§ 255. Same-Statute of limitation not running in favor of party out of the state.-A state statute of limitations containing a provision that when the defendant is out of the state, the limitation shall not run against the plaintiff if he resides in the state, but shall if he resides out of the state, does not deny to the non-resident plaintiff in such a case any privilege or immunity of a citizen secured by the constitutional provision declaring that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.'' 67

§ 256. Same-Intention of the constitutional provision.-The intention of the first clause of the second section of the fourth article of the constitution was to confer on the citizens of the several states a general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under the like circumstances.68

(e) THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BE ABRIDGED.

§ 257. Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States protected by the fourteenth amendment.-Limitation upon the states. In the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, it is declared that: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." This provision is, of course, a limitation upon the states; it is directed against state action. It was not intended

to protect individual right against individual invasion. It restrains and annuls all state legislation and state action of every kind which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.69 Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of this provision, and cannot claim its benefit.70

§ 258. Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States partially enumerated by the supreme court.-The su

67 Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowry, 93 U. S. 72, 78 (23:806).

68 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 138 (33:538).

69 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 62 (27:836); Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U. S. 313,

338

(25:667); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (21:394); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (23:588).

70 Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359-364 (51:520).

preme court of the United States, without attempting to give a comprehensive definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and without assuming to state them all, has made a partial enumeration of them, which is sufficient to indicate the character of those rights which are protected by the constitutional inhibition under consideration. The court, in its decisions has mentioned the following: A citizen of the United States, as such, has the right to come to the seat of the government to assert claims or transact business, to seek the protection of the government or share its offices: he has the right of free access to its seaports, its various offices throughout the country, and to the courts of justice in the several states; to demand the care and protection of the general government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government; the right, with others, to peaceably assemble and petition for a redress of grievances; the right to the writ of habeas corpus; to use the navigable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several states; also all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations; the right to become citizens of any state in the union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that state; and the rights secured to him by the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments to the constitution."1

Cases, 16

71 Slaughter-House Wall. 36 (21:394); Maxwell V. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 617 (44:597); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 36 (18:745).

"Living as we do under a common government, charged with the great concerns of the whole union, every citizen of the United States, from the remotest states or territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the principal departments established at Washington, but also its judicial tribunals and public offices in every state and territory of the Union. And the various provisions of the

constitution of the United States -such for example, as the right to sue in a federal court sitting in another state, the equal privileges and immunities secured to citizens of other states, and the provisions that vessels bound to or from one state to another shall not be obliged to enter and clear or pay duties-all prove that it intended to secure the freest intercourse between the citizens of the diffrent states. For all the great purposes for which the federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the

§ 259. What are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States-Right to vote. The right to vote is not a privilege or an immunity of national citizenship; the constitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon any one; the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship.72

§ 260. Same-Right to practice law in state courts.-The right to practice law in the state courts is not a privilege or an immunity of a citizen of the United States; the right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of the state is one of those powers that was not transferred for its protection to the federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by reason of the fact that the party seeking such license is a citizen of the United States.73

§ 261. Same-Right to sell intoxicating liquors.-The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and essential character of the national government, and granted or secured by the constitution of the United States, and the right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the rights growing out of such citizenship." The fourteenth amendment does not take

United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own states. And a tax imposed by a state for entering its territories or harbors is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the citizens of other states as members of the union, and with the objects which that union was intended to attain. Such a power in the states would produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it." Chief Justice Taney, dissenting opinion in Passenger Cases, 7 How. 492 (12:790), cited with approval by Mr. Justice Miller in

Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 36 (18:745), and also in SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (21:394).

72 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178 (22:631); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 569 (23:588); United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 256 (23:563); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 634 (48: 817).

73 Browell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 (21:442); Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 118 (38:926); Philbrook v. Newman, 85 Fed. 142.

74 Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662 (37:599); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129 (21:929); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 678 (31:205).

from the states those powers of police which were reserved at the time the original constitution was adopted. Undoubtedly it forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; but it was not designed to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberty and property of its citizens, and to promote their health, morals, education and good order.75

§ 262. Same State statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons.-A state statute prohibiting persons from carrying dangerous weapons on the person does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.76

§ 263. Same State laws requiring separation of the races on railway trains.-A state statute which requires all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in that state to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by partition so as to secure separate accommodations, and providing that no person or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned to them on account of the race to which they belong, and giving to the officers in charge of such passenger trains the power, and requiring them to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which he belongs, and enforcing the provisions of the act by penal sanction, does not deprive persons of the African race of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." 77

§ 264. Same State statute regulating the slaughter of animals. A state statute, establishing regulations for the landing, yarding, inspection and slaughter of all animals shipped into a

75 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31 (28:923); Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (34:519); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662 (37:599).

76 Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 539 (38:812).

77 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 564 (41:256).

"The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the ab

solute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish the distinction based upon color, or to enforce social as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." Brown, Justice. in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra.

designated district, whose flesh is designed for food in such district, and creating a private corporation, and granting it the exclusive privilege of maintaining stock-landings, stockyards and slaughter-houses within such district for a period of years, and requiring that all such animals shall be landed at the stock-landings and slaughtered at the slaughter-houses of the corporation, and nowhere else, and fixing maximum charges for all animals so landed or slaughtered, to be paid by the owners to the incorporated company, does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The enactment by a state of a statute regulating the landing, inspection and slaughter of animals for food, and the inspection of the meat after slaughter, is but the exercise by the state of the police power which was reserved to the states when the constitution was originally adopted, and which has not been. surrendered by them, by the fourteenth amendment, or any other amendment."s

§ 265. Same--State judicial procedure.-It has been contended, on writ of error in the supreme court of the United States, and urged as ground of reversal, by persons convicted of crime in state courts, that the limitations imposed by the first ten amendments to the federal constitution on the federal courts, in regard to judicial procedure, were, by the operation of the fourteenth amendment, extended to the states, and restrict the states to the judicial procedure prescribed for the federal courts in the first ten amendments, and that the guaranties therein contained in regard to judicial procedure have become, by force of the fourteenth amendment, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, which no state can abridge or deny. In other words, it has been contended that the forms and methods of judicial procedure prescribed by the first ten amendments for the federal courts, were, by the fourteenth amendment, converted into privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the United States, and that they are entitled to that identical procedure in all criminal prosecutions against them in the courts of the several states.79

But

U. S. 581, 617 (44:597); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 160 (30:971).