necessity, might be changed by the legislature in future ages, and it is pleasant to hear those people quarrelling at this who profess themselves for changing it as often as they please, and that even without the consent of the entire legislature. SOME REMARKS ON THE BARRIER TREATY Between HER MAJESTY AND THE STATES-GENERAL; To which are added, The said Barrier Treaty, with the two separate Articles; part of the Counter-project; the seatiments of Prince Eugene and Count Zinzendorf upon the said Treaty; and a Representation of the English Merchants at Bruges. PREFACE. WHEN I published the discourse called "The Conduct of the Allies," I had thoughts either of inserting or annexing the "Barrier Treaty" at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information; but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making some few reflections upon that famous treaty, sufficient as I thought to answer the design of my book. I have since heard that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it has been laid before the house of commons. That I may give some light to the reader who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know that a project for a treaty of barrier with the States was transmitted hither from Holland, but being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here, with many additions and alterations. This last was called the counter-project, and was the measure whereby the duke of Marlborough and my lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a treaty of barrier with the States. I have added a translation of this counter-project in those articles where it differs from the barrier treaty, that the reader by comparing them together may judge how punctually those negotiators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of prince Eugene of Savoy and the count de Zinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written I suppose while it was negotiating. And lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the British merchants at Bruges, signifying what inconveniences they already felt and further apprehended from this barrier treaty. SOME REMARKS, &c. IMAGINE a reasonable person in China reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs or our geography, he would conceive their high mightinesses the states-general to be some vast powerful commonwealth, like that of Rome, and her majesty to be a petty prince, like one of those to whom that republic would sometimes send a diadem for a present, when they behaved themselves well, otherwise could depose at pleasure and place whom they thought fit in their stead. Such a man would think that the States had taken our prince and us into their protection, and in return honoured us so far as to make use of our troops as some small assistance in their conquests and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incursions of barbarians upon some of their out-lying provinces. But how must it sound in a European ear, that Great Britain, after maintaining a war for so many years with so much glory and success and such prodigious expense; after saving the empire, Holland, and Portugal, and almost recovering Spain, should toward the close of a war enter into a treaty with seven Dutch provinces, to secure to them a dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without stipulating the least advantage for herself; and accept as an equivalent the mean condition of those States assisting to preserve her queen on the throne, whom, by God's assistance, she is able to defend against all her majesty's enemies and allies put together? Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us if the States had not found it their interest to use very powerful motives with the chief advisers (I say nothing of the person immediately employed), and if a party here at home had not been resolved, for ends and purposes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occasion for it. The counter-project of this treaty, made here at London, was bad enough in all conscience: I have said something of it in the preface: her majesty's ministers were instructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project which would have been of consequence to Britain, and one or two more where the advantages of the States were not so very exorbitant, and where some care was taken of the house of Austria. Is it possible that our good allies and friends could not be brought to any terms with us, unless by striking out every particular that might do us any good and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing of Dunkirk surely might have remained, which was of some benefit to the States as well as of mighty advantage to us, and which the French king has lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty. But let me now consider the treaty itself: among the one-and-twenty articles of which it consists, only two have any relation to us, importing that the Dutch are to be guarantees of our succession, and are not to enter into any treaty until the queen is acknowledged by France. We know very well that it is in consequence the interest of the States as much as ours that Britain should be governed by a protestant prince. Besides, what is there more in this guaranty than in all common leagues, offensive and defensive, between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other against any invader with all their strength? Such was the grand alliance between the emperor, Britain, and Holland, which was, or ought to have been, as good a guaranty of our succession to all intents and purposes as this in the barrier treaty; and the mutual engagements in such alliances have been always reckoned sufficient