by Article 3, Section 309 of the Compensation Act of 1915. Now March 4, 1918, appeal dismissed and award of Compensation Board affirmed.

BERGER-GLOSE CO. v. HAINES ET AL.

Mechanics' Lien-Sub-contractor-Notice-"Nature of Labor or Materials Furnished."

Under Section 8 of the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 431, as amended by the Act of March 24, 1909, P. L. 65, a statement in the notice by the sub-contractor of his intention to file a lien, that the "nature of the materials furnished" was "hardware and glass," is too indefinite; and where a copy of the notice is attached to the lien filed, the lien will be stricken off on motion.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 23 April Term, 1916, M. L. D. Amandus D. Berger, et al., partners trading as Berger-Glose Company, v. George F. Haines and Thomas J. Creitz. Mechanics' lien. Rule to strike off lien. Rule absolute.

Calvin E. Arner, for Claimant.

Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for Geo. F. Haines, owner.

Groman, P. J., March 4, 1918. A petition to show cause why the Mechanics' Lien filed in this proceeding should not be stricken off, was presented July 5, 1916, and a rule granted. On April 2, 1917, an opinion was filed wherein the basis of a possible settlement was suggested. We there stated that where a claim contains only one good item which is the subject of a lien, it should not be stricken off even though all the other items were insufficient: McCristal v. Codhran, 147 Pa. St., Page 225; Mercer Milling and Lumber Co. v. Kreaps, 18 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 1.

The question involved herein is the sufficiency of the notice of intention to file a lien. The notice attached to the lien reads as follows: "3.-The nature of the material furnished was hardware and glass." Was this then "a description of the quality of the things furnished so that they could be distinguished and identified?" The notice of intention to file a lien served on the owner had not attached to it an itemized statement giving the owner an

account of the various items furnished, prices to be paid and kind of materials; if this had been done in connection with the notice served, claimants would undoubtedly be within the rule laid down in Willson, Appellant, v. Canevin, 226 Pa. St., Page 363 and 366. We, however, will have to dispose of this matter upon the record before us. In A. G. Breitweiser Lumber Company, Appellant, v. Wyss-Thalman, 51 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 83 (1912), the notice of intention to file a lien stated that the material was "rough lumber and mill work." The lower court in making the rule to strike off the mechanics' lien absolute, held that the term "rough lumber and mill work" was too general to sustain a lien; upon appeal, the lower court was sustained. In Benton, Appellant, v. Berg Distilling Co., 63 Pa. Sup. Ct., Page 412 (1916), the notice of intention to file a lien sets forth that claimant "furnished lumber used in the construction of the building." This was held insufficient to sustain the lien. Applying the rule thus established to the facts before us in this case, we reach the conclusion that the notice to file a mechanics' lien was insufficient to sustain the lien.

Now March 4, 1918, rule to strike off lien made absolute.

KIEFER v. SULKIN ET AL.

Fixtures-Vendor and Vendee-Preliminary Injunction.

The owner of a hotel property conveyed same without reservation of bar fixtures, counters, etc. Held, that as between vendor and vendee in the absence of any evidence of intention on the part of the vendor to retain the fixtures at the time of the conveyance, they passed to vendee.

Sur motion to continue preliminary injunction. In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Sitting in Equity, No. 4 April Term, 1918.

Smith, Paff & Laub, for Plaintiff.

E. J. Fox & J. W. Fox and Parke H. Davis, for Defendants.

The opinion of the court was filed April 8, 1918, by McKeen, J. A preliminary injunction was granted by the court on the twenty-first day of March, 1918, restrain

