same property — which had been underlet by him, and for which, under protest, as above stated, he has now paid the rent to the United States - have been collected by the Quarter-master, from the under-tenants, and that thus the United States government had been in receipt of double rent; but he does not allege that he, or his principal, has suffered any loss of rent due, or that any under-tenant has refused to pay him what rents might be lawfully demanded.

No evidence is adduced, on the part of Moreau, to support this last complaint, except the written statement, not under oath, of the agent, Dumargeau. And these allegations are fully disproved by the report and official statement of Captain McClure, the Quarter-master in charge.

From the foregoing statement, it appears that Slidell, the lessor, a wellknown traitor, now residing in France, and engaged in open hostilities against the United States, is the owner of the property in question; that it has been seized, and is now held, as enemy property by our military forces; that the said real estate had been leased by Slidell to Theodore Moreau; that Moreau had given Slidell his notes in advance, for payment, or security for the payment, of the rent; that the lease expired November 1, 1862, and that thereupon all right of said lessee ceased, and the occupant became tenant under the United States.

A part of the notes aforesaid, amounting to the sum of $3125, have been taken into the possession of the United States and surrendered to the lessee, without even making a payment of more than one half the amount thereof: so that while he, on his part, has enjoyed the full consideration of the bargain, he has not performed the corresponding obligation to pay the notes.

It appears distinctly that Mr. Moreau has not been called upon to pay his notes a second time to the Federal authorities, but on the contrary, as above stated, has been relieved from payment of a considerable proportion of the sum for which he had given his obligation to Mr. Slidell.

The hardship, if any, exists on the part of the United States, who have not received the full value of the rents due to them. Since the lease expired, the occupant, having become tenant to the United States directly, cannot complain that he is required to pay rent. required to pay rent. Still less is such complaint well founded, if it be considered that the amount paid by him is much less than what he was to pay under the lease, and that his liability to pay anything could have been avoided by him, by giving up the premises to their rightful owner, the government of the United States.

I therefore have the honor to recommend that no allowance should be made to the applicant.

WILLIAM WHITING,

(Signed)

December 3, 1863.

Solicitor of the War Department.

[No. 369.]

Claim for Cotton seized.

SIMON QUEYROUSE,

A French subject, claims pay for fifty-six bales of cotton taken from him. by the United States.

OPINION.

The memorial of Simon Queyrouse shows that he was, in September, 1862, an alien resident in New Orleans, within the lines of the United States army; that at some time previous he had purchased of one Lestrapes, resident within the rebel lines, fifty bales of cotton; that this cotton was then stored in the enemy's country.

In May, 1863, these fifty bales, with six others, were captured by the United States forces under command of Major-General Banks.

There is thus disclosed a case of apparently unauthorized trading with the enemy, contrary to the Proclamation of the President issued August 16, 1861; and by virtue of that Proclamation this merchandise, if brought within States not in insurrection, or if captured, would be forfeited.

Under the Act approved March 12, 1863, and the orders of the Secretary of War made in pursuance thereof, captured property is to be turned over to the special agents appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to be disposed of by them according to law. The capture complained of by Mr. Queyrouse was made since the passage of this Act.

I cannot advise, therefore, that this Department interfere with the disposal of this cotton by the special agents of the Treasury Department, or sanction any claim for compensation for the property delivered, or to be delivered, to them.

(Signed)

December 5, 1863.

WILLIAM WHITING, Solicitor of the War Department.

[No. 410.]

Senate Resolution as to Enrolment of Slaves.

Enrolment of slaves in Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

Resolution of the Senate inquiring of the Secretary whether the slaves in the above States have been enrolled; and if not, why not?

Letter to the Senate, in answer to the resolution, prepared for the signature of Secretary of War December 31, 1863.

COPY OF LETTER.

As the resolution is understood, "persons held to service or labor by the laws of Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri"

are slaves still, under the personal control and possession of their masters, within either of the aforesaid States, under the laws thereof.

In answer to the inquiry of the resolution, the Secretary of War has the honor to inform the Senate that such slaves have not been enrolled among the military forces of the United States, under any provision of the "Act for enrolling and calling out the forces of the United States and for other purposes," approved on the 3d day of March, 1863.

In answer to the inquiry "why such enrolment has not been made?” the Secretary of War has the honor to say, that, in his opinion, the laws of the United States do not allow the enrolment and calling into service of slaves held in the actual possession of loyal persons, who, being citizens of the United States, are also citizens of and resident in either of the aforesaid States. Therefore such enrolment has not been made.

The Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, restricts the enrolment to able-bodied citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens. The question whether there is any power to enroll slaves under the provisions of the laws as they now stand, depends on the construction given to the term "citizen of the United States." By the laws of each of the States named in the resolution, slaves are not citizens of such States, nor deemed to hold the rights of citizens of the United States.

