bal things are heterogeneous, being intellectual, sensible, and emotional.

§ 3. That the earth needs no support is also an intellectual conception that depends for its unverbal signification on only the organism of the intellect; for if we adopt the Indian tradition, that the earth rests on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise, the intellect will still organically insist that the tortoise must rest on something, and so ad infinitum. Nor can the earth hang on any thing. The intellect may verbally suspend the earth with a chain from the sky, but the intellect will insist on a support to sustain the sky; and so again ad infinitum. The intellect is thus brought to the necromantic dilemma that usually attends such verbal processes; the intellect being compelled to choose between a conceived ultimate support that is unsupported, or a conceived ultimate suspension that is unsuspended. Modern astronomers select the latter alternative, and dismissing both Atlas and the elephant, conceive, intellectually, that the earth is suspended in space without a suspension on any thing, and mistake this logical subjective result of their intellectual organism for a physical reality: much like the fabled dog, who mistook for a rival quadruped what was only a subjective creation of the water into which he was looking.

§ 4. That every given time must have been preceded by a past, and must be followed by a future, are among the most inevitable conceptions of the intellect; but when the intellect proceeds illimitably with the past, the process

brings us to the usual necromantic dilemma of a past without any antecedent, or an antecedent which had no beginning. Nor is our intellectual process with reference to a future any less necromantic, for we ultimately arrive at an end without any future, or a future without any end.

§ 5. That every thing required in its construction some material, is another conception that the intellect is organically incapable of avoiding; but when the intellect continues such conceptions abstractedly and illimitably, it arrives as usual at a necromantic dilemma, which presents us with a first material that was made out of nothing, or an eternity of things without any beginning to the series. The latter conclusion was held by the ancients; the creative power of Deity, said they, extends no farther than the arrangement of pre-existing materials. The moderns reject this circumscription of Divine power, and, taking the opposite alternative, insist that God created every thing out of nothing. Spinoza deemed both results unsatisfactory, and insisted that Deity was the material out of which all things are created. This he esteemed a great physical discovery of the intellect, and by which the maxim, nihil fit ex nihilo, was reconciled with the sole eternity of Deity. In view of such intellectual speculations which differ only in topics, not in kind, from any others that confound what pertains to the intellect subjectively with what pertains to the senses objectively, we may see that the wisdom of the world may well be accounted "foolishness with God." The intellect, by conceiving words in logical forms, cannot dis

cover physical things which our senses have not revealed to us, any more than we can, "by taking thought, add a cubit to our stature."

§ 6. The intellect is organically compelled to conceive also, that nothing can exist without a maker; but when we intellectually predicate a maker illimitably, we arrive at a dilemma of the usual character, and must choose between a succession of makers without a beginning, or a beginning without a maker. The same may be repeated, severally, of the intellectual conceptions of a cause, a contriver, a designer; in each case we must choose between the conception of an endless succession of causes, contrivers, designers, without a first; or we must arrest the succession by an intellectually conceived first, that is uncaused, uncontrived, and undesigned, etc. A celebrated European philosopher, in lecturing on the above topics, was in the habit of prefacing his introduction by saying to his class, "Now, gentlemen, we will make God!" The remark was probably a sarcasm, for he belonged to the school which deems words insignificant when they refer to no sensible object; not seeing that intellectually conceived words derive an unverbal subjective meaning from the intellect whose aspirations and organism generally the conceived words manifest: just as the words scarlet, sweet, loud, fragrant, etc., durive an unverbal meaning from only the senses whose perceptions they designate; and just as the words anger, love, and pity, derive an unverbal meaning from only the internal feelings the words refer to.

87. The indestructibility of matter is another conception of the intellect similar to the foregoing; the intellect being organically compelled to admit it, or to admit, ultimately, that something is nothing. The infinite divisibility of matter is another intellectual necessity of the same character; the intellect being organically necessitated to admit it, or to admit, ultimately, that a whole is not greater than a part. But while I endeavour to show that intellectually conceived words result from, and signify unverbally an intellectual organism, I mean not to assert that any verbal conceptions are innate, even when, like most or all the foregoing, they are found in all ages of the world and among all races of men. I claim only that given verbal conceptions are a result of the organism of the intellect when placed under given objective circumstances; and that the universality of any given verbal conception is a result of only the universality of the excitive objective circumstances; just as you will find language wherever you find human society-apple-eaters, wherever you find applesclimbers, wherever you find hills-swimmers and fishers, wherever you find water-and walkers every where, the earth being co-extensive with man.

LECTURE X.

OF THE UNFALLACIOUS PROSECUTION OF INQUISITION.

CONTENTS.

1. Retrospect of the preceding Lecture.

2. Questions analysed into an inquirer, inquiree, and object.

8. Each of the three is unverbally triform, and only verbally a unit. 4. The error exemplified of seeking sensibly what is only intellectual, and of seeking intellectually what is only sensible.

5. Inquisition is limited by the purview of our sensible, intellectual, and moral organisms.

6. All physical inquisition is unanswerable that is not within the purview of the senses; all intellectual inquisition is unanswerable that is not within the purview of the intellect; and all inquisition that relates to the internal feelings is unanswerable that is not within the purview of our consciousness therein.

7. Knowledge, except of language, is, in its ultimate form, unverbal, not verbal.

8. Conclusion.

Retrospect of the preceding Lecture.

81. The preceding Lecture teaches that when the intellect premises that any thing is a contrivance, the intellect is organically constrained to see in the premises that they include the agency of a contriver; when the intellect premises that any thing is an effect, the intellect is organically constrained to conceive that the effect required a precedent