her natural life. I am of the opinion therefore in answer to your second question that the value of this life estate, based on the expectancy of life of the said Clara G. Buchanan, widow of the testator, and determined as of the date of the death of said testator, should be ascertained by the appraisers, appointed by and acting under the order of the probate court, and when so determined should be deducted together with the sum of five hundred dollars from the appraised value of said property, according to the provisions of Section 5333 G. C., as amended.

The latter part of Section 5543 G. C. provides that the value of the life estate "shall be determined by the so-called Actuaries' Combined Experience Tables and five per cent. compound interest."

According to the actuaries' combined experience tables as set forth in Wolfe's "Inheritance Tax Calculations," the present value of an annuity of $1.00, payable at the end of each year for the remainder of the life of a person at the age of forty-seven, is $12.02.

Assuming that the appraisers should find that the entire value of the real estate in question at the time of the death of the testator was $8800.00, the estimated annual income on this valuation at 5 per cent would be $440.00. Multiplying the above sum of $12.02 by 440 gives $5,288.80, the value of the life estate. This sum plus $500.00 deducted from the entire value of the property in question, which we have assumed to be $8800.00, leaves a remainder of $3,011.20 which would be subject to the collateral inheritance tax.

The foregoing is merely an illustration of the application of the actuaries' combined experience tables in determining the value of the life estate.

I am informed by the superintendent of insurance that the above mentioned work on collateral inreritance tax calculations has been carefully prepared and that the tables therein set forth may be relied upon as being correct. If you desire to secure a copy of said work you can write to S. H. Wolfe, the author and publisher, 165 Broadway, New York City.

Your third question calls for an interpretation of that part of Section 5332 G. C., which provides that the provisions of Section 5331 G. C. shall not apply "to property or interests in property transmitted to or for the use of an institution in the state for purposes only of public charity or other exclusively public purposes."

In an opinion of my predecessor, Hon. Timothy S. Hogan, as found in the annual report of the attorney general for the year

1913, at page 1178 of said report, it was held that a bequest to a church is not one "to or for the use of an institution in this state for purposes only of public charity or other exclusively public purposes" within the meaning of the provision of Section 5332 G. C., and that such a bequest is therefore subject to the collateral inheritance tax if it exceeds the amount exempted by Section 5331 G. C.

I concur in said opinion and therefore hold that the bequest, referred to in your third inquiry, over and above the sum of five hundred dollars exempted by provision of said Section 5331 G. C., as amended, is subject to the collateral inheritance tax.

Where the Qualified Electors of a Rural School District Vote in Favor of Centralization of its Schools, the Board of Education in Proceeding to Centralize the Schools, May in the Exercise of its Sound Discretion, Secure Sites at Different Points in Such District and Erect Suitable Buildings Thereon.

No. 1392-(Opinion Dated March 17, 1916.)

Hon. F. B. Pearson, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Columbus, Ohio.

Dear Sir: In your letter of March 2 you request my opinion as follows:

"The following question has been submitted to this department:

"Conditions: A rural school district has voted to centralize in accordance with Section 4726.

"Query: May the board of education erect buildings at more than one point in a township and still conform to the provisions of this Section 4726, G. C.?

"This department would like to have your opinion on this question which is frequently asked."

Section 4726 G. C. (104 O. L., 139) provides:

"A rural board of education may submit the question of centralization, and, upon the petition of not less than onefourth of the qualified electors of such rural district, or upon the order of the county board of education, must submit such question to the vote of the qualified electors of such rural fourth of the qualified electors of such rural district, or upon district at a general election or a special election called for that purpose. If more votes are cast in favor of centralization than against it, at such election, such rural board of education shall proceed at once to the centralization of the schools of the

rural district, and, if necessary, purchase a site or sites and erect a suitable building or buildings thereon.

It will be observed that the above provision of Section 4726 G. C. makes it mandatory upon the board of education of a rural school district to proceed at once to centralize the schools of such district if, upon the submission of the question, more votes are cast in favor of centralization than against it.

Said provision of the statute, however, vests in said board of education the discretion to determine whether it is necessary, for the purpose of centralizing said schools, to secure one or more sites and erect a suitable building or buildings thereon.

The question naturally arises whether said board of education may, in the exercise of its discretion, secure sites at different points in the district and erect buildings on such sites for the accommodation of its pupils.

I find upon investigation that practically the same provision of the statute as above set forth in Section 4726 G. C. was formerly found in Section 3927-1 of the Revised Statutes (94 O. L., 317). Said Section 3927-1 R. S. provided as follows:

"A township board of education may submit the question of centralization, and upon the petition of not less than onefourth of the qualified electors of such township district, must submit such question to a vote of the qualified electors of such township district, and if more votes are cast in favor of centralization than against it, at such election, it shall then become the duty of the board of education, and such board of education is required to proceed at once to the centralization of the schools of the township, and, if necessary, purchase a site or sites and erect a suitable building or buildings thereon;

* * * ""

In the case of State ex rel Haines vs. Board of Education, 15 O. C. D., 424, the court, in interpreting the above provision of Section 3927-1 R. S., held:

"It is only when the board deems it necessary to purchase a site and erect a building thereon that the act requires them to do so, and there is nothing in the act itself preventing the original board, before the building is erected or commenced, from reconsidering the action taken, and resolving to centralize the schools not in one but in two places. It may have made a mistake in the first instance and the very discretion vested in it by the act carries with it the power and duty to correct that mistake. If the original board may reconsider its action in this respect, then its successor, being clothed with

all the powers of the old board, may exercise them, with a like discretion, subject, however, to the rights of a party to any contract the former board may have made. It may be said that successive boards may thus undo all that their predecessors have done, prevent the centralization of the schools and ultimately defeat the will of the people; but it is only the natural result of an elective system of government and which is in reality the expression of the will of the people through its chosen representatives. Such boards cannot legally refuse to centralize the schools because the law makes this duty imperative, but the mode and manner of performing it is discretionary, and if the duty is not performed by the old board such discretion is vested in its successor."

Cases may be readily conceived in which the accommodation of pupils attending the centralized schools and their economic transportation would require the location of said schools at different points in the district.

I am of the opinion, therefore, in answer to your question that, where the qualified electors of a rural school district vote in favor of centralization, the board of education, in proceeding to centralize the schools of said district, may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, secure sites at different points in such district and erect suitable buildings thereon for the accommodation of its pupils.

I might add that the board of education of a rural school district may effect this same result under provision of Section 7730 G. C. (106 O. L., 398) without a vote of the people by suspending all of the schools in said district and conveying the pupils attending such schools to centralized schools established by said board of education at such points in said district as said board in the exercise of its discretion may determine. It would probably be necessary, however, for said board of education, in the exercise of the authority vested in it by provision of Section 7625 G. C., to submit to the electors of said district the question of issuing bonds for the purpose of securing the necessary funds to provide suitable buildings for said centralized schools.

SECRETARY OF STATE