the two transfers was $30 per acre or $19,200, the purchasers assuming encumbrances as a part of the purchase price. It was further found that the Frieds were to charge Collard with the balance of any and all accounts which they had against Collard, and, as soon as the sums so assumed could be ascertained, they, the Frieds, would pay to Collard the balance found to be due on the purchase. The court then found (without itemizing) that the Frieds had paid encumbrances against the land and assumed others, "making the total amount assumed, paid, and charged, as and for the purchase price and properly applied thereon, the sum of $17,418.24." It then found that there still remained due to Collard $1,881.76, and it placed the amount of Collard's equity in the land at this sum, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent from the date of sale, and further found "that the payment of said amount by the said defendants Fried is the only condition attached to said transaction to prevent them from being the fee holders and owners thereof." The question now is, Did the 1914 book account constitute a part of the sum of $17,418.24, credited to Collard upon the purchase price in the above finding?

A careful examination of the transcript of the testimony upon which the above findings were based discloses that the book account for the year 1914 did not enter into the consideration for either of the transfers. On the contrary, it shows that the debit items, amounting to $475.44, were partially offset in the statement by credit allowances for Collard's share of crops delivered to Fried and sold by him, and that neither the crops nor the accounts subsequent to the execution of the second deed entered into the consideration or the findings. In view of this fact, it was clearly error for the trial court in this action to exclude the testimony in support of the counterclaim based upon the book account of 1914. This error cannot be corrected without a retrial of this action, unless the judgment creditor will voluntarily allow credit upon the judgment for the sum of $390.53, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from January 1st, 1915, to date. The order of this court is that, upon the filing of a confession of judgment in the district court on the defendant's counterclaim in the above amount, the judgment appealed from be, and hereby is, affirmed; and that neither party recover costs on this appeal; otherwise the judgment is reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA EX REL. N. B. LIVINGSTON, Respondent, v. F. W. ROSE, C. L. Tompkins, Tom Smith, G. J. Peterson, W. N. Hocking, Members of the North Dakota Board of Dental Examiners, Appellants.

Where the evidence is not contained in the record transmitted to this court, it must be assumed that the evidence adduced upon the trial established the facts as found by the trial court.

Opinion filed January 9, 1919.

From a judgment of the District Court of Ward County, Leighton, J., defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

William Langer, Attorney General, Daniel Brennan, Assistant Attorney General, and O. B. Herigstad, State's Attorney, Ward county, for appellants.

The appellants claim that the respondent has not complied with the laws of this state, nor does his complaint or petition herein contain a statement of facts showing his compliance with the laws of this state, or that he is a properly qualified person to admit to the practice of dentistry in this state. There is no showing that respondent ever presented to these appellants, the dental board, any evidence of his preliminary high school education which entitles him to admission without condition to the freshman class in the College of Liberal Arts of the University of North Dakota, and he is not entitled to take the examination under the laws of this state. Sess. Laws 1915, chap. 119, § 2; Comp. Laws 1913, § 510; Sess. Laws 1911, chap. 280.

Sinkler & Eide and Fisk & Murphy, for respondent.

The petition here was not subject to attack by demurrer, the proper practice being a motion to quash the alternative writ. State v. Olson, 30 S. D. 460, 139 N. W. 109.

This being a special proceeding of a civil nature, the findings upon

disputed questions of fact have the force of a verdict, and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them. Schmidt v. Anderson, 29 N. D. 262, 150 N. W. 871; State ex rel. Trimble v. St. Paul & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 28 N. D. 621, 150 N. W. 463.

The statute here under consideration is reciprocal in its nature, and should be given a liberal construction. Laws 1915, § 2, chap. 119.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order granting a writ of mandamus directing defendants as members of the North Dakota Board of Dental Examiners to issue to the petitioner N. B. Livingston, a license to practise dentistry in the state of North Dakota. The return of answer alleges that the laws of Arkansas, where the petitioner formerly practised his profession, did not maintain a standard equal to that required in this state, and that therefore the petitioner was not entitled to be admitted to practise under the provisions of § 2, of chapter 19, of the Laws of 1915. The case comes to this court upon the judgment roll alone. No statement of the case has been settled. Hence, it must be assumed that the facts as found by the trial court were established by the evidence. The trial court found that the standard established by the laws of Arkansas was equal to that established by this state. Ordinarily the laws of a sister state must be pleaded and proved as facts. 5 Enc. Ev. 808. But in this state the judge, upon being called upon to do so, may take judicial notice "of the laws of a sister state when the printed and authenticated volumes are presented to the court for examination." Comp. Laws 1913, § 7938, subd. 63. In the case at bar the findings of fact of the trial court sustained the conclusions drawn. And in the absence of the evidence, we are in no position to review the correctness of the findings or determine whether they are in fact sustained by the evidence. The judgment of the District Court must therefore be affirmed. It is so ordered.

