In re Cretiew. stricken out because all the transactions therein alleged as the grounds of opposition to the bankrupt's discharge occurred long before the passage of the bankrupt act. * * * By the twenty-ninth section of that act it is provided that "no discharge shall be granted to the bankrupt if he has given any fraudulent preference contrary to the provisions of that act, or made any fraudulent payment, gift, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any part of his property; or if he has, in contemplation of becoming bankrupt, made any pledge, payment, transfer, assignment or conveyance of any part of his property, directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, *** for the purpose of preventing the property from coming into the hands of the assignee, or of being distributed under the act in satisfaction of his debts ;" and the question is whether the second specification sufficiently alleges any bar to the bankrupt's discharge under these provisions. There is nothing in the language of the section which contains these provisions which clearly expresses or plainly indicates an intention to confine the operation of these provisions to transactions occurring after the passage of the bankrupt act. In respect to other fraudulent or prohibited acts mentioned in the same section, such intention is clearly expressed, or necessarily to be inferred, but such is not the case in respect to the provisions under consideration, and clear or strong proof of legislative intention should be required before deciding that Congress intended that an act equally fraudulent and dishonest in its character and purpose before and after the passage of the bankrupt act should bar a discharge if done the day after its passage, and not bar it if done the day before it became a law. In order to present in the clearest and fullest manner the language upon which this question of interpretation or construction arises, the twenty-ninth section of the bankrupt act will be copied in full. It is as follows: SEC. 29. And be it further enacted, That at any time after In re Cretiew. the expiration of six months from the adjudication of bankruptcy, or if no debts have been proven against the bankrupt, or if no assets have come to the hands of the assignee, at any time after the expiration of sixty days, and within one year from the adjudication of bankruptcy, the bankrupt may apply to the court for a discharge from his debts; and the court shall thereupon order notice to be given by mail to all creditors who have proved their debts, and by publication at least once a week in such newspapers as the court shall designate, due regard being had to the general circulation of the same in the district, or in that portion of the district in which the bankrupt and his creditors shall reside, to appear on a day appointed for that purpose, and show cause why a discharge should not be granted to the bankrupt. No discharge shall be granted, or, if granted, be valid (1) If the bankrupt has wilfully sworn falsely in his affidavit annexed to his petition, schedule or inventory, or upon any examination in the course of the proceedings in bankruptcy, in relation to any material fact concerning his estate or his debts, or to any other material fact; or (2) if he has concealed any part of his estate or effects, or any books or writings relating thereto; or (3) if he has been guilty of any fraud or negligence in the care, custody or delivery to the assignee of the property belonging to him at the time of the presentation of his petition and inventory, excepting such property as he is permitted to retain under the provisions of this act; or (4) if he has caused, permitted or suffered any loss, waste or destruction thereof; or (5) if, within four months before the commencement of such proceedings, he has procured his lands, goods, money or chattels to be attached, sequestered, or seized on execution; or (6) if, since the passage of this act, he has destroyed, mutilated, altered or falsified any of his books, documents, papers, writings or securities; or (7) has made or been privy to the making of any false or fraudulent entry in any book of account or other document with intent to defraud his creditors; or (8) has removed, or caused to be removed, any part of his property from the district with In re Cretiew. intent to defraud his creditors; or (9) if he has given any fraudulent preference contrary to the provisions of this act, or made any fraudulent payment, gift, transfer, conveyance or assignment of any part of his property; or (10) has lost any part thereof in gaming; or (11) has admitted a false or fictitious debt against his estate; or (12) if having knowledge that any person has proved such false or fictitious debt, he has not disclosed the same to his assignee within one month after such knowledge; or (13) if being a merchant or tradesman, he has not, subsequently to the passage of this act, kept proper books of account; or (14) if he, or any person in his behalf, has procured the assent of any creditor to the discharge; (15) influenced the action of any creditor at any stage of the procedings by any pecuniary consideration or obligation; or (16) if he has, in contemplation of becoming bankrupt, made any pledge, payment, transfer, assignment or conveyance of any part of his property, directly or indirectly, absolutely or conditionally, for