matters are proper for first consideration and adjustment by the Commission. National Council, F. C. A. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 34 Inters. Com. Rep. 60; New York State Shippers Asso. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 30 Inters. Com. Rep. 437; Southern Missouri Millers Club v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 26 Inters. Com. Rep. 245, 251; National Wholesale Lumber Dealers Asso. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 14 Inters. Com. Rep. 154; Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 10 Inters. Com. Rep. 505, 532; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 10 Inters. Com. Rep. 548, 575; Loomis v. Lehigh R. Co. 240 U. S. 43.

All such matters as are here presented are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Commission and the courts will decline to act or adjudicate upon them until the Commission has had opportunity to hear and pass upon them. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 239 U. S. 556; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Co. 204 U. S. 426; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co. 215 U S. 481; Robinsen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 222 U. S. 506; Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 230 U. S. 247; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 231 U. S. 304; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352; Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tie Co. 234 U. S. 138; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co. 237 U. S. 121; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co. 238 U. S. 456.

This case presents problems which directly concern rate making and are entirely administrative in their nature. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 232 U. S. 199; R. R. v. Puritan Coal Co. supra; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co. supra, pp. 469, 470; National Lumber Asso. v. R. R. 14 Inters. Com. Rep. 154; New York Shippers Asso. v. New York C. R. Co. 30 Inters. Com. Rep. 437.

CHRISTIANSON, J. This action was brought to recover moneys expended by the plaintiff in coopering and lining certain freight cars which the defendant furnished to the plaintiff in which to ship grain over defendant's railroad.

In its complaint plaintiff alleges "that at the several times between September 15, 1915, and December 31, 1915, and at several times during the months of January, March, April, and May, 1916, as appears from the annexed schedule, the plaintiff was a shipper of

numerous carloads of grain consisting of wheat, rye, flax, and barley over the railway of said company from Wolseth, North Dakota, to St. Paul, Minnesota," that for each shipment or carload the freight car furnished by the defendant was not properly lined or coopered fər receiving or containing the kind of grain sought to be shipped, and that defendant failed and neglected when requested to repair the same and put it in readiness for shipment within four hours after due notice of the defect had been given to the defendant's agent; that the plaintiff was obliged to line and cooper the cars, and pay out and expend on the several cars the sum shown in the schedule annexed to the complaint amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $151.41.

The defendant in its answer denies the allegations of the complaint and affirmatively alleges that the claims referred to in the complaint arose incident to interstate commerce shipments and in the course of interstate commerce; that the defendant was an interstate carrier, and that at the time of the shipment referred to in the complaint it had filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission the tariffs under which such shipments were made, and that said tariffs did not provide for payment or allowances for repairs of cars or cooperage of the character described in the complaint or otherwise; that said rates had been duly approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission and published and promulgated as required by law, and were then in full force and effect; that the state statute relating to cooperage has no application to interstate shipments and that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but that the same is one for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel made a motion for a directed verdict on substantially the same grounds, set out in the affirmative defense. The motion was granted. Judgment was entered dismissing the action and plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff predicates its right to recover upon § 4707, Comp. Laws 1913, which provides: "Every railroad corporation or common carrier doing business in this state shall when requested by any shipper of wheat, flax, or other grain, flour or flour mill products, furnish to such shipper a box car or box cars properly lined or coopered for receiving and containing the kind of grain, flour or flour mill products sought to be shipped and if such railroad, railroad corporation

or common carrier shall furnish any car not so lined or coopered to such shipper and shall fail to prepare and put in readiness such car within four hours after notice by such shipper to its agent at point of shipment that such car is not in proper condition such shipper may repair such car at his own expense and recover such sum so expended in a civil action against such railroad corporation or common carrier." Plaintiff also contends that this section is merely declaratory of the common law, and merely aids a shipper in enforcing a commonlaw obligation against a carrier.

The Federal Constitution expressly grants power to Congress to regulate commerce among the several states and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution.

"The authority of Congress extends to every part of interstate commerce and to every instrumentality or agency by which it is carried on; and the full control by Congress over the subjects committed to its regulation is not to be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations." Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18.

The object of vesting such power in Congress was to insure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse, and uniformity of regulation, against conflicting and discriminatory state legislation. 7 Enc. U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 303. There can be no divided authority over interstate commerce. The regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme. And when Congress sees proper to act with respect to any particular branch of interstate commerce, state regulations in conflict therewith or acting on the same subject, are thereby superseded. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co. 226 U. S. 426, 57 L. ed. 284, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 203, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; 5 R. C. L. p. 704.

The Interstate Commerce Act provides that it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of the act, to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any par

ticular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. Michie, Carr. § 4016.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has been vested with plenary administrative power to enforce the provisions of the act. Under the powers conferred the Interstate Commerce Commission may supervise the conduct of carriers, hear complaints concerning the violations of the act, investigate the same, and if the complaints are well founded it may direct not only the making of reparation to the injured person, but may order the carrier to desist from such violation in the future. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 222 U. S. 506, 56 L. ed. 288, 32 Sup Ct. Rep.

114.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive jurisdiction "to determine whether a regulation or a practice affecting rates or matters sought to be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act is unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, preferential, or prejudicial." Michie, Carr. § 4156. And the courts have no power to originally hear complaints upon any of the matters sought to be regulated by the act and within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil. Co. supra. "The effect of the act is not merely to suspend the right of a shipper to maintain an action at law to recover damages resulting from an unreasonable rate or discriminating regulation or practice established by an interstate carrier while such rate or regulation remains in force, but to supersede such right entirely, and substitute therefor the remedy provided by the act itself." Michie, Carr. § 4156.

"The dominating purpose of the statute," said Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court in the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 419, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1550, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18, "was to secure conformity to the prescribed standards through the examination and application of the complex facts of transportation by the body created for that purpose, and, as this court has repeatedly held, it would be destructive of the system of regulation defined by the statute if the court, without the preliminary action of the Commission, were to

undertake to pass upon the administrative questions which the statute has primarily confided to it."

The effect of the act to regulate commerce upon the various problems arising with respect to the interstate traffic has been considered and expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co. 226 U. S. 426, 57 L. ed. 284, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 203, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174, that court held that the Minnesota Reciprocal Demurrage Law was invalid and ineffective as applied to cars used in interstate traffic. In discussing the Interstate Commerce Act and its effect on the Minnesota statute, the court said:-"As legislation concerning the delivery of cars for the carriage of interstate traffic was clearly a matter of interstate commerce regulation, even if such subject was embraced within that class of powers concerning which the state had a right to exert its authority in the absence of legislation by Congress, it must follow in consequence of the action of Congress to which we have referred that the power of the state over the subject-matter ceased to exist from the moment that Congress exerted its paramount and all embracing authority over the subject. We say this because the elementary an! long-settled doctrine is that there can be no divided. authority over interstate commerce, and that the regulations of Congress on that subject are supreme."

In Illinois C. R. Co. v. De Fuentes, 236 U. S. 157, 59 L. ed. 517, P.U.R.1915A, 840, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275, the court held that "Congress has so far undertaken to regulate the subject as to invalidate, as an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce, an order of a state railroad commission under which a carrier may be required, upon demand of a carrier or shipper, and on terms fixed by the commission, to switch empty cars from any connection with a competing interstate railway to a designated side track within its own terminals in a city, for the purpose of being loaded there with goods intended for interstate commerce, and when so loaded, to move the same back to the competitor's line for continued transportation to another state, and also to accept from competing interstate lines at points within the city loaded cars brought from other states, and place them on its own side track although such side track was the real destination contemplated at the time of the original shipment."