That the power of regulating the trade of the province, reserved by the parliament of the United Kingdom, however beneficially it may have been exercised on several occasions for the prosperity of the colony and the general good of the empire, has, nevertheless, from the variations and uncertainty of the duration of its enactments, occasional injurious uncertainty in mercantile speculations, and prejudicial fluctuations in the value of real estate in the country, and in the different branches of industry particularly connected with trade.

That the inhabitants of the different towns, parishes, townships, extraparochial places and counties of this province, suffer from the want of sufficient legal powers for regulating and managing their several local concerns indispensable to improvement and their common welfare.

That much uncertainty and confusion has been introduced into laws for the security and regulation of property, by the intermixture of different codes of laws and rules of proceeding in the courts of justice; and that the administration of justice is become insufficient and unnecessarily expensive.

That this uncertainty and confusion has been greatly increased by enactments affecting real property within the colony, made in the parliament of the United Kingdom since the establishment of the provincial parliament, without those interested having even had an opportunity of being heard, and particularly by a recent decision on one of the said enactments in the provincial court of appeals.

That several of the judges in the courts in this province have long been engaged in, and have even taken a public part in the political affairs and differences of the province, at the same time holding offices during pleasure, and situations incompatible with the due discharge of their judicial functions, tending to destroy that confidence in their impartiality, in cases where the executive government is concerned, which is so essential to the peace and well-being of the community.

That during a long series of years, executive and judiciary offices have been bestowed almost exclusively upon one class of subjects in this province, and especially upon those the least connected by property or otherwise with its permanent inhabitants, or who have shewn themselves the most averse to the rights, liberties and interests of the people.

That holding executive offices essential to the proper and regular administration of the government, and having lost the confidence of the country, several of these persons avail themselves of means afforded by their situations, to prevent constitutional and harmonious co-operation of the government and the house of assembly, and to excite ill-feeling and discord between them, while they are remiss in their different situations to forward the public business.

That there exists no sufficient responsibility on the part of the persons holding these situations, nor any adequate accountability among those of them entrusted with public money, the consequence of which has been, the misapplication of large sums of public money, the loss of large sums of public money and of the money of individuals, by defaulters, with whom deposits were made, under legal authority, hitherto without reimbursement or redress having been obtained, norwithstanding the humble representations of your petitioners.

That the evils of this state of things have been greatly aggravated, by enactments made in the parliament of the United Kingdom, without even the knowledge of the people of this colony, which enactments have rendered temporary duties imposed by the provincial parliament permanent; leaving in the hands of public officers, over whom the assembly have no effectual controul, large sums of money arising within this province, which is applied by persons subject to no sufficient accountability.

That the selection of legislative councillors has also been chiefly confined to the description of the inhabitants of the province before mentioned, or to public officers holding situations during pleasure, with large salaries paid out of the public revenue, and who, uniting in the same persons legisiative, executive and judiciary powers, countenance, encourage and uphold

14 G. 3, c. 88.

abuses, and render all legislative remedies in the provincial legislature nearly impracticable.

That while the people of this province suffer under the present state of things, and endeavour to obtain redress, they are not the less sensible of the advantages which they enjoy under your Majesty's government, and perticularly of the more liberal policy adopted towards this colony within the last two years; they nevertheless feel with sentiments of the deepest regret, that the hopes with which they were cheered, after a long period of unmerited suffering and insult, have been greatly dimin hed by the delays which have occurred in redressing many of the grievances complained of in their humble petition to the king and parliament in 1828, most of which were recommended to be removed by the select committee of the honorable the house of commons on the state of Canada, which reported in the same year; particularly

The interspersion of crown and clergy reserves among the lands granted by the crown.

The evils resulting from Imperial legislation for the internal concerns of the colony.

The composition of the legislative council.

The dependence of the judges, and their interference with the political concerns of the province.

The want of responsibility and accountability of public officers, and of a tribunal in the colony for the trial of impeachments.

The withholding of the revenues of the estates of the late order of jesuits, from the purposes of education.

The management of the waste lands of the crown, in consequence of which applicants for actual occupation are prevented from freely possessing the same under secure titles, in sufficient quantities for cultivation, without unnecessary delay, and without any expense or burthen, other than the fair and necessary costs of survey and title.

Your petitioners most respectfully submit, that most of the grievances and subjects of complaint above set forth, may be remedied by your Majesty's royal prerogative, and that such a result would be equally advantageous to all classes of your Majesty's faithful subjects in this province, and to the general welfare of the empire.

Wherefore your petitioners most humble pray that your Majesty will be pleased to take this their humble petition into your gracious consideration, and exercise your royal prerogative for remedy of the evils of which they complain, to the end that they may be wholly and for ever removed. And, as in duty bound, your petitioners will ever pray.

CX

CANADIAN REVENUE CONTROL ACT, 18311

(1 & 2, William IV, c. 23.)

