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THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE

The change in the character of the office of governor, resulting from the reformation of the original state governments and the redivision of powers between their several branches, has brought about a corresponding change in the normal relations between the executive and the legislature. By the middle of the nineteenth century, as has been indicated, the governor had been shorn of most of his administrative responsibilities and had become primarily a legislator. The subsequent reconstruction of state administration in response to changing social and economic conditions has not restored the administrative character of the gubernatorial office. It has rather tended to enhance the importance of the governor's legislative powers, and to diminish the gap that once was supposed to separate the chief executive from the legislature.

THE EXECUTIVE VETO

The principal source of the present legislative authority of the chief executive is the veto power. In 1915 more than one thousand separate bills or parts of bills failed to become law because of executive disapproval. In thirty-nine states about 7 per cent of the total number of bills submitted to the governors for approval were vetoed. The use of the veto was very much greater in some states than in others. The governor of California disapproved 225 bills or parts of bills out of a total of 996 bills adopted by the legislature. In New York 223 bills or parts of bills out of 980 and in Pennsylvania 211 out of 1003 were the subject of executive disapproval. At the other extreme, there was no use of the veto in Rhode Island, and in four states there was only one veto each. Doubtless many factors affect the use of the veto power by the state governors, but the most important is the nature of the power itself. In the states where the governor could veto separate items in appropriation bills there were nearly ten times as many vetoes in proportion to the total number of bills as in the states where the governors did not possess that power. In the latter class

of states the governors vetoed on the average about one bill in seventy. In the former class they vetoed either as a whole or in part on the average about one in seven. The veto power is in general effective. Comparatively few measures are reenacted by the legislatures after they have been returned without the approval of the executive. In 1915 in only five out of thirty-nine states were any bills or parts of bills passed over the executive veto. Out of a total of 1066 vetoes only twentytwo were overriden by the legislatures. In other words, 98 per cent of all the vetoes were effective.

The effectiveness of the veto power as a means of executive control of legislation is increased by the rules adopted in many states governing the use of the so-called "pocket" veto. By the Federal Constitution the President is allowed ten days in which to examine congressional enactments and affix his signature to those he approves. A bill becomes law without his approval, if he fails to return it within that period to the house in which it originated with a statement of the reasons for his disapproval. But if Congress adjourns within ten days after sending a bill to the President, and his signature is not affixed before adjournment, the bill does not become law. Failure on the part of the President to sign such a bill before the adjournment of Congress operates therefore as an absolute veto, and is called the "pocket" veto. A similar rule existed in many of the states and was found to work badly. Because of the constitutional limitations upon the length of legislative sessions and the practice of adopting most legislation in the closing days of the session, the governors had insufficient time in which to examine the bills submitted to them for approval. Consequently they were forced either to sign many bills which, could they examine them with care, they would veto, or else to run the risk of "killing" measures which might on careful examination prove unobjectionable. In order to remove this difficulty, many states have provided that bills shall become law unless vetoed by the governor within a specified period after the adjournment of the legislature. This period extends from five days in several states to thirty days in Pennsylvania and a few others. Such a rule gives the governor more opportunity to examine the legislative output, and enables him to exercise

his absolute veto more deliberately and confidently. In a few states, notably New York and California, the governor's power is even stronger. He is allowed thirty days for the examination of bills enacted at the close of the session, and no bill becomes a law unless signed by him within that period. In such states the governor sits after the close of the legislative session practically as a third chamber. He grants hearings to advocates and opponents of measures which have received legislative approval, refers legal and financial questions to his attorney-general or other advisers, and in general does what he can to determine for himself whether the measures proposed by the legislature should be enacted. In such states as New York, Pennsylvania, and California, the legislative output is so great that even in thirty days the governor cannot examine it all for himself. He must delegate a part of the task to others, organize a council of revision, so to speak, and rely in many cases upon the advice of his informal councilors. Thus ancient practices reappear under modern forms.

