§ 211. Same Same-Same-Usual points of alleged conflict -Frivolous contentions of litigants.-There are three points in which it is most usually alleged that state action is in conflict with the limitations imposed by the amendments, viz: (1) The exercise of the police power by the state; 87 (2) the exercise of the taxing power by the state; 88 and (3) the judicial procedure of the state.s And in some cases state legislation is alleged to be in conflict with all three of the limitations contained in the fourteenth amendment.90 In a large percentage of the cases, the alleged conflict between the limitations and state action is not only without merit, but absolutely frivolous, so much so that the supreme court has animadverted upon the number and character of the contentions carried there." the case last cited, the plaintiff in error alleged that, in a proceeding against her under the laws of the state of Louisiana, to subject her real estate to the collection of a local assessment, for local drainage, she was deprived of her property without due process of law, in violation of the limitation in that respect contained in the fourteenth amendment; and the court, in overruling the contention, speaking by Justice Miller, said: In "It is not a little remarkable, that while the provision has been in the constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the federal government, for nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner in which 87 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 130 (21:395); Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113, 134 (24:77); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (28:923); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 678 (31:205); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth of Ky., 161 U. S. 677, 704 (40:849). ss Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 108 (24:916); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 102 U. S. 586 (26: 253); King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 (43:214); San Diego Land & T. Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739 (44:1154); Falbrook Irr. Co. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (41:369); League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156 (46:478); et passim. 89 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 617 (44:597) and authorities there cited. 90 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 130' (21:395). In this case, the butchers of New Orleans claimed that a state statute in the exercise of the police power, regulating the slaughter of animals in that city was in conflict with all three of the limitations of the fourteenth amendment, and also imposed upon them "involuntary servitude" in violation of the thirteenth amendment. 91 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 108 (24:916). the powers of that government has been exercised have been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon all its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or in the more enlarged theater of public discussion. But while it has been a part of the constitution, as a restraint upon the power of the states, only a few years, the docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that state courts and state legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty or property without due process of law. There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the fourteenth amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court, the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court, of the justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded." "2 (e) CITIZENSHIP-NATIONAL AND STATE. § 212. Citizenship defined.-The federal constitution nowhere defines the meaning of the word citizen or citizens, either by way of inclusion or exclusion, except in so far as this is done by the affirmative declaration in the fourteenth amendment, that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside;" and the constitution must be interpreted, and the word citizen defined, in the light of the common law, in whose language the instrument was written, and the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the statesmen who framed it, and the people of the states who adopted it. According to the principles and definitions of the common law, as ascertained and expounded by the supreme court of the union, a citizen is a member of a political community, owing it allegiance and entitled to its protection, the allegiance of the citizen and the protection of the political community 92 Davidson v. New Orleans, supra. being reciprocal obligations, and the one being a compensation for the other; and, as applied to Amercian institutions, a citizen is a member of the political community called the state, and also of the larger, national community, called the United States. Both men and women are citizens.93 93 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (22:627); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (15:691); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 732 (42:890); United States v. Cruikshank, 94 U. S. 542 (23:388). In Minor v. Happersett, which was an action brought by a woman in a state court in the state of Missouri against a registrar for refusing to register her as a lawful voter, and was carried by writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, Chief Justice Waite, delivering opinion of the court, said: the "It is contended that the provision and laws of the state of Missouri which confines the right of suffrage and registration therefor to men, are in violation of the constitution of the United States and, therefore, void. The argument is, that as a woman born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the state in which she resides, she has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities of her citizenship, which the state cannot by its laws or constitution abridge. "There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are perand sons, by the fourteenth amendment, 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are expressly declared to be 'citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they re side.' But, in our opinion, it did not need this amendment to give them that position. Before its adoption, the constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several states, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance. For convenience, it has been found necessary to give a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words 'subject,' 'inhabitant' and 'citizen' have been used, and the choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. 'Citizens' is now more commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one living under a republican government, it was adopted by nearly all of the states upon § 213. Same-The African race-Dred Scott case.-Chief Justice Taney held that: The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, meaning the same thing, both describing the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, constitute what we familiarly call the sovereign people, hold the power, their separation from Great Britain, and was afterwards adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the constitution of the United States. When used in this sense, it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more. "To determine, then, who were citizens of the United States before the adoption of the amendment, it is necessary to ascertain what persons originally associated themselves together to form the nation, and what were afterwards admitted to membership. "Looking at the constitution itself, we find that it was ordained and established by 'the people of the United States,' and then going further back, we find that these were the people of the several states that had before dissolved the political bands which connected them with Great Britain, and assumed a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth, and that had by Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, in which they took the name of the United States of America,' entered into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to or attack made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. "Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these states when the constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen-a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were. "Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first by birth, and second, by naturalization. This is apparent from the constitution itself, for it provides (art. 2, sec. 1), that 'no person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president,' and (art. 1, sec. 8), that congress shall have power 'to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.' Thus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization. "The constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At and conduct the government through their representatives, and that every citizen is one of the people and a constituent member of this sovereignty; and that, neither the negroes of the African race, who, at the time of the Declaration of Independence, had been imported into this country and sold and held as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become the common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider, that all children born of citizen parents, within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens. The words 'all children' are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection as 'all persons,' and if females are inIcluded in the last they must be included in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact, the whole argument of the plaintiff proceeds upon that idea." After showing from the legislative and judicial history of the country, that women have always been considered as citizens the same as men, and holding that they are in fact such, the opinion proceeds: "The constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we must look elsewhere. In this case we need not determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them. It certainly is nowhere made so in express terms. The United States has no voters in the states of its own creation. The amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had. No new voters were necessarily made by it. Indirectly it may have had that effect, because it may have increased the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under the constitution and laws of the states, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through the states and the state laws, and not directly upon the citizen." In United States v. Cruikshank, supra, it is said, in the opinion: "Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as their collective rights. In the formation of a government, the |