By the opinion of the State Department, as stated in the letter of Mr. Thomas, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Rice, dated November 4, 1856, it was held, "that there can be no doubt that negroes are not citizens of the United States."

According to the opinion of the Hon. Edward Bates, Attorney-General of the United States, dated November 29, 1862, a colored man may be a citizen of the United States, and therefore competent to command an American vessel. But no opinion has been expressed by him whether slaves can or cannot be deemed citizens of the United States.

In the case of Dred Scott, heard before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1856, it was alleged that "Dred Scott was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, because he was a negro of African descent, his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into the country and sold as negro slaves;" and on these facts, it was pleaded that the court below had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court sustained the plea, and decided, “upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court that it appears by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri in the constitution, and that the Circuit Court, for that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judgment for the defendant (Scott) must consequently be reversed, and a mandate issued directing the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." This decision applies to a colored person, who, having once been a slave, then claimed his freedom, but was denied the right to become a party before the court, because he was

not, as the court held, a citizen of Missouri, and, therefore, not a citizen of the United States.

That decision has not yet been reversed; and if persons of African descent, being, or claiming to be, free, are not citizens of any States, nor of the United States, à fortiori, slaves of similar descent would not be construed by the same court as citizens of the United States, should any attempt be made to enroll them as such.

The laws of Congress also indicate that slaves within the loyal States were not intended to be enrolled in the forces of the United States.

The Act known as the Fugitive Slave Law, approved September 18, 1850, ch. 60, is still in force, whereby fugitive slaves, from either of the aforesaid loyal States, may be reclaimed; and though the military forces of the country are forbidden to do so, yet peaceful citizens are still bound by law to aid in a prompt and efficient execution of this slave law, by recapturing and returning fugitive slaves to their masters, whenever their services are required for that purpose.

This law still recognizes the right of the slave master to retain or to regain possession of his slave who attempts to escape from personal outrage, or through love of country, seeks to join the army of the Union.

The Act of 1862, approved April 16, for abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, appropriated money to pay the claims of slave masters, thereby showing an intention, on the part of Congress, to recognize their right to compensation for the labor and service of slaves, when deprived thereof by law.

The Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, again recognized the right of such masters as had been loyal, had not borne arms against the United States, or given aid and comfort to the enemy, to regain their escaped slaves.

These Acts have not been repealed. They are inconsistent with the treatment of slaves in loyal States, as citizens of the United States, required to be enrolled under the Act of 1863.

The Proclamations of the President have forborne to call upon slaves of loyal masters in loyal States, for military service, without the assent of such masters. Taking into view, therefore, the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court, the legislation of Congress, conservative of the alleged rights of loyal slave owners, and the previous action of the Executive, the Secretary of War has felt constrained to forbear to enroll slaves in the military forces under the provisions of the Act of 1863.

That the government has the right to call into military service every subject owing it allegiance, whether citizen of the United States or not, whether bond or free, it is not supposed that any loyal man can reasonably doubt; and if it be the will of Congress, it has the power to exercise that right, and, doubtless, will pass such laws as it may deem proper in the present condition of public affairs.

[No. 433.] ALIENAGE.

How does service in the Federal or Rebel army affect the plea of alienage?

J. H. Foster, Paymaster, Twenty-second District, Pennsylvania, reports two cases, in one of which he has received instructions that service in the rebel army does not deprive a man of the right to exemption on the plea of alienage; while in the other he is told that service in the Federal army does deprive him of that right, and he asks how the Board should act on these cases.

OPINION.

Service in the rebel army, by an alien, does not make him a citizen of the United States, nor deprive him of the benefit of the plea of alienage against any claim of this government for military service. The volunteering of an alien in the army of the United States, to serve for a given period, subjects him to all the rules and regulations of the military service, during the term of his enlistment. After his contract of enlistment has expired, he still has the rights of alienage, as against the United States.

The Proclamation of the Queen gives the United States no rights over British subjects, though its violation subjects them to the penalties of British laws, and to the laws of war.

(Signed)

WILLIAM WHITING, Solicitor of the War Department.

[No. 448.]

ALIENAGE.

Colonel Fry, Provost Marshal-General, submits the case of two deserters from a French corvette, who have enlisted in the United States service as substitutes, and who are claimed by the French consul as French subjects, and deserters from the French service.

OPINION.

Aliens, who are subjects of a foreign government, having voluntarily enlisted in the service of the United States, as substitutes for drafted men, are not entitled to be discharged from such service by reason of alienage; but may, under the law of nations, be held to perform their engagements, without giving the government to whom their allegiance is due just cause of complaint.

(Signed)

WILLIAM WHITING, Solicitor of the War Department.