GRACE, J. I concur in the result.

ROY REICHERT, Respondent, v. C. W. REICHERT, Appellant.

County court

final decree

(170 N. W. 621.)

vacating or opening

cannot after one year. 1. After the expiration of one year from the date of entry of a final decree, the county court has no authority to vacate or open up the same upon grounds of fraud, deception, or misrepresentation.

2. Sections 8534, 8595, and 8596, Compiled Laws 1913, construed and held to prescribe the power of a county court to open up and vacate a final decree, the grounds therefor, and the limitations of time thereupon.

3. Where a final decree was entered in a guardianship estate on August 11, 1911, and a petition to vacate the same was filed in the county court on March 31, 1916, and thereafter an appeal was taken to the district court from an order of the county court, vacating such decree and a trial de novo had, the trial court erred in affirming the order of such county court.

Appeal from the District Court of Foster County.

Action to vacate final decree of county court.

From an order of the district court affirming the order of the county court the defendant appeals.

Reversed, with direction to reverse the order of the county court and to dismiss the proceeding therein to vacate such final decree.

Edward P. Kelly, for appellant.

An order or decree of distribution made by a county court is of equal rank with judgments entered by courts of record. Comp. Laws 1913, § 8837; Sjoli v. Hogenson, 19 N. D. 82, 122 N. W. 1008.

A decree allowing final account is conclusive except where right of appeal is allowed or relief in other court permitted, or where persons against whom decree is made are under legal disability. Re Nelson, 26 S. D. 615, 125 N. W. 113.

That a former judgment or decree can be set aside and annulled for fraud, there can be no question, but it must be a fraud extrinsic and collateral to the questions examined and determined in the action, and

it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason for the rule is that there must be an end of the litigation. Graves v. Graves (Iowa) 109 N. W. 707; Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 27 Pac. 970; Mahoney v. State Ins. Co. 110 N. W. 1041; Hedrick v. Smith & Read, 115 N. W. 226; Richards v. Moran (Iowa) 114 N. W. 1035; Clark v. Lee (Minn.) 59 N. W. 970; Keighler v. Savage Mfg. Co. 71 Am. Dec. 600; Reeves v. Reeves (S. D.) 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574; South Haven & Eastern R. Co. v. Colner, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 564; Zeitland v. Zeitland (Mass.) 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 569; Bleakley v. Barclay (Kan.) 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 230; Moore v. Gulley (N. C.) 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 242; Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N. D. 343; Casey v. Powell, 73 Am. Dec. 211.

That a judgment was confessedly procured by perjury gives a court of equity no jurisdiction to enjoin its enforcement. Reeves v. Reeves (S. D.) 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574; South Haven & E. R. Co. v. Colner, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 564; Zeitland v. Zeitland (Mass.) 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 569; Bleakley v. Barclay (Kan.) 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 230; Moore v. Gulley (N. C.) 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 242; Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N. D. 343; Casey v. Powell, 73 Am. Dec. 211.

T. F. McCue, for respondent.

Courts possess the inherent power to vacate and set aside collusive and fraudulent judgments, notwithstanding that more than one year has elapsed after their entry. Williams v. School Dist. 21 N. D. 198; Yorke v. Yorke, 3 N. D. 343; Freeman v. Wood, 11 N. D. 7.

A guardian who conceals from the court the fact that he has bought land with his ward's money commits a fraud and deception on the court, for which relief will be granted. Gilbreath v. Teufel, 15 N. D. 152; Bergin v. Haight, 33 Pac. 760; Campbell v. Campbell, 92 Pac. 184; Code § 5852; 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 123, 125, 127; Leach v. Leach (Wis.) 26 N. W. 754; Ross v. Conway, 28 Pac. 786.

Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practised upon him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of compromise, or anything that prevents a real trial or contest, there exist reasons for which a suit may be sustained to annul and set aside the former judgments or decree and open the case for a new trial and a fair