without any separate benefit to either party. It is, no doubt, for the interest of Britain that the States should have a sufficient barrier against France; but their high mightinesses, for some few years past, have put a different meaning upon the word barrier from what it formerly used to bear when applied to them. When the late king was prince of Orange, and commanded their armies against France, it was never once imagined that anv of the towns taken should belong to the Dutch; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch, and Flanders was only a barrier to Holland as it was in the hands of Spain rather than France. So in the grand alliance of 1701 the several powers promising to endeavour to recover Flanders for a barrier was understood to be the recovering of those provinces to the king of Spain; but in this treaty the style is wholly changed: here are about twenty towns and forts of great importance, with their chattellanies and dependencies (which dependencies are likewise to be enlarged as much as possible), and the whole revenues of them to be under the perpetual military government of the Dutch, by which that republic will be entirely masters of the richest part of all Flanders, and upon any appearance of war they may put their garrisons into any other place of the Low Countries: and further, the king of Spain is to give them a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a-year, to enable them to maintain those garrisons. Why should we wonder that the Dutch are inclined to perpetuate the war, when, by an article in this treaty, the king of Spain is not to possess one single town in the Low Countries until a peace be made? The duke of Anjou, at the beginning of this war, maintained six-and-thirty thousand men out of those Spanish provinces he then possessed, to which if we add the many towns since taken, which were not in the late king of Spain's possession at the time of his death, with all their territories and dependencies, it is visible what forces the States may be able to keep, even without any charge to their peculiar dominions. The towns and chattellanies of this barrier always maintained their garrisons when they were in the hands of France; and, as it is reported, returned a considerable sum of money into the king's coffers; yet the king of Spain is obliged by this treaty (as we have already observed) to add, over and above, a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a-year. We know likewise that a great part of the revenue of the Spanish Netherlands is already pawned to the States, so that after a peace nothing will be left to the sovereign, nor will the people be much eased of the taxes they at present labour under. Thus the States, by virtue of this barrier treaty, will in effect be absolute sovereigns of all Flanders, and of the whole revenues in the utmost extent. And here I cannot, without some contempt, take notice of a sort of reasoning offered by several people, that the many towns we have taken for the Dutch are of no advantage, because the whole revenue of those towns is spent in maintaining them. For first, the fact is manifestly false, particularly as to Lisle and some others. Secondly, the States after a peace are to have four hundred thousand crowns a-year out of the remainder of Flanders, which is then to be left to Spain. And lastly, suppose all these acquired dominions will not bring a penny into their treasury, what can be of greater consequence than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conquests, which before they always did by taxing their natural subjects? How shall we be able to answer it to king Charles III. that, while we pretend to endeavour restoring him to the entire monarchy of Spain, we join at the same time with the Dutch to deprive him of his natural right to the Low Countries? But suppose by a Dutch barrier must now be understood only what is to be in possession of the States, yet, even under this acceptation of the word, nothing was originally meant except a barrier against France, whereas several towns demanded by the Dutch in this treaty can be of no use at all in such a barrier. And this is the sentiment even of Prince Eugene himself (the present oracle and idol of the party here), who says that Dendermond, Ostend, and the Castle of Gand, do in no sort belong to the barrier, nor can be of other use than to make the StatesGeneral masters of the Low Countries, and hinder their trade with England; and further that those who are acquainted with the country know very well that to fortify Lier and Halle can give no security to the States as a barrier, but only raise a jealousy in the people that those places are only fortified in order to block up Brussels and the other great towns of Brabant. In those towns of Flanders where the Dutch are to have garrisons, but the ecclesiastical and civil power to remain to the king of Spain after a peace, the States have power to send arms, ammunition, and victuals, without paying customs, under which pretence they will engross the whole trade of those towns, exclusive of all other nations. This prince Eugene likewise foresaw, and in his observations upon this treaty here annexed proposed a remedy for it. And if the Dutch shall please to think that the whole Spanish Netherlands are not a sufficient barrier for them, I know no remedy from the words of this treaty but that we must still go on and conquer for them as long as they please. For the queen is obliged whenever a peace is treated to procure for them whatever shall be thought necessary besides, and where their necessity will terminate is not very easy to foresee. Could any of her majesty's subjects conceive that in