"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Georgia, the Sumpter, the Nashville, the Tallahassee, and the Chickamauga, respectively, the tribunal is unanimously of opinion, that Great Britain has not failed, by any act or omission, to fulfill any of the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article VI., in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of international law not inconsistent therewith.

"And so far as relates to the vessels called the Sallie, the Jeffer ferson Davis, the Music, the Boston, and the V. H. Joy respectively, the tribunal is unanimously of opinion that they ought to be excluded from consideration for want of evidence.

"And whereas, so far as relates to the particulars of the indemnity claimed by the United States, the costs of pursuit of the Confederate cruisers are not, in the judgment of the tribunal, properly distinguishable from the general expenses of the war carried on by the United States:

"The tribunal is, therefore, of opinion, by a majority of three to two voices, that there is no ground for awarding to the United States any sum by way of indemnity under this head.

"And, whereas, prospective earnings cannot properly be made the subject of compensation, inasmuch as they depend in their nature upon future and uncertain contingencies :

"The tribunal is unanimously of opinion that there is no ground for awarding to the United States any sum by way of indemnity under this head.

“And, whereas, in order to arrive at an equitable compensation for the damages which have been sustained, it is necessary to set aside. all double claims for the same losses, and all claims for 'gross freights,' so far as they exceed 'net freights';

"And, whereas, it is just and reasonable to allow interest at a reasonable rate;

"And, whereas, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Washington, it is preferable to adopt the form of adjudication of a sum in gross, rather than to refer the subject of compensation for further discussion and deliberation to a board of assessors, as provided by Article X., of the said treaty :

"The tribunal, making use of the authority conferred upon it by Article VII., of the said treaty, by a majority of four voices to one, awards to the United States a sum of $15,500,000 in gold, as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States, for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the tribunal, conformably to the provisions contained in Article VII., of the aforesaid treaty.

"And, in accordance with the terms of Article XI. of the said treaty, the tribunal declares that all the claims referred to in the treaty as submitted to the tribunal are hereby fully, perfectly, and finally settled.'

"Furthermore, it declares that each and every one of the said claims, whether the same may or may not have been presented to the notice of, or made, preferred, or laid before the tribunal, shall henceforth be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and inadmissible.'

"In testimony whereof this present decision and award has been made in duplicate, and signed by the arbitrators who have given their assent thereto, the whole being in exact conformity with the provisions of Article VII., of the said Treaty of Washington.

"Made and concluded at the Hotel de Ville of Geneva, in Switzerland, the 14th day of the month of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two.1

"CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, "FREDERICK SCLOPIS,

"STAMPFLI,

"VICOMTE D'ITAJUBA."

1 The Three Rules of the Treaty of Washington.-These rules have been the subject of widespread interest and discussion. The question was immediately raised, whether they formed, at the time of the American civil war, or indeed since that time, a true expression of the accepted principles of International Law. The English government, at the time of the arbitration, announced that it did not accept them “as a statement of principles of International Law which were in force at the time when the claims arose; and the view generally held in England was that they were ex post facto rules.

On the other hand, continental jurists are inclined to regard these rules as a fair statement of modern International Law upon the subject to which they apply. (See an article by Calvo in the Revue de Droit International, vol. VI., pp. 453-532.)

In considering this question, it should be remembered that, by the introduction of steam as the motive power of ships, and of iron and steel as the material of their construction, the conditions of maritime warfare have been very radically changed. What might have been a reasonable rule as applied in the time of sailing ships, might now, in the age of swift ironclads, be intolerably oppressive. In the cases of the Santissima Trinidad, U. S. v. Quincy, and the Meteor, the courts were dealing with small sailing vessels, which had been converted into privateers, the possession of which by one or the other belligerent made very little difference in the general result of the struggle; whereas, the possession of an ironclad ship might very well turn the scale one way or the other, as indeed it did in the war between Chili and Peru, in 1880-1881. This great power of inflicting injury upon one of the belligerents, it is fair to say,

SECTION 42.-AID TO INSUrgents.

(a) Loans of Money.

DE WUTZ v. HENDRICKS.

COMMON PLEAS, 1824.

(9 Moore, 586.)

The question of the legality of a contract to negotiate a loan in aid of insurgents.

This was an action of trover for certain papers, and which were described in the declaration to be a power of attorney, and sundry engravings.

