otherwise the conqueror would be subjected to the rule of those whom he has subjugated. But the local laws of a conquered country may be changed not only by the law-making power of the conquering country, but by virtue of the BELLIGERENT rights of the conqueror. All these propositions follow from the fact that the power of a public enemy to make or administer law is terminated by the conquest of their territory by a dif ferent law-making and law-administering power, viz., that of the conqueror. The local laws of a conquered country of which our army holds military occupation, have no force or effect whatever, except by our permission.† When such local laws agree with those of the invading country, such laws may be, and usually are, adopted and sanctioned because they do so agree therewith. Thus rules governing the rights of property, the relations of persons, itants of the territory ceded or conquered, see, among other authorities, the following, viz : Vattel, B. B. ch. 13, sects. 199, 201. 4 Com. Dig. Ley. (C.) Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 176. Blankard v. Galdy, 2 Salk. 411; S. C. 2 Mod. 222. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 165. Hall v. Campbell, Cowp. 204, 209. Anon. 2 P. Williams, 76. Ex parte Prosser, 2 Br. C. C. 325. Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, Knapps, P. C. R. 338. Ex parte Anderson, 5 Ves. 240. Evelyn v. Forster, 8 Ves. 96. Sheddon v. Goodrich, 8 Ves. 482. 2 Ves. Jr. 349. Att'y Gen'l v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. 154. 8 Wheaton, 589; 12 Wheaton, 528-535. 6 Pet. 712; 7 Pet. 86, 87; 8 Pet. 444-465. 9 Pet. 133, 734, 749. * Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 199. ↑ Note to Forty-third Edition. — Several of the seceded States, since the surrender of the rebel armies, have either passed, or have attempted to enforce, their local laws in relation to freedmen and colored citizens, which have been forcibly set aside by the commanders of our military departments under the reconstruction acts. and the laws of crimes in the respective countries of the belligerents, are often so nearly alike that the administration of them is permitted to remain unchanged even in war. But no laws or institutions established by law are permitted to survive, which are in conflict with those of the conqueror. In all cases, the will of the conqueror governs. Hence, in a ceded or subjugated territory, all laws violating treaty stipulations with foreign nations, or granting rank and titles or commercial privileges in conflict with the institutions of the conqueror, are abrogated.* It has been asserted that the municipal laws of a belligerent territory remain in force, "proprio vigore," until altered by military orders; but, although such laws may have been tacitly adopted, or the enforcement thereof may have been permitted, it is not because these laws retained any validity "proprio vigore." Their only validity was derived from the tacit or express sanction and adoption thereof by the will of the commanderin-chief of the invading army. In case of conquest of a foreign country, the question has been asked, what laws, if any, of the invading country are ipso vigore, and without legislation extended over the territory acquired in war? The suppression of the present rebellion is not the conquest of a foreign country. The citizens of the United States residing in the districts in rebellion are not alien enemies, though they are public enemies; and it is important, in several points of view, to observe the dis * Halleck, Int. Law, 833, 834, and authorities there cited: Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper, 205. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 1 Cowp. 165. Gardner v. Fell, 1 Jacob and Walk. 27, 30, note. Att'y Gen'l v. Stewart, 2 Merivale, 159. tinction between enemies who are subjects of a foreign government, and are therefore called "alien enemies," and those who are denizens and subjects of the United States, and being engaged in civil war, are called "public enemies." An alien owes no allegiance or obedience to our government, or to our constitution, laws, or proclamations. A citizen subject is bound to obey them all. In refusing such obedience, he is guilty of crime against his country, and finds in the law of nations no justification for disobedience. An alien, being under no such obligation, is justified in refusing such obedience. Over an alien enemy, our government can make no constitution, law, or proclamation of obligatory force, because our laws bind only our own subjects, and have no extra-territorial jurisdiction. Over citizens who are subjects of this government, even if they have so far repudiated their duties as to become enemies, our constitution, statutes, and proclations are the supreme law of the land. The fact that their enforcement is resisted does not make them void. It is not in the power of armed subjects of the Union to repeal or legally nullify our constitution, laws, or other governmental acts. The proclamations of the President, issued against insurgents, in the performance of duties imposed on him by the Constitution; the Acts of Congress, in executing its powers; and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, are all, in one respect, "like the Pope's bull against the comet;" these proclamations, laws, and decisions will be alike resisted and spurned by our adversaries so long as they can carry on the war. But when the soldiers of the Union shall have routed and dispersed the last armed force of the rebellion, and when the supremacy of our military power shall be undisputed, the constitution, proclamations, laws of Congress, and decisions of the Supreme Court will at the same time, pari passu, be acknowledged and enforced. It is therefore idle to speculate upon the legal validity and operation of the proclamation liberating enemies' slaves, in districts not yet secured by our military possession. It would be equally useless to attempt to determine the validity and operation of our constitution, laws, and decisions of courts in these rebellious districts. Neither of them will be enforced upon the enemy until they have been subjugated. When that event takes place, whether it be the result of battles or of returning sanity of repentant madmen, the army of the United States will then have actual possession of every portion of the United States, and of every slave who may be found therein ; and the right of the slave to his freedom under the constitution and under the statutes passed, and the proclamations issued by the government during the war, will be secured to him at the same time that other rights under the same constitution and proclamations will be secured to the other inhabitants of the country. And there can be no doubt that in civil war the laws of the United States, rightfully extending at all times over the whole country, are to be enforced, so far as applicable, in time of war, over the belligerent territory as fast as it comes under our military control; and that in case of complete conquest, the constitution and laws of the Union will be restored to full operation over all the inhabitants thereof. At the same time, the laws of war will have swept away all local hostile authorities, and all laws, rights, and institutions resting solely thereon. The Commander-in-Chief has the right, during war, to treat their local laws as inoperative, or to adopt some and reject others; to permit the holding of courts by local authorities acting under military power of the conqueror, or to forbid them, and to substitute military courts of his own. Having all the rights of war over the subjugated inhabitants, he has all the powers of a government de facto and de jure, and can therefore impose upon them whatever laws or regulations may suit his pleasure, in accordance with the laws of war. The LAWS OF WAR are the only laws required by the Constitution to be laid by military power upon public enemies in time of civil war. Congress may modify by legislation the hardship of belligerent rights. But whatever may be done or omitted by the President or by Congress, the laws and municipal institutions of the conquered inhabitants are "swept by the board." Whatever law is rightfully administered, is law expressly declared or tacitly permitted by the will of the conqueror.* JUDICIAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. The courts judicial, as established by laws of Congress in the seceded States, having been closed by civil war, may be reëstablished whenever the districts over which they have jurisdiction shall be permanently reduced under the power of the United States. When the officers of such courts, either by engaging * For authorities on this question, see Halleck, Int. Law, 832. Calvin's Case, Coke's Rep. part 7. Gardner v. Fell, 1 Jacob and Walker, 22. Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 165. Collet v. Lord Keith, 2 East. 260. Blankard v. Guldy, 4 Mad. 225. |