the towns we have taken for the Dutch, and given into their possession as a barrier, either the States should demand or our ministers allow that the subjects of Britain should, in respect to their trade, be used worse than they were under the late king of Spain? Yet this is the fact, as monstrous as it appears: all goods going to or coming from Newport or Ostend are to pay the same duties as those that pass by the Schelde under the Dutch forts; and this, in effect, is to shut out all other nations from trading to Flanders. The English merchants at Bruges complain that, after they have paid the king of Spain's duty for goods imported at Ostend, the same goods are made liable to further duties when they are carried thence into the towns of the Dutch new conquests, and desire only the same privileges of trade they had before the death of the late king of Spain, Charles II. And in consequence of this treaty, the Dutch have already taken off eight per cent. from all goods they send to the Spanish Flanders, but left it still upon us. But what is very surprising, in the very same article where our good friends and allies are wholly shutting us out from trading in those towns we have conquered for them with so much blood and treasure, the queen is obliged to procure that the States shall be used as favourably in their trade over all the king of Spain's dominions as her own subjects or as the people most favoured. This I humbly conceive to be perfect boys'-play: "Cross I win, and pilea you lose," or "What's yours is mine, and what's mine is my own." Now, if it should happen that in a treaty of peace some ports or towns should be yielded us for the security of our trade, in any part of the Spanish dominions, at how great a distance soever, I suppose the Dutch would go on with their boys'-play and challenge half by virtue of that article: or would they be content with military government The two sides of our coin were once nominally distinguished by cross and pile, as they are now by heads and tails. necessity, might be changed by the legislature in future ages, and it is pleasant to hear those people quarrelling at this who profess themselves for changing it as often as they please, and that even without the consent of the entire legislature. SOME REMARKS ON THE BARRIER TREATY Between HER MAJESTY AND THE STATES-GENERAL; The said Barrier Treaty, with the two separate Articles; part of the Counter-project; the sentiments of Prince Eugene and Count Zinzendorf upon the said Treaty; and a Representation of the English Merchants at Bruges. PREFACE. WHEN I published the discourse called "The Conduct of the Allies," I had thoughts either of inserting or annexing the "Barrier Treaty" at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information; but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making some few reflections upon that famous treaty, sufficient as I thought to answer the design of my book. I have since heard that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it has been laid before the house of commons. That I may give some light to the reader who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know that a project for a treaty of barrier with the States was transmitted hither from Holland, but being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here, with many additions and alterations. This last was called the counter-project, and was the measure whereby the duke of Marlborough and my lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a treaty of barrier with the States. I have added a translation of this counter-project in those articles where it differs from the barrier treaty, that the reader by comparing them together may judge how punctually those negotiators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of prince Eugene of Savoy and the count de Zinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written I suppose while it was negotiating. And lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the British merchants at Bruges, signifying what inconveniences they already felt and further apprehended from this barrier treaty. SOME REMARKS, &c. IMAGINE a reasonable person in China reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs or our geography, he would conceive their high mightinesses the states-general to be some vast powerful commonwealth, like that of Rome, and her majesty to be a petty prince, like one of those to whom that republic would sometimes send a diadem for a present, when they behaved themselves well, otherwise could depose at pleasure and place whom they thought fit in their stead. Such a man would think that the States had taken our prince and us into their protection, and in return honoured us so far as to make use of our troops as some small assistance in their conquests and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incursions of barbarians upon some of their out-lying provinces. But how must it sound in a European ear, that Great Britain, after maintaining a war for so many years with so much glory and success and such prodigious expense; after saving the empire, Holland, and Portugal, and almost recovering Spain, should toward the close of a war enter into a treaty with seven Dutch provinces, to secure to them a dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without stipulating the least advantage for herself; and accept as an equivalent the mean condition of those States assisting to preserve her queen on the throne, whom, by God's assistance, she is able to defend against all her majesty's enemies and allies put together? Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us if the States had not found it their interest to use very powerful motives with the chief advisers (I say nothing of the person immediately employed), and if a party here at home had not been resolved, for ends and purposes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occasion for it. The counter-project of this treaty, made here at London, was bad enough in all conscience: I have said something of it in the preface: her majesty's ministers were instructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project which would have been of consequence to Britain, and one or two more where the advantages of the States were not so very exorbitant, and where some care was taken of the house of Austria. Is it possible that our good allies and friends could not be brought to any terms with us, unless by striking out every particular that might do us any good and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing of Dunkirk surely might have remained, which was of some benefit to the States as well as of mighty advantage to us, and which the French king has lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty. But let me now consider the treaty itself: among the one-and-twenty articles of which it consists, only two have any relation to us, importing that the Dutch are to be guarantees of our succession, and are not to enter into any treaty until the queen is acknowledged by France. We know very well that it is in consequence the interest of the States as much as ours that Britain should be governed by a protestant prince. Besides, what is there more in this guaranty than in all common leagues, offensive and defensive, between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other against any invader with all their strength? Such was the grand alliance between the emperor, Britain, and Holland, which was, or ought to have been, as good a guaranty of our succession to all intents and purposes as this in the barrier treaty; and the mutual engagements in such alliances have been always reckoned sufficient without any separate benefit to either party. It is, no doubt, for the interest of Britain that the States should have a sufficient barrier against France; but their high mightinesses, for some few years past, have put a different meaning upon the word barrier from what it formerly used to bear when applied to them. When the late king was prince of Orange, and commanded their armies against France, it was never once imagined that any THE BARRIER TREATY. of the towns taken should belong to the Dutch; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch, and Flanders was only a barrier to Holland as it was in the hands of Spain rather than France. So in the grand alliance of 1701 the several powers promising to endeavour to recover Flanders for a barrier was understood to be the recovering of those provinces to the king of Spain; but in this treaty the style is wholly changed: here are about twenty towns and forts of great importance, with their chattellanies and dependencies (which dependencies are likewise to be enlarged as much as possible), and the whole revenues of them to be under the perpetual military government of the Dutch, by which that republic will be entirely masters of the richest part of all Flanders, and upon any appearance of war they may put their garrisons into any other place of the Low Countries: and further, the king of Spain is to give them a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a-year, to enable them to maintain those garrisons. Why should we wonder that the Dutch are inclined to perpetuate the war, when, by an article in this treaty, the king of Spain is not to possess one single town in the Low Countries until a peace be made? The duke of Anjou, at the beginning of this war, maintained six-and-thirty thousand men out of those Spanish provinces he then possessed, to which if we add the many towns since taken, which were not in the late king of Spain's possession at the time of his death, with all their territories and dependencies, it is visible what forces the States may be able to keep, even without any charge to their peculiar dominions. The towns and chattellanies of this barrier always maintained their garrisons when they were in the hands of France; and, as it is reported, returned a considerable sum of money into the king's coffers; yet the king of Spain is obliged by this treaty (as we have already observed) to add, over and above, a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a-year. We know likewise that a great part of the revenue of the Spanish Netherlands is already pawned to the States, so that after a peace nothing will be left to the sovereign, nor will the people be much eased of the taxes they at present labour under. Thus the States, by virtue of this barrier treaty, will in effect be absolute sovereigns of all Flanders, and of the whole revenues in the utmost extent. And here I cannot, without some contempt, take notice of a sort of reasoning offered by several people, that the many towns we have taken for the Dutch are of no advantage, because the whole revenue of those towns is spent in maintaining them. For first, the fact is manifestly false, particularly as to Lisle and some others. Secondly, the States after a peace are to have four hundred thousand crowns a-year out of the remainder of Flanders, which is then to be left to Spain. And lastly, suppose all penny these acquired dominions will not bring a into their treasury, what can be of greater consequence than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conquests, which before they always did by taxing their natural subjects? How shall we be able to answer it to king Charles III. that, while we pretend