ing Louis Sulkin and B. E. Jones, the defendants, from selling, removing or otherwise disposing of the bar, back bar, office counter, cigar counter, mirrors, fixtures, appurtenances and improvements contained in certain real estate known as the Sterling hotel, situated on the south side of Northampton St., between Fourth and Fifth Sts., in the city of Easton, Pa. At the hearing held on the twenty-seventh day of March, 1918, it developed that the hotel property was conveyed to complainant by Louis Sulkin, one of the defendants, and Rosie Sulkin, his wife, by deed dated the thirtieth day of January, 1918, and that at the time of the conveyance of said property, B. E. Jones, the other of said defendants, was the lessee of Louis Sulkin and all the right, title and interest of Louis Sulkin in the lease to said B. E. Jones was assigned unto complainant. No title to the fixtures was established in said B. E. Jones at the time of the hearing and, therefore, the only question that need be discussed is whether the said fixtures passed with the real estate at the time of the conveyance thereof by Louis Sulkin and wife unto complainant. Louis Sulkin was the owner of the fixtures in question and acquired them with the real estate at the time he purchased same from his predecessor in title. On the nineteenth day of December, 1917, Louis Sulkin entered into an agreement of sale for said premises with complainant which said agreement of sale was offered in evidence and made a part of the record, as well as the deed for said premises from Louis Sulkin and wife unto complainant. Neither the agreement of sale nor the deed contains any reservation of fixtures. It further appeared that the real estate agent who negotiated the sale for said premises informed the purchaser that the fixtures would go with the real estate although it does not appear that he had any specific authority from Louis Sulkin, except from inference, to make such statement to the purchaser. The son of complainant, however, testified that Louis Sulkin prior to the execution of the deed had told him that the fixtures went with the property. For the purposes of the case it is not necesssary to comment how the fixtures were annexed to the premises as the criterion in Pennnsylvania is the intention to annex. The presumption in favor of trade that a tenant who attaches fixtures to premises intends to remove them does not exist in the

case at bar as the transaction is between vendor and vendee and in such instances the rule in regard as to what shall be considererd a part of the realty is much more strict than that which exists between landlord and tenant. There was no proof submittted at the hearing of the intention of the vendor to retain the fixtures in question at the time of the conveyance of the premises and unless expressly excepted by the terms of sale they pass to complainant.

And now, April 8, 1918, the injunction heretofore granted is continued until final hearing.

KLINE v. KLINE.

Divorce Notice of Taking of Depositions.

The service of notice to take depositions in a divorce proceeding or the service of a rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted, as provided for by the rules of court, rises no higher in its requirements than the requirements of the act relative to the service of the subpoena in divorce-personal notice within the county.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 54 October Term, 1917. Mamie E. Kline v. W. Russell Kline. In Divorce. Master's Report.

Francis J. Gildner, for Libellant.

Groman, P. J., December 31, 1917. In the above proceeding, the Master in his report states that the testimony submitted would justify a decree in divorce, that he would so recommend but for the fact that personal notice of the time and place of taking the testimony was not given to the respondent, a resident of Altoona, Pennsylvania, the respondent not being a resident of Lehigh County. The service of notice to take depositions in a divorce proceeding or the service of a rule to show cause why a divorce should not be granted as provided for by the rules of court, rises no higher in its requirements than the requirements of the act relative to the service of the subpoena in divorce-personal notice within the county.

The rules of court fix the master's fee at twenty-five dollars and ten dollars additional for each meeting after

the first; the record fails to show that the master had more than one meeting. To entitle him to an additional allowance, the report should show that he is within the requirements of the rule. Failure to so show, preclude the court from making the order requested by the master. Now December 31, 1917, the report of the master is referred back to the prothonotary's office; the prothontary is directed to issue a rule upon the respondent as required by Section 14 of our rules of court.

HENNINGER v. HENNINGER.

Divorce-Amendment-Date of Marriage.

A master and examiner has no authority to amend a libel in divorce.

Where the respondent was served personally, and was present at the taking of the depositions, a divorce will not be refused because of a variance in the allegation and proof as to the date of the marriage.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 29 April Term, 1917. Leonard Henninger v. Anna Henninger. In Divorce. Master's Report.

Dallas Dillinger, Jr., for Libellant.

Groman, P. J., February 18, 1918. The record herein shows that a pluries subpoena in divorce was served upon respondent; that at a hearing fixed by the master and examiner to take testimony, the respondent was personally present; that while such hearing was in progress, counsel for libellant moved to amend the libel so as to show that libellant and respondent were married on the 30th day of June, 1907, instead of 1908. The amendment was allowed by the master. The proof submitted would warrant the granting of a decree, but the court cannot allow such a proceeding to pass unchallenged for the reason that no amendment to a libel can be allowed by a master and examiner; the duties of a master are entirely governed, regulated and controlled by the order of his appointment. This is so evident that no citation of authorities is required.

Should a decree in divorce be refused for the above reason only? As before stated, personal service was had, the respondent was present at the hearing. If the amend