An Act to amend an Act of the fourteenth year of His Majesty King George the Third, for establishing a fund towards defraying the charges of the administration of justice and support of the civil gov ernment within the Province of Quebec in America.

22ND SEPTEMBER, 1831.

Whereas by an Act passed in the fourteenth year of the reign of his late Majesty, King George, the Third, intituled "An Act to establish a Fund towards further defraying the charges of the administration of justice and support of the Civil Government within the Province of Quebec in America," it was amongst other things enacted that from and after the fifth day of April, one thousand, seven hundred and seventy-five, there should be raised, levied, collected and paid unto his said late Majesty, his 1 This Act was violently opposed by the Duke of Wellington. (See Lord's Journals, 6 Sept., 1831.) See No. XXVI.

heirs and successors, for and upon the respective goods thereinafter mentioned, which should be imported and brought into any port of the said Province, over and above all other duties then payable in the said Province by any Act or Acts of Parliament, the several rates and duties therein mentioned; (that is to say,) for every gallon of brandy or other spirits of the manufacture of Great Britain, three-pence; for every gallon of rum or other spirits, which should be imported or brought from any of his Majesty's sugar colonies in the West Indies, six-pence; for every gallon of rum or other spirits which should be imported or brought from any other of his Majesty's colonies or dominions in America, nine-pence; for every gallon of foreign brandy, or other spirits of foreign manufacture, imported or brought from Great Britain, one shilling; for every gallon of ium or of the produce or manufactures of any of the Colonies or Plantations in America not in the possession or under the Dominion of his Majesty imported from any other place except Great Britain, one shilling; for every gallon of molasses and syrups which should be imported or brought in the said Province in ships or vessels belonging to his Majesty's subjects in Great Britain or Ireland, or to his Majesty's subjects in the said Province, three-pence; for every gallon of molasses and syrups which should be imported or brought into the said Province in any other ships or vessels in which the same might be legally imported, six-pence; and after those rates for any greater or less quantity of such goods respectively; and it was thereby further enacted that all the monies that should arise by the said duties (except the necessary charges of raising, collecting, levying, recovering, answering, paying, and accounting for the same) should be paid by the Collector of his Majesty's customs into the hands of his Majesty's Receiver-General in the said Province for the time being, and should be applied in the first place in making a more certain and adequate provision towards defraying the expenses of the administration of justice and of the support of the Civil Government in the said Province; and that the Lord High Treasurer, or the Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, or any three or more of them for the time being should be and they were thereby empowered from time to time by any warrant or warrants under his or their hand or hands, to cause such money to be applied out of the said produce of the said duties towards defraying said expenses; and it was thereby enacted that the residue of the said duties should remain and be reserved in the hands of the said Receiver-General for the future dispositions of Parliament: And whereas the said Province of Quebec hath since the enactment of the said Act been divided into the two Provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada: And whereas it is expedient to make further provision for the appropriation of the duties raised, levied and collected under the said Act; be it therefore enacted by the King's Most Excel- Legislative lent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Councils of Upper and Temporal and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Lower Canada authority of the same, that it shall and may be lawful for the Legislative may appropri Councils and Assemblies of the said Provinces of Upper Canada and Lower ate certain Canada respectively, by any Acts to be by them from time to time passed thereof as and assented to by his Majesty, his heirs, and successors, or on his or their shall seem behalf, to appropriate in such manner, and to such purposes as to them meet to them. respectively shall seem meet, all the monies that shall hereafter arise by, or be produced from the said duties, except so much of such monies as shall be necessarily defrayed for the charges of raising, collecting, levying, recovering, answering, paying, and accounting for the same.'

1 See Lucas, Lord Durham's Report, Vol. I, p. 182; Vol. II, p. 141.

revenues

CXI

PETITION OF HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY OF LOWER CANADA, 1833' [Trans. Christie, op. cit.]

To the king's most excellent Majesty.

May it please your Majesty,-We, your Majesty's faithful and loyal subjects, the commons of Lower Canada, assembled in provincial parliament, deeply impressed with the necessity of the concordance and harmony that ought to prevail between the several branches of the legislature of this province, for promoting the happiness, the welfare and the good government of its inhabitants, have taken into mature consideration the circumstances connected with the constitution and composition of the legislative council of this province, as established by the act of the parliament of Great Britain, in the 31st year the reign of your late royal father, our august sovereign of blessed memory, have considered it as our duty towards your Majesty as the supreme head of the British Empire, and paternal chief of the people who compose it; towards ourselves as representing one of the most loyal of those people, and towards the general interests of the empire, most respectfully to represent:

That the legislative council of this province, has not, at any period of its existence, given proofs of that spirit of independence and community of interests, with the inhabitants of the country, which could alone ensure that harmony in the proceedings of the government, and give, in particular to each of its branches, that degree of confidence of public opinion which is requisite to produce that effect.