to endeavour restoring him to the entire monarchy of Spain, we join at the same time with the Dutch to deprive him of his natural right to the Low Countries? But suppose by a Dutch barrier must now be understood only what is to be in possession of the States, yet, even under this acceptation of the word, nothing was originally meant except a barrier against France, whereas several towns demanded by the Dutch in this treaty can be of no use at all in such a barrier. And this is the sentiment even of Prince Eugene himself (the present oracle and idol of the party here), who says that Dendermond, Ostend, and the Castle of Gand, do in no sort belong to the barrier, nor can be of other use than to make the StatesGeneral masters of the Low Countries, and hinder their trade with England; and further that those who are acquainted with the country know very well that to fortify Lier and Halle can give no security to the States as a barrier, but only raise a jealousy in the people that those places are only fortified in order to block up Brussels and the other great towns of Brabant. In those towns of Flanders where the Dutch are to have garrisons, but the ecclesiastical and civil power to remain to the king of Spain after a peace, the States have power to send arms, ammunition, and victuals, without paying customs, under which pretence they will engross the whole trade of those towns, exclusive of all other nations. This prince Eugene likewise foresaw, and in his observations upon this treaty here annexed proposed a remedy for it. And if the Dutch shall please to think that the whole Spanish Netherlands are not a sufficient barrier for them, I know no remedy from the words of For the queen is this treaty but that we must still go on and conquer for them as long as they please. obliged whenever a peace is treated to procure for them whatever shall be thought necessary besides, and where their necessity will terminate is not very easy to foresee. Could any of her majesty's subjects conceive that in the towns we have taken for the Dutch, and given into their possession as a barrier, either the States should demand or our ministers allow that the subjects of Britain should, in respect to their trade, be used worse than they were under the late king of Spain? Yet this is the fact, as monstrous as it appears all goods going to or coming from Newport or Ostend are to pay the same duties as those that pass by the Schelde under the Dutch forts; and this, in effect, is to shut out all other nations from The English merchants at trading to Flanders. Bruges complain that, after they have paid the king of Spain's duty for goods imported at Ostend, the same goods are made liable to further duties when they are carried thence into the towns of the Dutch new conquests, and desire only the same privileges of trade they had before the death of the late king of Spain, Charles II. And in consequence of this treaty, the Dutch have already taken off eight per cent. from all goods they send to the Spanish Flanders, but left it still upon us. But what is very surprising, in the very same article where our good friends and allies are wholly shutting us out from trading in those towns we have conquered for them with so much blood and treasure, the queen is obliged to procure that the States shall be used as favourably in their trade over all the This I humbly conceive king of Spain's dominions as her own subjects or as the people most favoured. to be perfect boys'-play: "Cross I win, and pilea you lose," or "What's yours is mine, and what's mine is my own." Now, if it should happen that in a treaty of peace some ports or towns should be yielded us for the security of our trade, in any part of the Spanish dominions, at how great a distance soever, I suppose the Dutch would go on with their boys'-play and challenge half by virtue of that article: or would they be content with military government The two sides of our coin were once nominally distinguished by cross and pile, as they are now by heads and tails. and the revenues, and reckon them among what shall be thought necessary for their barrier? This prodigious article is introduced as subsequent to the treaty of Munster, made about the year 1648, at a time when England was in the utmost confusion, and very much to our disadvantage. Those parts in that treaty, so unjust in themselves and so prejudicial to our trade, ought in reason to have been remitted rather than confirmed upon us for the time to come. But this is Dutch partnership; to share in all our beneficial bargains and exclude us wholly from theirs, even from those which we have got for them. In one part of the Conduct of the Allies, among other remarks upon this treaty, I make it a question whether it were right in point of policy or prudence to call in a foreign power to be a guarantee to our succession; because by that means we put it out of the power of our legislature to alter the succession, how much soever the necessity of the kingdom may require it? To comply with the cautions of some people I explained my meaning in the following editions. I was assured that my lord chief-justice affirmed that passage was treason. One of my answerer's, I think, decides as favourably; and I am told that paragraph was read very lately during a debate, with a comment in very injurious terms, which perhaps might have been spared. That the legislature should have power to change the succession, whenever the necessities of the kingdom require, is so very useful toward preserving our religion and liberty, that I know not how to recant. The worst of this opinion is, that at first sight it appears to be whiggish; but the distinction is thus: the