At the trial, before Lord Chief Justice BEST, at Guildhall, at the Sittings after the last Term, it appeared that the plaintiff had proposed to raise money by way of loan, to espouse the cause of the Greeks against the government of the Porte. That he stated publicly that he was authorized to do so, and, in consequence, applied to the defendant, a stockbroker, to negotiate the loan, who required certain securities to be left with him for that purpose; that the plaintiff accordingly lodged with him a power of attorney, which, he stated, was signed and executed abroad by the Exarch of Ravenna, authorizing him, the plaintiff, to raise money for the Greek cause; he also requested the defendant to procure certain scrip receipts to be engraved, which he accordingly did, and which were afterwards stamped at the stamp office, as such receipts. The defendant suspecting the accuracy of the plaintiff's statement or authority, the intended loan failed, and no money was raised by him. The plaintiff then claimed the power of attorney and engraved scrip receipts from the defendant, which he refused to deliver up, until the engraver's bill ought not to be permitted to neutral citizens; and the neutral nation is alone in a position to restrain them.

In view of these facts, it is believed that the doctrine set up by the United States Neutrality Act and by the Federal Courts, that the "intent" of the owner or shipbuilder is the criterion by which his guilt or innocence is to be judged, is wholly inadequate; it would not for a moment stand the test of the rule of "due diligence," as applied by the Geneva tribunal.

The English Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 is perhaps the best and fairest expression of the modern rule anywhere to be found in public laws.

and other expenses had been paid. On their amount being tendered, the defendant claimed a commission for scrip on part of the loan, which the plaintiff also offered to pay, provided the defendant would transfer the scrip to him, on which he claimed such commission; but none was in fact ever raised, as the projected loan fell to the ground in the first instance. The plaintiff having again formally demanded the above documents from the defendant, who refused to deliver them up, he commenced the present action.

For the defendant, it was submitted, that the whole of the transaction was a fraud on the part of the plaintiff, as he had no authority to negotiate the loan in question. And his Lordship being of opinion, that a resident in this country could not enter into an engagement to raise money by way of loan, to assist subjects of a foreign state, so as to enable them to prosecute a war against a government in alliance with our own, without the license of the Crown; the Jury accordingly found a verdict for the defendant.

Lord Chief Justice BEST.-"I am of opinion, that the whole of the transaction on which the plaintiff rested his claim to recover the articles in question from the defendant, was bottomed in fraud; the Jury so found at the trial; and I am perfectly satisfied with their verdict.

"I then thought that it was contrary to the law of nations, for persons residing in this country, to enter into engagements to raise money, by way of loan, for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign state in arms against a government in alliance with our own; and that no right of action could arise out of such a transaction; and I consequently suggested a nonsuit; but as it was not insisted on by the defendants' counsel, I allowed the cause to proceed. A case in circumstances precisely similar to the present, except that a different loan was proposed to be raised, was lately decided in the Court of Chancery in which the Lord Chancellor entertained the same opinion as myself, and in which he is stated to have said, that English Courts of Justice will not take notice of, or afford any assistance to persons who set about raising loans for subjects of the King of Spain, to enable them to prosecute a war against that sovereign; or, at all events that such loans could not be raised without the license of the Crown. I left the question to the Jury on the merits, and they found that the power of attorney was an abrogated fabrication. It appeared on the face of it to have been executed in Greece, it was drawn up in the modern Greek language, and was pretended to have been sent from that country. The plaintiff, however, adduced no evidence to show that it was a genuine instrument; but, on the contrary, it was proved to have been executed in London,

but by whom did not appear. The other articles sought to be recovered, and described in the declaration as engravings, were scrip receipts, which could be of no value, as the whole of the transaction to which they were intended to be applied fell to the ground, as it was founded and bottomed in fraud. It was proved for the defendant, that he was employed by the plaintiff to negotiate the loan in question; that many articles had been written on the subject, and that placards had been stuck up in the city, stating, that the plaintiff was not authorized by the Greek government to raise any money, and that it was altogether a fraud.

"I told the Jury, that, with respect to the power of attorney, the plaintiff could not be entitled to recover, unless he shewed that it was a genuine instrument, as it was so described in the declaration; and that to render it valid, he should have proved that it was executed in Greece; but there was no evidence whatever to shew that fact; on the contrary, it was proved to have been concocted and executed in Mincing Lane. I also told the Jury, that if the plaintiff was attempting a fraud on the public by raising money under a false pretence, and that he caused the papers in question to be delivered to the defendant in furtherance of such attempt, he could not be entitled to recover them back in this action. The Jury, under these circumstances, were fully warranted in considering the transaction as fraudulent; and I am not only satisfied with their verdict, but am decidedly of opinion that there is no ground whatever to disturb it.

"The rest of the Court concurring, Rule refused."

THOMPSON v. POWLES.

CHANCERY, 1828.

(2 Simon, 194.)

Loans to unrecognized communities.

The contract in this case was for the purchase of Guatemala bonds, which were in the hands of the London agents of that government. The plaintiff was led into the venture by the fraud and misrepresentations of the agents and their partners in guilt, and now files a bill in Chancery for the recovery of his money, the Guatemalan government having repudiated its agents and all their engagements because of these frauds.