract as to wages, while those engaged in all these other classes of business are left entirely free to contract as they see fit? We think the attempt of the legislature to impose such restrictions is clearly repug nant to the constitutional limitation above referred to, and therefore void." — ED.

1 In Banc, reversing a decision of the same court, Division No. 1, in the same case, in October, 1892, 22 S. W. Rep. 332. See the elaborate opinion of Thomas, J., as there reported. — ED.

2 The first of these sections provides: "It shall not be lawful for any corporation, person, or firm engaged in manufacturing or mining in this State to issue, pay out, or circulate for payment of the wages of labor, any order, check, memorandum, token, or evidence of indebtedness, payable, in whole or in part, otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable at its face value, without discount, in cash or in goods, wares, or merchandise or supplies, at the option of the holder, at the store or other place of business of such firm, person, or corporation; . . . and the person who, or corporation, firm, or company which, may issue any such order, check, memorandum, token, or other evidence of indebtedness, shall, upon presentation and demand within thirty days from date or delivery thereof, redeem the same in goods, wares, merchandise, or supplies at the current cash market price for like goods, wares, merchandise, or supplies, or in lawful money of the United States, as may be demanded by the holder of any such order, memorandum, token, or other evidence of indebtedness: provided,” etc. Section 7060 makes it a misdemeanor for any person, firm, or company engaged in mining or manufacturing to issue or circulate, in payment of wages, any order, check, etc., payable otherwise than as provided in section 7058; or to fail to redeem any such order, check, etc., in money when presented for payment.