That it could not be otherwise, when it is considered that the original constitution of that body, and its renovation in proportion as vacancies occurred has been at the disposal of the crown, at the recommendation of the provincial administrations, most frequently interested in surrounding themselves in that second branch, by public functionaries, or by other individuals known to be advocates of the measures of the executive, and who became thus clothed with a legislative inviolability. No bounds were given to those appointments, and they were thus made, in great majority, from among those who were the least connected with the country, either in point of permanent interest, of services rendered to their fellow citizens, or of the esteem in which they were held. Hence the whole body became isolated from the people, none of the great interests of whom it represents.

That the existence of this evil which has for a long time formed the subject of the remonstrances of the inhabitants of this country, has induced us to search for a remedy, so that the provincial government might be reconstituted upon bases which may at the same time coincide with those imitations of the metropolitan government, which it was evidently the intention of its legislators to introduce in the Canadas, and at the same time present that practical analogy the results of which were, no doubt, not less their desire to introduce, and without which apparent imitation in forms alone, would only produce a still greater anomaly.

Although we have no hesitation in stating our opinions as to the means of remedying this constitutional defect in our government, as forming the bases of our humble representations to your Majesty, and although we do not consider that all the interests of the country are fully and equally represented in the third branch of the legislature, yet those to whom a defective system of government have given an unconstitutional preponderance, might make a handle of it to cause the expression of our opinion not to be looked upon as that of the population in general; and, by the operation of the same system, the representations of interested public functionaries, and of privileged persons in the colony might reach your Majesty's government, carrying the same weight as those of the representatives freely elected by the whole people. This danger added to the wide local distance might cause measures adopted in the United Kingdom with the best inten1 For an official reply to this Petition, see No. CXIII.

tions, but without practical and local knowledge, to be discordant with the true interests of the province and even to hurt those interests in essential points.

We therefore presume humbly to represent that, in case your Majesty should be convinced of the difficulties that have been exposed, there would be the certain means of preventing them, by placing the people of the country in general, in a situation to express their opinion, and to recommend proper modifications through delegates freely and indiscriminately chosen for that purpose by all classes, and out of all classes of the community, so as to be in harmony with the interests of the province, and with those of his Majesty's government, which cannot be separated from each other. Such a body', constituted in virtue of an act of parliament of the United Kingdom, to whom they would have afterwards to make a report of their labours, would, whilst it could be no disparagement to the supreme authority of the empire, be in unison with the numerous examples in the free institutions of this continent, with respect to which it has often been declared that England desired to leave nothing to be wished for by the inhabitants of these colonies.

A general assembly of this kind, would prove to be a faithful interpreter of all the interests of the colony taken collectively, including those which it was the intention to be caused to be represented by the legislative council, and those which that body claim to represent. Those interests would in effect possess therein, all their weight and all their legitimate influence; unless, indeed, whilst the executive branch of the colonial government represents the interests of the metropolitan state, there ought to be also another constituted branch out of the country, and compounded of elements without any affinity with the varied interests and feelings of those who inhabit it.

In case your Majesty should not consider it proper at this time to adopt such a measure, we will not take upon ourselves, in stating the result of our deliberations, to determine whether the entire abolition of the present legislative council of this province, and the assimilation of its government to that of several of the adjacent colonies, would tend to cause peace and harmony to be re-established in the conduct of affairs. The people of the country, if they had an opportunity of being legally constituted for that purpose, would be the best judges to decide this weighty question. We therefore proceed upon the supposition that an intermediate legislative branch may, in certain cases, produce more maturity in the deliberation and examination of bills, than if only one body were called upon to assent to them; at the same time, circumstances of rare occurence might happen in which the popular representations might, for the moment, contravene the interests of the body of their constituents, and that those interests might be cherished in the second branch, and guarded, until the wishes of the people were more fully expressed, either by more decided representations or by the means of new elections.

The second branch as actually in existence, in no way connected, in the majority of its members, with the superior and permanent interests of the country, is not adapted to fulfil that end; and even putting the case, of which as yet there has been no example, that a provincial administration were to send to it a majority of men of opposite principles, the following administration, or perhaps the same, might very soon hasten to recompose the body in such a way as to ensure its approbation of their measures.

The habits, the climate, the newness of the country, the changeability of fortunes, the division of estates, and the laws which facilitate it, are obstacles to the existence of a permanent aristocracy, so that an hereditary legislative body with the powers of the house of lords, would be simply an impossibility in Canada. Landed property being here almost wholly owned in small lots by the mass of the people, it would be impossible to make a choice so as to form a permanent legislative council, even supposing it to be a numerous one, of men who in their own persons would present The suggestion of a "Convention" was embodied in a resolution by the House of Assembly in January, 1833.