But still a difficulty arose; the globe is only one thing, while my analysis converts it into two things, a sight globe and a feel globe. If the oneness of the two globes is simply a contrivance of language, as I had supposed of the orange, all languages would not concur, as they do, in calling the sight globe and the feel globe one thing. The uniformity seemed too extensive to be conventional, hence gradually became evident to me, that the oneness of the globe, not being sensible, must be intellectual; the intellect being so organized, that the sight globe and the feel suggest a unit to the intellect; and language so constituted that it refers, in all names of things, to the intellectually conceived unit.

Besides, if the oneness were only verbal, as I had at first supposed it was, an uneducated deaf mute would not deem as one thing, the sight globe and the feel globe; but his intellect conceives the two to be a unit, as completely, no doubt, as ours. The organic tendency of the intellect to thus aggregate sensible multiplicity into intellectual units is, as I ultimately discovered, one of the essential foundations of language, names referring to these intellectual units; and if our intellects had not been organized to thus conceive units, we could talk of an army no way but by repeating the muster-roll; nor would that have sufficed— every soldier, George or Thomas, or whatever may be his name, being himself a unit only intellectually; while physically, he is head, arms, face, eyes, hands, and other multitudinous and almost innumerable sensible items.

§ 2. Arriving thus accidentally and gradually at the knowledge that names, like globe, orange, army, etc., imply a oneness which is only intellectual and subjective, while the objective things named may be sensibly multiform, I soon found that the analysis would unriddle many questions that have long perplexed metaphysics; for instance, can seeing inform us of distance? When distance is analysed as above, we find a sight distance, a feel distance, and an intellectual conception uniting the two; therefore, whether seeing can inform us of distance, depends wholly upon what we choose to deem the signification of the nominal unit distance. If we limit the signification to the intellectual unit, we may maintain that neither seeing nor feeling can inform us of distance; they only suggest distance to the mind. If, again, we limit the meaning of the nominal unit to the feel distance, we may maintain that feeling can inform us of distance, but seeing cannot. The controversy relates not to unverbal things, but to the definition of the word distance; a question over which we possess an entire control, it being wholly conventional and verbal.

What we have said of the nominal unit distance, we may repeat of the nominal unit figure. Can seeing inform us of roundness? Roundness, as a unit, is a conception of the intellect, while sensibly we find a sight roundness and a feel roundness, as we manifested when speaking of globe. If, however, we choose to limit the meaning of the word to the intellectual unit, we may mystify ourselves and

others by affirming that neither seeing nor feeling can reveal to us roundness; or we may limit the signification of the word to the feel roundness, and then astonish ourselves by finding that seeing cannot inform us of roundness.

And what we have thus said of distance and figure, we may repeat of the nominal unit externality. We find a sight external, a feel external, and an intellectual unit, which the intellect forms out of the two sensible manifestations; and to which unit the word external is commonly limited. If, therefore, you limit the word external to the intellectual unit, (excluding the sight and the feel,) you may mystify yourself with the discovery that the earth and nothing therein, possesses an existence external of your intellect; and deem this stupid, worthless, though somewhat famous verbal equivoke, a great psychological mystery. Or should this insidious subtraction of two things from three, and finding only one remain, be too obviously simple to be mystified, you may include the feel in your definition of the nominal unit external, and thereby (still excluding the sight) arrive at the conclusion that seeing cannot inform us of externality; and that without the sense of feeling we should know nothing of the externality of the universe. This latent verbal criticism constitutes, in some of its many phases, what I meant when I said in my first lecture that while philosophers are investigating and determining the meaning of words, they deem themselves engaged in profounder discussions.

8. The nominal unit shadow is an intellectual unit

also, but we never mystify ourselves in relation thereto, for it is as much a unit sensibly as it is nominally and intellectually. The like may be said of echo and of light; but the greater number of nominal units are severally an intellectual aggregation of different and often numerous sensible items; and we may greatly mystify ourselves if we look sensibly for their oneness which is intellectual. A city, for instance, composed of a hundred thousand inhabitants, and ten thousand houses, is as much a nominal unit as a shadow; but if we seek the city, deeming it some sensible unit that conforms in oneness to the city's oneness which is intellectual, we may deem the ill success of our fallacious sensible search a great mystery. So, if we seek in man for some physical or sensible unit which shall conform in oneness to man's nominal oneness, we are, in like manner, seeking physically for what is not physical but intellectual. Such searches are deemed neither fallacious nor futile, and much has been written to determine in what part of physi cal man his oneness consists. If you cut off Peter's arms, the remainder of Peter will be a man. Take off his legs, and his remainder is still a man; how much, therefore, say such inquirers, and what must you take away from Peter before the remainder will cease from being a man?— thereby evidently mistaking the nominal oneness, which is only intellectual, for a physical mystery.

The nominal unit matter is mysterious from a like misapprehension of the nature of its oneness. All we know thereof, say philosophers, is the sensible properties of mat