on the trial shows the location of the boulevard and the lands lying east of Pine street made by its construction:

MAURICE T. MOLONEY, Attorney General, (T. J. ScoFIELD and M. L. NEWELL, of counsel,) for appellant:

At common law a grant of land bounded by the sea or by navigable tide-water did not pass the title below highwater mark. Hargrave's Law Tracts, 17, 18, 27.

"Where the soil is the king's the building below the high-water mark is a purpresture,-an encroachment and intrusion upon the king's soil,-which he may either de

molish or seize or rent at his pleasure; but it is not ipso facto a common nuisance, unless, indeed, it be a damage to the port and navigation." Mitford's Pl. (4th ed.) 145; Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & A. 268; Attorney General v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603; Attorney General v. Parmeter, 10 Price, 378; Attorney General v. Terry, L. R. 9 Ch. 425; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Weber v. Harbor Comrs. 18 Wall. 57.

As governing the rights of proprietors owning lands on public navigable streams in this State, and as to the rights of the State therein, and the public to the navigation, trade and fishing therein, this court has applied the law as it existed in Great Britain. Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510; People v. St. Louis, 5 Gilm. 368; Ensminger v. People ex rel. 47 Ill. 388; Chicago v. Laflin, 49 id. 173; Lovingston v. St. Clair County, 64 id. 56; Chicago v. McGinn, 51 id. 272; Braxon v. Bressler, 64 id. 490; Railway Co. v. Stein, 75 id. 44; Houck v. Yates, 82 id. 181; Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 id. 334; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 id. 52; Trustees v. Schroll, 120 id. 509.

The constitution provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be expressed in its title, and the subject of this act is not expressed in its title. People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 574; Const. sec. 13, art. 4; Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182; Timm v. Harrison, 109 id. 593; Leach v. People ex rel. 122 id. 440; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 id. 229; Dolese v. Pierce, 124 id. 140; Cohn v. People, 149 id. 486.

LOUIS M. GREELEY, also for appellant:

It has uniformly been held that a power to sell and convey property given to an agent vests him only with authority to sell for cash. Under such authority he may not sell on time, (Whipple v. Pope, 33 Ill. 334; School District v. Insurance Co. 62 Me. 330;) much less exchange or sell for a consideration other than money. Hampton v. Moorhead, 62 Iowa, 91; Taylor v. Starkey, 59 N. H. 142; Trudo v. Anderson, 10 Mich. 357; Morrill v. Cone, 21 How. 75; Co

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lumbus I. & B. Co. v. Humphries, 64 Miss. 258; Mechem on Agency, secs. 325, 326.

The above rules apply with redoubled force where the agent is a municipal corporation or a public officer, and the property to be disposed of is public property. Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 511; School District v. Insurance Co. 62 Me. 330; 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (4th ed.) secs. 89, 91.

Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved against the corporation, and the power is denied. 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. secs. 89, 91; Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 511; School District v. Insurance Co. 62 Me. 330.

HERRICK, ALLEN & BOYESEN, for appellees the Newberry Library and Nathaniel K. Fairbank.

EDWARD O. BROWN, for appellees the Commissioners of Lincoln Park.

MARSTON, AUGUR & TUTTLE, for appellee Arthur L. Farwell.

WILSON, MOORE & MCILVAINE, for appellees Andrew H. Green et al. Trustees.

GEO. W. SMITH, for appellees Charles Fitz Simons et al.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court: The first ground relied upon by the People to reverse the judgment of the circuit court has been subdivided in the argument into the three following propositions: First, that the legislature of the State of Illinois has no power to alienate the submerged lands of Lake Michigan, as proposed by the act of June 4, 1889; second, that Lake Michigan and its submerged lands (subject to the paramount right of the general government under the commerce clause of the constitution of the United States) can only be disposed of by the State of Illinois in aid of trade, commerce and the free navigation of the same;

third, the people of the State having a common right of piscary over all the waters of the lake, the State cannot alienate the submerged lands, or any part thereof, so as to destroy such right of piscary.

The law seems to be well settled in the different States that the title to and dominion over lands covered by tide-waters within the boundaries of the several States belong to each State wherein they are located. The State holds the fee in trust for the public. The doctrine established in regard to lands covered by tidewaters has also been held applicable to lands bounded by fresh water on our large lakes. As early as 1860 the question arose in this State in regard to the proper construction to be placed on a deed conveying lands with Lake Michigan as a boundary line, and in disposing of the question this court, in Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, held that a grant giving the ocean or a bay as the boundary line, by the common law carries it down to the ordinary high-water mark; that the point at which the tide usually ebbs and flows is the boundary of a grant to the shore, and that the rule which governed in regard to lands on tide-water applied to lands on our large lakes. It is there said (p. 525): “A fair and reasonable construction of the language 'running to the lake and with the lake,' would mean to that place where its outer edge is usually found. We are therefore clearly of the opinion that the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes is the boundary of land in a conveyance calling for the lake as a line."

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Aside from the fact that the waters of our large lakes are fresh and there is no ebb and flow of the tide, they do not differ materially from the open sea, and no reason is perceived why one rule should be applied to lands bounded by the sea and a different rule applied to lands bordering on our great lakes. Where a navigable river is called for as a boundary line the grantee will take to the thread of the current of the stream. But the rule that

governs our rivers has no application to our great lakes. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, announces the same doctrine laid down by this court. It is there said: "We hold that the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the great lakes applies which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under tide-waters on the borders of the sea, and that the lands are held by the same right in the one case as in the other and subject to the same trusts and limitations." It is true that the State holding the title to the lands covered by the waters of Lake Michigan does not hold such title subject to barter and sale, as does the United States its public lands; but the State holds the title in trust, in its sovereign capacity, for the people of the entire State, for the purposes of navigation and fishery. The governmental powers of the State over these lands cannot be relinquished or given away. The trust imposed upon the State must be kept and faithfully observed.

But did the State repudiate the trust and transcend its powers on the enactment of the act of June 4, 1889, which authorized the board of park commissioners to extend its boulevard or driveway over and upon the bed of Lake Michigan, and sell and convey the submerged lands which might be reclaimed in extending the driveway in the lake? The extension authorized, as construed by the board of park commissioners in making the improvement, is not a matter of small moment, but, on the other hand, owing to the large amount of territory involved and the large interests of the public in the waters of the lake and property owners on the lake, the proposed extension is so far-reaching in its effect as to present questions of great importance. The distances of the outer breakwater from the shore line of the lake as it existed in 1888 are as follow: At the south line of Oak street 1340 feet; at the