York. In that state the legislature chooses each year one member of the state board of regents for a term of twelve years. The compensation is nominal, and the powers of the board are practically limited to the choice of a commissioner of education. This officer is well paid, and serves during the pleasure of the board as the active head of the public school system of the state. The manner of appointing the regents protects them against ordinary political influences, since it would require seven years to change a majority of the board, and thus enables them to choose the commissioner of education solely with a view to his professional attainments and administrative skill. Such a system has the advantage of taking the management of the schools as completely "out of politics" as is possible. In most states where a similar type of organization has been adopted for the department of education, the members of the board which selects the commissioner are appointed by the governor for comparatively long terms, and as the terms are ordinarily so arranged that not more than one expires in any one year, the independence of the educational department is well safeguarded. Where it is highly important, as in the management of the public schools, to reduce ordinary political influences to a minimum, this type of organization has heretofore possessed distinct advantages over the first.

The third type of departmental organization closely resembles the second. In this type, there is both an unpaid board and a well-paid expert official at the head of the department, but the division of authority between them is different from that existing in the second type. The unpaid board not only chooses the paid expert, but actively directs the administration of the department. The paid expert is nominally the agent of the board, and the latter is the principal in the conduct of affairs. Actually the relations between principal and agent will be largely determined by the character of the men themselves. An active and capable secretary of such a board will often exercise as much real influence as the commissioner in the second type of organization. Active and capable members of boards, however, may exercise much more influence than in the second type. The system has the advantage of combining the enthusiasm and personal enterprise of intelligent amateurs with

the experience and skill of the professional administrator. Under the most favorable conditions it brings together in one harmonious organization the public-spirited citizen and the bureaucrat. It is a more economical type of organization than the second or fourth types, and seems particularly well adapted for the conduct of pioneer work in new fields of administration. It was a type frequently adopted when the state governments first turned their attention to educational, agricultural, charitable, and public health administration. It has been more generally employed in some parts of the country, notably in New England, than in others. Under this type of departmental organization, for example, Horace Mann developed the work of the Massachusetts state board of education, and F. B. Sanborn that of the board of charity.

The fourth type of departmental organization is most commonly employed in those branches of administration which combine administrative and quasi-legislative powers. The members of this type of administrative board or commission, unlike those of a board of the third type, are expected to devote most or all of their time to the duties of the office, and receive suitable compensation. Their secretary is distinctly a subordinate, and, unlike the secretary of a board of the third type, receives a smaller salary than his chiefs. The power and responsibility are combined in the hands of the board or commission itself. The earliest examples of this type were the boards of equalization created in several states prior to the Civil War. Most of the early boards of equalization, however, consisted of other state officials, ex officio, or were elected by the people. After the Civil War this type of organization was adopted for the railroad and warehouse commissions of the Granger period, and is now employed for all public service commissions except those which are popularly elected. Recently it has been applied to several other branches of state administration, notably the administration of health and labor laws. Modern health and labor laws contain numerous provisions to the effect that the conditions of employment shall be reasonably safe and wholesome, that employees shall be adequately protected against the danger of industrial accident and disease, or that due care be taken to preserve the health and safety of industrial wage

earners. The enforcement of laws couched in such general terms was found to be exceedingly difficult, unless the generalities of the law were translated into specific instructions for the guidance of industrial inspectors. The legislatures were unable to do this work themselves, for it required more time and more specialized skill than they commonly possessed. The practice of leaving to the courts the interpretation of such general provisions in particular cases as they arose was slow, vexatious, and inadequate. The need arose for the determination in advance of fixed and definite sanitary and industrial rules which should serve as guides both to the official inspectors and to the public. The power to adopt such rules, like the power to regulate the rates of public utilities, seemed too broad to confide in a single administrative official. In 1911 Wisconsin, which had led the way in the creation of modern tax and public utility commissions, established a state industrial commission with a comprehensive jurisdiction over the enforcement of labor legislation of all kinds. This method of dealing with such matters came to be known as the Wisconsin idea, and has been copied in most of the states, particularly in the middle and far West, where there has been much legislation in recent years relating to social and industrial welfare. Several of these commissions, in fact, notably in the Pacific coast states, have been named industrial welfare commissions, and have received very broad powers for the regulation of hours of labor, rates of wages, and other social and industrial conditions.