Whigs are for changing the succession when they think fit, although the entire legislature do not consent; I think it ought never to be done but upon great necessity, and that with the sanction of the whole legislature. Do these gentlemen of revolution principles think it impossible that we should ever have occasion again to change our succession? and if such an accident should fall out, must we have no remedy until the Seven Provinces will give their consent? Suppose that this virulent party among us were as able as some are willing to raise a rebellion for reinstating them in power, and would apply themselves to the Dutch, as guarantees of our succession, to assist them with all their force under pretence that the queen and ministry, a great majority of both houses, and the bulk of the people, were for bringing over France, popery, and the pretender? Their high mightinesses would, as I take it, be sole judges of the controversy, and probably decide it so well that in some time we might have the happiness of becoming a province to Holland. I am humbly of opinion that there are two qualities necessary to a reader before his judgment should be allowed; these are. common honesty and common sense, and that no man could have misrepresented that paragraph in my discourse unless he were utterly destitute of one or both. The presumptive successor and her immediate heirs have so established a reputation in the world for their piety, wisdom, and humanity, that no necessity of this kind is likely to appear in their days; but I must still insist that it is a diminution to the independency of the imperial crown of Great Britain to call at every door for help to put our laws in execution. And we ought to consider that, if in ages to come such a prince should happen to be in succession to our throne as should be entirely unable to govern, that very motive might incline our guarantees to support him, the more effectually to bring the rivals of their trade into confusion and disorder. But to return: the queen is here put under the unreasonable obligation of being guarantee of the whole barrier treaty; of the Dutch having possession of the said barrier and the revenues thereof before a peace; of the payment of four hundred thousand crowns by the king of Spain; that the States shall possess their barrier even before king Charles is in possession of the Spanish Netherlands, although by the fifth article of the grand alliance her majesty is under no obligation to do anything of this nature except in a general treaty. All kings, princes, and states, are invited to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution. This article, though very frequent in treaties, seems to look very oddly in that of the barrier. Popish princes are here invited among others to become guarantees of our protestant succession: every petty prince in Germany must be entreated to preserve the queen of Great Britain upon her throne. The king of Spain is invited particularly, and by name, to become guarantee of the execution of a treaty by which his allies, who pretend to fight his battles and recover his dominions, strip him in effect of all his ten provinces; a clear reason why they never sent any forces to Spain, and why the obligation not to enter into a treaty of peace with France until that entire monarchy was yielded as a preliminary was struck out of the counter-project by the Dutch. They fought only in Flanders because there they only fought for themselves. King Charles must needs accept this invitation very kindly, and stand by with great satisfaction while the Belgic lion divides the prey and assigns it all to himself. I remember there was a parcel of soldiers who robbed a farmer of his poultry, and then made him wait at table while they devoured his victuals without giving him a morsel, and upon his expostulating had only for answer, "Why, sirrah, are we not come here to protect you?" And thus much for this generous invitation to all kings and princes to lend their assistance, and become guarantees out of pure good nature for securing Flanders to the Dutch. In the treaty of Ryswick no care was taken to oblige the French king to acknowledge the right of succession in her present majesty; for want of which point being then settled, France refused to acknowledge her for queen of Great Britain after the late king's death. This unaccountable neglect (if it were a neglect) is here called an omission, and care is taken to supply it in the next general treaty of peace. I mention this occasionally, because I have some stubborn doubts within me whether it were a wilful omission or not. Neither do I herein reflect in the least upon the memory of his late majesty, whom I entirely acquit of any imputation upon this matter. But when I recollect the behaviour, the language, and the principles of some certain persons in those days, and compare them with that omission, I am tempted to draw some conclusions which a certain party would be more ready to call false and malicious than to prove them so. I must here take leave (because it will not otherwise fall in my way) to say a few words in return to a gentleman, I know not of what character or calling, who has done me the honour to write three discourses against that treatise of The Conduct of the Allies, &c., and promises for my comfort to con clude all in a fourth. I pity answerers with all my heart for the many disadvantages they lie under. My book did a world of mischief (as he calls it) before his First Part could possibly come out, and so went on through the kingdom while his limped slowly after, and if it arrived at all was too late, for people's opinions were already fixed. His manner of an |