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CHAPTER XIV

THE FURTHER REFORM OF STATE GOVERNMENT

Two conclusions stand out clearly from the study of state government in the United States. In the first place, it is evident that the governments of the states are now very different from what they were in the beginning. We are accustomed to look back at the institutions of the Fathers with veneration and awe. The truth is, so far as state government is concerned, that the institutions originally established were for the most part very imperfect. The people of all the states began with the same fundamental principles, popular sovereignty and the reign of law. But there was no agreement upon methods of reducing those principles to practice. Some of the methods originally employed were well devised and have endured. The government of Massachusetts, the most carefully planned and best balanced of the original state governments, is still carried on under the original constitution. In that state the character of the government has been much more affected by the growth of parties and the development of administrative activities than by the formal amendment of the constitution. In most of the original states, however, the first governments were not carefully planned and have been greatly altered by constitutional changes. These changes have been many and various, but, as already indicated, they may all be classified under one or the other of two heads. The changes falling under the first head have to do with the democratization of the forms of government. The electorates have been made broader and more completely representative of the people. Their control over the other branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, has been strengthened. The changes falling under the second head have to do with the redivision of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The legislatures, practically supreme in most

of the original states, have been subjected to more effective checks, and a better balance has been established between them and the coördinate branches. The result is that state government is now not only very different, but also on the whole very much better than it was in the beginning.

The second conclusion to be drawn from the study of the government of the states is that the process of change by which the improvement of state government has been accomplished has not yet come to an end. The state governments are expected to do a great deal more for the people than in the beginning, and many things no doubt are now done much better. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that state government is not very efficient and in some cases not even decent. Whilst much of the dissatisfaction with the state governments must be ascribed to the imperfections of human nature, it is evident that the forms of government also still remain imperfect. The people have betrayed their dissatisfaction by the continual discussion of fresh expedients for further reform. In recent years some of these expedients have been adopted, notably the direct primary, the regulation of the use of money in elections, and, to a more limited extent, direct legislation and the recall. But in general public opinion seems bewildered by the variety of expedients that are offered. There is no agreement yet concerning the proper qualifications for the suffrage or the best methods of making nominations and conducting elections. There is no agreement concerning the organization or powers of the legislatures, executives, and judiciary. There is no agreement concerning the functions of the electorates or the methods of changing the state constitutions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the recent discussion of the need for further reform has as yet been followed by a disproportionately small amount of actual achievement. There is no reason to suppose, however, that either the popular dissatisfaction or the discussion of expedients for further reform will cease, while political conditions in the states remain as they are at present. State government in the future, as in the past, will probably be very different from what it is now. If the right expedients are now adopted, it ought also to be very much better. The changes in state government now most frequently proposed for adoption, like those already adopted, may all be

classified under one or the other of two heads. First, there are those intended to broaden the electorates and give them greater control over the conduct of public affairs. Secondly, there are those intended to impose further limitations upon the powers of the legislatures and to increase the authority and usefulness of the executives and judiciary. The first class of changes, now as in the beginning, are advocated for the purpose of making the state governments more popular; the second, to make them more efficient. Most contemporary plans for the further reform of state government, however, deal only with special cases of imperfection. Specific remedies are suggested for specific evils, regardless of their bearing upon the government of the state in other respects. The messages of the governors, for example, in recent years have frequently contained suggestions for changes in the conduct of elections, as by the adoption of better ballot laws, or for changes in the organization and procedure of the legislatures, as by the adoption of the unicameral system, or in the executives, as by the introduction of the budget system, or in the judiciaries, as by the reform of the use of injunctions or of the system of trials of appeals. But plans for the systematic revision of state government as a whole are comparatively infrequent. When politicians or reformers do take a broader view of the problems of state government, their attention seems generally to be directed either to the further democratization of the forms of government in the interest of greater popular control or to the further redivision of powers between the legislatures and the coördinate branches in the interest of greater efficiency, but rarely to both at once. Several noteworthy plans for the more or less general reform of state government, however, have recently been put forth.

I

THE COMMISSION PLAN

The most radical of the various plans for the further reform of state government is the commission plan. The commission plan for states is based upon the commission plan for cities, the principal features of which are the following: (1) the concen

tration of all legislative and executive authority in a single small body, the commission, consisting usually of five members; (2) the exercise of legislative powers by the commission as a whole; (3) the exercise of executive powers by each commissioner over a separate department of administration; (4) the election of the commissioners at large; and (5) the enforcement of responsibility to the people and the maintenance of continuous popular control over both the legislative and the administrative acts of the commission and of each commissioner by means of the direct popular referendum, initiative, and recall. Considerable variation in details is to be found among the charters of commission-governed cities, but in general the differences are of minor importance. The terms for which commissioners are elected range from one to six years, two and four year terms being the most common, and are usually so adjusted that they expire one or two at a time. In most cities where the commission plan has been adopted the assignment of departments to the several commissioners is made by the commission itself, but in some cities each commissioner is elected to take charge of a particular department, and the commission as a whole cannot alter his administrative duties, except by altering the organization and functions of the department, so far as permitted by the charter. In most cities the commissioners are nominated in a non-partisan primary and elected without party designation of any sort. In some the primary has been abolished and in its place the preferential ballot is employed at the election. Subordinate officials are often protected by the merit system, and partisan control of patronage and partisanship in general are so far as possible eliminated.

The commission plan, as applied in the cities, has demonstrated its possession of many advantages.1 The concentration of powers has put an end to the friction between mayors and councils that often occurred in cities governed in accordance with the traditional plan, and has centralized responsibility for the management of municipal affairs. It has facilitated the adoption of businesslike methods in the conduct of the public business and stimulated attention to economy and efficiency. If the adoption of the commission plan has not greatly altered the per1 See W. B. Munro, The Government of American Cities, pp. 304-310.

sonnel of municipal government, it has unquestionably improved the tone of municipal politics. On the other hand, its limitations are equally apparent. It restricts the public service, at least so far as holding political offices are concerned, much more narrowly than the older system of municipal government. It offers no security for an adequately representative government in cities with a large and variegated population. It provides an administration, which, unless it is to be dangerously susceptible to sinister control, requires for the protection of the public a large measure of publicity in all its proceedings and a watchful citizenry. In particular, the concentration of the appropriating and the spending power in the same hands may lead the commissioners into grave temptations, unless they are adequately checked by the instruments of direct popular control, the referendum, initiative, and recall. In the smaller cities, however, these limitations are not seriously felt. In all kinds of cities the commission plan promises a frame of government which the voters can readily understand, a consideration which doubtless has greatly aided in promoting its rapid and widespread adoption. As a leading authority on the government of cities has well said, the advocates of the commission plan have "rendered a real service in directing public attention to the most urgent need of the American municipal system, the simplification of a machine which is far too complex for the work that it has to do. As a protest against the old municipal régime it has been effective; as a policy it has, despite incidental shortcomings, fulfilled much of what its sponsors have claimed for it." 1

The adoption of the commission plan for cities, and the accompanying marked improvement in the tone and results of municipal government, inevitably led to the suggestion of the commission plan for states. To the advocates of the commission plan it was enough to point to the conditions in commissiongoverned cities. To the careful student of state government, however, that argument was inconclusive. In the first place, it is evident that much of the improvement in the character of municipal government that has followed the rapid spread of the commission plan has been the result of features commonly introduced with the commission plan, but not essential to it. Non

1 Munro, op. cit., p. 319.

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