The fifth type of departmental organization resembles that originally adopted for the organization of the executive department. After the abolition of the original governor's councils, except in three of the New England states, this type of organization fell into disuse. It has been recently revived and adopted for departments which exercise both ordinary administrative and extraordinary quasi-legislative powers. The first instance of its renewed use seems to have been in the Massachusetts department of boiler inspection, organized in 1907. The chief boiler inspector was charged with the duty of seeing that steam boilers were reasonably safe. The legislature was unable to define by law with sufficient accuracy the tests of safety to be applied to all kinds of boilers under all sorts of conditions. Con

sequently it provided for the creation of a board of boiler rules, which was charged with the duty of preparing standard specifications for the testing and licensing of steam boilers. This board was composed of four persons, one representative of boiler manufacturers, one representative of boiler users, one representative of stationary engineers and firemen, and one representative of boiler insurance companies, together with the chief boiler inspector, who acted as chairman. Since that time this type of departmental organization has been adopted in other cases where wide discretionary powers were delegated to administrative officials, notably in the organization of the New York and Massachusetts departments of health in 1913 and 1914, respectively, and in the organization of the New York and Pennsylvania departments of labor in 1913.1 In all these cases a single commissioner appointed by the governor is charged with the enforcement of the laws relating to health or labor conditions, as the case may be, together with the enforcement of the codes elaborated by the advisory board or council. These councils are composed of four or six representatives of the various interests most directly concerned in the work of the departments, appointed by the governor, together with the commissioner. They exercise quasi-legislative but no purely administrative powers. The commissioner is paid a suitable salary, and the members of the council are paid a smaller sum, proportioned to the work they do. Under this fifth type of organization there is a more logical application than under the fourth type of the old maxim, Many heads for counsel, one for action. It is possible to make the advisory councils more representative of the different interests concerned than the administrative commissions can ordinarily be, without sacrificing administrative efficiency on the part of the commissioners for the sake of securing their representative character. It is also possible to hold the single administrative head more strictly responsible for the good conduct of administration than can be done where there are three or more commissioners of equal authority.

1 The New York department of labor was reorganized in 1915, and a modified form of the fourth type of organization was adopted. See Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, p. 446. This book contains (ch. ix) a valuable discussion of the problem of administrative organization.

NEED FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The process of state administrative reorganization has aroused some misgivings among those who appreciate the advantages of the nineteenth century system of administrative anarchy. It has been feared that the increasing centralization of administrative power and the increasing employment of specialists and professional administrators would drive the ordinary citizen, the amateur administrator, out of the public service. This apprehension is unfounded. The plain citizens whose pride in the performance of civic duty leads them to accept local administrative offices are not being supplanted by the expert in the employ of the state. Their work for the most part is being supplemented, not supplanted, for the principal cause of centralization is the increase in the activities of the state. The process of centralization is a process of division of labor. There was never a time when there was more opportunity for publicspirited spare-time service on the part of the people of the towns and cities. There is also ever growing opportunity for specialized service on the part of experts, devoting their whole time to the solution of the social and industrial problems which a progressive civilization makes constantly more urgent and more technical. An examination of the present results of administrative reorganization indicates that the public service has not yet been so organized as to cope with these new problems most effectively. The process of centralization must go further, the process of integration must go much further, before the state governments can satisfactorily perform the newer duties that are pressing upon them. The states need a more scientific system of administrative organization. They need better arrangements for the selection and employment of experts in the more technical branches of public administration. Above all they need a real chief executive. If the governor cannot be permitted to perform the duties of such an office, the need will have to be met in some other way.

In New York and a few other states, notably Michigan and Wisconsin, the governor may remove certain local administrative officers for neglect of duty or inefficiency, namely sheriffs and district attorneys. This is good so far as it goes, but it is only the beginning of administrative reorganization.