The increase in the effectiveness of the veto power has reacted upon the general position of the governor and his relation to the legislature. His influence over legislation is much greater than is indicated by the number of bills actually vetoed by him. Many bills which it is known the governor will not approve will not be adopted by the legislature, or will be amended in the hope of removing the grounds of executive disapproval. Legislators may even support measures known to be favored by the executive in order to avoid executive disapproval of private and local bills in which they may be especially interested. Since the effectiveness of the veto power is a matter of common knowledge, the promoters of legislation often seek executive approval for proposed legislation before its introduction into the legislatures. The governors are induced, if possible, to endorse important projects of legislation in their annual messages to the legislatures, or to assist them by sending in special messages. The executive messages are looked to by the people of the states as legislative programs, and consequently exert a greater influence upon the course of legislation than any speeches that may be pronounced by ordinary members on the floor of either house. Members are prone to look to the governor not

only to outline the legislative program, but also to prevent the adoption of undesirable legislation which it may be inconvenient for them to defeat. This shifting of responsibility has gone so far in some states that the governor exerts a more powerful ' and beneficial check upon legislation adopted by both houses than either house does upon that adopted by the other. This seems to be the case, for example, in New York. In California an instance is recorded where the legislature passed two contradictory bills dealing with the same subject, with the expectation that the governor would approve the better of the two and disapprove the other.2 In short, the veto power, especially in the states where it exists in its most effective form, has enormously enhanced the authority of the governor in his dealings with the legislature.

The growth of the legislative authority of the governor has been accompanied by a change in the conception of the office itself. Originally the governor was armed with the veto power primarily in order that he might protect his own office and the executive department generally against legislative encroachments. It seems to have been anticipated that such encroachments were most likely to come in the form of unconstitutional enactments, which the veto power might help to avert. The use of the veto power to control legislation not directly relating to the interests of the executive was a secondary consideration.3 At present, however, few vetoes are for the purpose of defending the constitutional prerogatives of the executive. Only a small proportion of the vetoes apply to important public general acts. Most of them deal with ill considered or badly drawn public acts of minor importance, private and local measures, and appropriations, particularly for salaries and special objects of various kinds. Governor Hughes of New York headed his omnibus veto message of 1910, covering 118 bills which he declined to approve after the close of the session, as follows:-"The following bills are not approved because they are either duplicates or unnecessary, or are defectively drawn, or are embraced in or conflict with bills already signed, or are unconstitutional, or are

1 See D. C. Colvin, The Bicameral Principle in the New York Legislature, p. 112. 2 See P. S. Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, p. 284. See The Federalist, no. 73.

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for purposes which can be suitably accomplished under general laws, or should be provided for, if at all, by amendments to the general law, or are objectionable and inadvisable by reason of proposed changes." In short, the office of governor tends to be regarded as an agency for supplying the deficiencies in the legislative branch of state government which result from the defective organization of the legislatures and from defective legislative procedure.

APPROPRIATIONS AND FINANCE

The development of the veto power has thrown upon the governor in two-thirds of the states important duties in connection with the revision of appropriations after they have been made by the legislature. But the states have been much slower to give the governor a voice in the preparation of appropriation bills before they are acted upon in the legislature. The natural jealousy of the executive power at the time of the Revolution caused the people of the original states to put complete control of public finance in the legislatures, and, subject to the veto power, there it has remained.

The traditional practice in the American states with respect to the voting of the appropriations is thoroughly consistent with a decentralized and disintegrated administrative system. Appropriations for certain purposes are required and their amounts may even be fixed by the state constitutions. Chief among these are the salaries of the members of the legislature, of the principal executive officers, and of the judiciary. Other appropriations are determined by the legislatures. In a dozen states, including several of the largest, all appropriations are limited to two years. Elsewhere the legislatures may make the appropriations for such period as they please. A few states, notably Michigan and Wisconsin, provide permanent appropriations for the principal objects of expenditure. A tendency towards permanent appropriations for certain purposes, notably education, is quite general. Special appropriations for private and local objects are often made without any limit of time.

1 See D. L. Colvin, The Bicameral Principle in the New York Legislature, p. 115.

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