the purpose of preferring any creditor or person having a claim against him, or who is or may be under liability for him, or for the purpose of preventing the property from coming into the hands of the assignee; or (17) of being distributed under this act in satisfaction of his debts; or (18) if he has been convicted of any misdemeanor under this act; or (19) has been guilty of any fraud whatever contrary to the true intent of this act; and before any discharge is granted, the bankrupt shall take and subscribe an oath to the effect that he has not done, suffered, or been privy to any act, matter, or thing specified in this act as a ground for withholding such discharge, or as invalidating such discharge if granted. In regard to the first four of the numbered clauses of this section it may be conceded that the character of the acts therein described requires that they should have been committed after the passage of the bankrupt act. In the fifth clause there is an express limitation of time which only requires that the acts therein described should have been In re Cretiew. committed within four months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and as a petition could have been filed at the end of three months after the passage of the act, it can hardly be said that the acts referred to in this clause must have been committed after the passage of the bankruptcy act in order to bring the bankrupt within the prohibition of this section. The next clause, by its express terms, is limited to acts committed since the passage of the act, and as the succeeding clauses (the seventh and eighth) are only connected with it by the disjunctive conjunction or, the same may be said in regard to those clauses. This actual and distinct expression of a limitation, in the clauses first alluded to, to acts committed after the passing of the act would seem to evidence an intention on the part of the legislature that the clauses in which there was no such limitation, either expressed or necessarily to be inferred, should not be so limited. In the next or ninth clause, there is a change of phraseology, which was not necessary unless it was intended to disconnect its provisions from the limitation of time contained in the three next preceding clauses. If not so intended, the connection with the sixth seventh and eighth clauses would have been made by the use of the word or alone, as in the seven and eighth clauses, but the words "if he" are inserted, apparently ex industria, to so far disconnect this clause from those immediately preceding as to remove it from the limitation of time expressed in the sixth clause. The subsequent insertion in the thirteenth clause, which contains the provision in regard to the omission to keep proper books of account of the words "subsequently to the passage of this act," is also a significant indication that the legislature intended no such or similar limitation to the clauses where no limitation was expressed or necesssrily to be implied from the nature or character of the acts described; and in the clauses numbered fourteen and sixteen, the words "if he" are inserted as indicating a partial but distinct separation of these clauses from the preceding one (as was done In re Cretiew. in the commencement of the sixth clause,) so as to disconnect them from any limitation of time contained in the preceding clauses. I shall therefore hold that there is no such limitation in respect to the acts relied upon in said second specification. It was strongly urged that the intents imputed to the bankrupt by this second specification could not possibly have existed so long prior to the passage of the bankrupt act. This is deemed a question of fact and not one of law, and the court cannot say that the intents alleged, and which must be proved to invalidate the discharge, could not have existed prior to the passage of the bankrupt act as alleged, more especially as it appears by the Congressional Globe, that on the twelfth day of December, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, which had been postponed from the then last session, was taken up on motion of Mr. Jenckes, was on his motion amended by striking out the words "first September, eighteen hundred and sixty-four," as the time when the act should take effect and inserting in lieu thereof "first of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-five,” and was then passed by the house; that it was the next day sent to the senate for concurrence, when it was immediately read twice and referred to the committee on the judiciary. Indeed, from May twenty-third, eighteen hundred and sixtytwo, when a bankrupt act was introduced into the senate of the United States by Mr. Foster, of Connecticut, to the passage of the bankrupt act of eighteen hundred and sixtyseven, the contemplation of becoming bankrupt may not unfrequently have been the happy or unhappy condition and occupation of the minds of many hopeless insolvents, and some of them, even in eighteen hundred and sixty-two, may have hastened to make secret and fraudulent dispositions of their property to prevent its distribution in bankruptcy and secure it for the future use of themselves and their families. Contemplation of bankruptcy within the intent of the bankrupt act, includes not only the contemplation of proceedings to be carried on in the bankruptcy court under the eleventh |