CHAPTER III. Ꭲ Ꮋ Ꭼ Ꮲ Ꭺ Ꭱ Ꭲ Ꮪ OF STATUTES. Blackstone's Enumeration of the Parts of a Statute: Practical Division-TitleCommencement-Preamble-Purview-Clauses-Provisoes-Exceptions Schedules. BLACKSTONE says * that every law may be said to consist of four several parts: The Declaratory, or that which defines the rights to be observed and the wrongs to be eschewed; The Directory, commanding the subject to observe the right and abstain from the wrong; The Remedial, pointing out the method to recover the right or redress the wrong; and The Vindicatory, or sanction, declaring the penalty to be inflicted for a violation of the law. This division is correct and philosophical, but has little practical value. A statute for practical purposes is divided into the following parts: The Title. The Commencement. The Preamble. The Purview, or Body of the Act. Provisoes. Exceptions. Schedules. * Introduction, § 2. The Title.-The custom of prefixing titles to statutes, was not regularly introduced prior to the eleventh year of the reign of Henry VII.; though particular instances may have occurred before that time. The title was formerly called the Rubric, from being written in red characters.* In the early English cases, the courts held the title to be no part of the statute; "no more," says Lord Holt, "than the title of a book is part of the book."+ This is not a very good illustration. The reason of the rule in England is better stated by Mr. Dwarris, who says that the title is usually framed only by the clerk of that house in which the bill first passes, and is seldom read more than once. In accordance with this, the title has been said to afford no clue to the legislative intent.§ But it now seems that where the meaning of the body of the act is doubtful, the title may be relied on as an assistance in arriving at a conclusion. The title, however, being, in strictness, no part of the act in a legal sense, it would be absurd to attempt to use it for the purpose of restraining or controlling any positive provision of the act. It can only be used for the fact of the maker's having given the law a certain name, if that fact can render any assistance in doubtful cases. Taken in connection with the other parts of the statute, the title, where the intent is not plain, may somewhat assist in removing ambiguities. T. * Dwarris, p. 500; Chancevs. Adams, Hard. 324. + Rex vs. Williams, I. W. Bl. 85; Poulter's Case, 3 Rep. 33; Wills vs. Wilkins, 6 Mod. 62. Dwarris, p. 501. § 1 Ambler, 22. Stradling vs. Morgan, Plowden, 203; King vs. Cartwright, 4 T. R. 490; King vs. George Marks, 3 East. 160. ¶ Dwarris, p. 502. In this country it has been said, on the same principle, though the title cannot control the plain intent of the statute, that where the words are doubtful, it may be resorted to to remove ambiguities.* It seems to me, on the whole, however, that the original rule is the true one. The title is rarely a matter of legislative debate or scrutiny; and though it may, and doubtless does, give a general idea of the purport of the act, still, it is precisely in cases of nicety and doubt that it cannot with safety be relied on.† In another point of view, the title of the statute has recently received much importance in some of the States of the Union. The 16th Section of the 3d Art. of the Constitution of New York, adopted in the year 1846, declares that "No private or local bill which may be passed by the Legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The design of this constitutional provision has been judicially declared to have been "to prevent the uniting of various objects, having no necessary or natural connection with each other, in one bill, for the purpose of combining various pecuniary interests in support of the whole, which could not be combined in favor of either by itself;" and, on the ground that the provision was to be so construed as to reach this mischief alone, it has been held, that an act entitled "an Act in relation to the fees and compensation of certain officers in the city and county of New York," by which salaries were given to four officers of that city, in place * U. S. vs. Fisher, 2 Cranch R. 386; U. S. vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; State vs. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334; Burgett vs. Burgett, 1 Ham. 219. + See reference to Title for aid in case of ambiguity; Williams vs. Williams, 4 Seld. 525, 535. Conner vs. The Mayor, 1 Seld. 285, 293. of the fees of their respective offices, and providing also that the fees should be paid into the city treasury and the salaries paid out of them, even assuming it to be a private bill, was not within the constitutional restriction above referred to; that it embraced but one subject, and that the subject was sufficiently expressed in the title. So again, where an act was passed entitled "For the relief of certain parties," and it contained, besides provisions for their relief, a clause repealing another statute on the same matter, which had been acted on and therefore ceased to be operative, it was held that this did not add another subject to the bill.f So, an act entitled "an Act to enable, &c. to raise money by tax," does not violate this provision, although the law contains special provisions, and designates the objects for which the tax is to be levied; and the Court of Appeals said, "There must be but one subject; but the mode in which the subject is treated, and the reasons which influenced the Legislature, cannot and need not be stated in the title, according to the letter and spirit of the Constitution." The purpose of the provision was, that neither the members of the Legislature nor the public should be misled by the title, not that the latter should embody all the distinct provisions of the bill in detail. The Constitution of the State of Texas contains the same provision, and makes it applicable to all bills, whether public or private. "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."§ And in that State * Conner vs. The Mayor, 1 Seld, 285. + Town of Guildford vs. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640. Sun Mutual Insurance Co. vs. The Mayor, 4 Selden, 241. § Cons. of Texas, 1845, Art. vii. § 24. also, it is held that the provision is to be liberally construed. So, where an act which was entitled, "to regulate Proceedings in the County Court," gave an appeal from the County Court to the District Court, and regulated proceedings therein, it was held that this was not within the mischief contemplated by the Constitution, and that the act was valid.* The Commencement.-This clause, with which where there is no preamble each bill commences, varies according to the character of the authority from which the law emanates. In England, says Mr. Dwarris, The mode of stating the enacting authority, has varied at different times. Regulations having the force of laws, assumed multiform shapes, appearing sometimes as ordinances; then as grants, patents, and charters; again, as mere directions or prohibitions of the king, but sanctioned, nevertheless, directly or indirectly, by the Lords and Commons. Formerly, the bill was in the nature of a petition, and these petitions were entered upon the Parliament roll; and upon these rolls the royal assent was likewise entered. Upon this groundwork the judges used, at the end of the Parliament, to draw up the act of parliament into the form of a statute, which was afterwards entered upon the statute roll. In Henry 6th's time, the former method was altered, and bills continentes formam * Murphey vs. Menard, 11 Texas, 673. The evil which these constitutional provisions are intended to correct, is ⚫ not of recent date. Mr. Barrington says (Obs. on Statutes, p. 449), "It becomes indeed, impossible, when statutes relate to matters of a very miscellaneous nature, that the title can be coëxtensive with the views of the Legislature. It is, therefore, to be wished that such acts of Parliament were distinct laws, and not thrown together in that very strange confusion which hath now obtained the name of a Hodge Podge Act." |