§ 334. Same-Same-Rule for construing legislative grants. In construing legislative grants, that construction must be adopted which is most advantageous to the interests of the state. All rights which are asserted against the state must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presumption; and if the grant or charter is silent about a power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, reasonabledoubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the state; and where it is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works the least harm to the state. But if there is no ambiguity in the charter, and the powers conferred are plainly marked, and their limits can be readily ascertained, then it is the duty of the court to sustain and uphold it, and to carry out the true meaning and intention of the parties to it. Any other rule of construction would defeat all legislative grants." § 334a. The prohibition protects all contracts, without regard to their nature or the character of the parties.-The constitutional inhibition, forbidding the states to pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts" uses the general term "contract," without distinguishing between different kinds or classes of contracts or the character of parties entering into them, and the words of the provision contain no distinction or exception, but are general and applicable to contracts of every description and by whomsoever made: and, therefore, the inhibition protects all contracts, which are valid by the municipal law, without regard to their nature, classification, subject-matter, or the character of the parties who make and 447); Willmington & W. R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264 (20:568); Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174 (32:377). 9 Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 3 Wall. 51, 83 (18:137); Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Co. v. Missouri River Packet Co., 125 U. S. 260, 273 (31: 731); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 544 (9: 822); Dubuque & P. R. R. Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66 (16:500); enter into them; it protects contracts whether executory or executed, express or implied, and whether they be contracts by legislative grant, or by matter of record, or by deed, or contracts without deed or simple contracts, as they are called at the common law; it protects contracts between private individuals, between the state and individuals, between the state and corporations, between corporations, between state and state, and between a state and the United States. The inhibition against the impairment of contracts is associated in the text of the constitution with the other great constitutional inhibitions against the state--the inhibitions against the emission of bills of credit, the inhibition for the protection of the currency, and the inhibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws-in the adoption of which the people of the several states manifested a determination to effectually protect themselves, their lives, their fortunes and their property from "the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed," and which are liable to result in hasty and inconsiderate legislation; and there is nothing in the words of the contract clause nor in the context which implies an intention to except from its operation any character or class of valid contracts, and the universal current of authority is that there are no such exceptions." 10 U. S. Const. art. 1, sec. 10; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87, 148 (3:87); Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 92 (5:547); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 627 (4:629); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 197 (4:529); Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 317 (6:606); Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 3 Wall. 51 (81:137); Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 (21:447); Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (14:977); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., 1 Wall. 116 (17:571); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29:525); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light & Heat, etc Co., 115 U. S. 650 (29:516); Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizen's Gas Light Co., 115 U. 10 S. 683 (29:510); McGehee V. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143 (18:314); Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 (21: 447); Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133 (11:529); St. Anna's Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362 (26:1128); Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430 (19:495); Wilmington & W. R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264 (20:568); Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314 (21:357); Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304 (14:705); McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608 (11:397); Louisiana v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574); Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (18:403); Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610 (21: 212); Louisiana v. New Orleans. 102 U. S. 203 (26:132); Clay . § 334b. Marriage not within the prohibition. The constitutional inhibition forbidding the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts was not intended to restrict the right of the legislatures of the state to legislate upon the subject of divorce; marriage is a social relation, and is not a contract within the meaning of the prohibition.11 County v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579 (26:856); Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596 (27:251); Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546 (21: 757); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (20:685); Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300 (21:179); Pittsburg, etc R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 326 (21: 189); Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 (24:558); Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (15:401); Bank v. Thomas, 18 How. 384 (15:460); Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436 (17: 173); Bank v. Ohio, 1 Black, 474 (17:180); New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 (24:352); Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U. S. 566 (29:495); Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36 (22:282); Northwest University v. People, 99 U. S. 309 (25: 387); Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 560 (7:939); Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 679 (26:271); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 367 (26: 395); Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 8 (26:302); Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66 (44:673); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 (41:93). 11 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 216 (31:654); Hunt v. Hunt, 97 U. S. 564, 565 (24:1109); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 715 (4:629). In Maynard v. Hill, supra, Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, and reviewing and quoting from the authorities, stated the ratio decidendi substantially as follows: "It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by the text writers and in de cisions of courts as a civil contract -generally to indicate that it must be founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence; but when the contract to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or changed, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress. "When the contracting parties have entered into the marriage state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the state, statutory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. They are of law, not of contract. It was a contract that § 335. "Obligation of contracts' defined.-The "obligation of contracts," within the meaning of the contract clause of the constitution, implies both (1) validity and (2) remedy. The inhibition protects from impairment (1) the legal validity of the contract itself, and the rights created by its terms and stipulations, and the duty of performance imposed by its engagements, and (2) the means and remedies for the enforcement of the contract, as established and defined, substantially. by the municipal law of the state, at the time when, and with reference to which, the contract was made. The idea of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation protected by the constitution. The obligation of a contract depends upon its terms and the means which the law in existence at the time affords for its enforcement. A law which alters the terms of a contract, by imposing new conditions, or dispensing with those expressed, is a law which impairs its obligation.12 the relation should be established, but, being established, the power of the parties as to its extent or duration is at an end. Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sovereign, as evidenced by law. They can neither be modified nor changed by any agreement of parties. It is a relation for life, and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. "It is not, then, a contract within the meaning of the clause of the constitution which prohibits the impairing the obligation of contracts. It is, rather, a social relation, like that of parent and child, the obligation of which arises not from the consent of concurring minds, but are the creation of the law itself, a relation the most important, as affecting the hapiness of individuals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life, and the true basis of human progress. "Marriage is more than a contract; it is the most elementary and useful of all the social relations, is regulated and controlled by the soverign power of the state, and cannot, like mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent of the contracting parties, but may be abrogated by the soverign will whenever the public good, or justice to both parties, or either of the parties, would thereby be subserved; and being more than a contract, and depending especially upon the soverign will, it is not embraced by the constitutional inhibition of legislative acts impairing the obligation of contracts." 12 Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314 (21:357); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 654 (20:685); Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (18: 403); Louisiana v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574); § 336.-Same-Axioms in American jurisprudence.-The supreme court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Justice Swayne, has announced the following axioms in American jurisprudence relating to contracts, namely: (1) The laws which exist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it. This embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement. Nothing is more material to the obligation of a contract than the means of its enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation which is guarantied by the constitution against impairment. (2) The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. (3) Any impairment of the obligation of a contract (the degree of the impairment is immaterial), is within the prohibition of the constitution. (4) The states may change the remedy, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is impaired. Whenever such a result is produced by the act in question, to that extent it is void. The states are no more permitted to impair the efficacy of a contract in this way, than to attack its validity in any other manner. Against all assaults coming from that quarter, whatever guise they may assume, the contract is shielded by the constitution. It must be left with the same force and effect, including the substantial means of enforcement which existed when it was made. The guaranty of the constitution gives it protection to that extent.1 13 § 337. Changing the remedy.-"Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608 (11:397); Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304 (14:705); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (4:629); Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610 (21:212); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203 (26: 132); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 596, 611 (24:793); Bronson V. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (11.143); Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 327 (24:858); Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (24:610); Seibert v. United States, 122 U. S. 284 (30: 1163); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 132 (40:93); Cleveland, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U. S. 300, 326 (21:179); Murray V. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 449 (24: 760). 13 Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314, 318 (21:357); United States v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 555 (18: 403). |