tine regulations established and enforced by one of them, does not give a cause of action to the other, although such quarantine rules and regulations are more stringent than called for by the particular exigency, and have been purposely framed with the view of benefiting the commerce and commercial cities maintaining them, at the expense of the complaining state and its commercial cities.15

§ 415. Suits by the United States against a state.-Under the constitutional grant to the supreme court of original jurisdiction in cases in which a state shall be a party, that court has jurisdiction of a suit filed therein by the United States against one of the states of the Union, to determine the boundary between such state and one of the territories of the United States. A question of boundary between a territory of the United States and one of the states of the Union is not one of a political nature, but is one susceptible of judicial determination by a court having jurisdiction of such a controversy; and that jurisdiction is vested, by the constitution, in the supreme court.16 An action of debt may be brought and determined upon its merits in the supreme court, by the United States against one of the states of the Union."

§ 416. The jurisdiction extends to suits of a civil nature only. The mere fact that a state is plaintiff is not a conclusive test that the controversy presented is within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court, and in which that court can grant relief against another state or her citizens or corporations created by her. It is only suits of a civil nature which are within this jurisdiction, and it does not extend to a suit by a state to recover of the citizens or corporations of another state penalties for a breach of her own municipal laws. The courts of no country or sovereignty execute the penal laws of another; and this rule applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties and forfeitures for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenues, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such

15 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1-28 (44:347).

16 United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621-649 (36:285).

17 United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211 (34:336).

penalties. And it has been accordingly held that the supreme court has no original jurisdiction of an action of debt brought by a state against an insurance corporation created by another state upon a judgment recovered by the plaintiff state against the defendant corporation for a penalty imposed by its statutes upon an insurance company for doing business in that state without having deposited in the office of the state commissioner of insurance the annual statement of its business and property as required by such statute.18 It is well settled that the court has no jurisdiction of a suit brought by a state, the subjectmatter of which is political.19

§ 417. Procedure in the supreme court in cases of original jurisdiction. The distinction between legal and equitable remedies is recognized in all the courts of the United States; 20 and in cases of original jurisdiction in the supreme court, it will frame its proceedings according to those which, at the time of the Revolution, had been adopted in England in analogous cases, the rules of the court of king's bench being followed in actions at law, and the rules of the court of Chancery governing in suits in equity, although the court is not bound to follow that procedure when it would embarrass the case by unnecessary technicalities or defeat the puposes of justice.21

18 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265-300 (32:239); U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 687; 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 436.

19 Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 5078 (18:721).

20 White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366378 (43:199).

21 California v. Southern Pacific

Co., 157 U. S. 229-271 (39:683); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657 (9:1233); S. C. 13 Pet. 23 (10:41); 14 Pet. 210 (10: 423); 15 Pet. 233 (10:721); Georgia v. Grant, 6 Wall. 241 (18: 848); Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478 (15:181).

CHAPTER X.

THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.

(a) THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OVER STATE COURTS.

418. The appellate jurisdiction of the federal supreme court over state courts derived from the constitution.-The words of the federal constitution defining the judicial power of the

general government grants to the federal supreme court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, in whatever court, state or federal, those cases may originate and be decided, and whoever may be parties to them, and even though a state may be party, and it is immaterial whether the case be one of a civil or a criminal nature; and from this constitutional grant of appellate judicial power is derived the jurisdiction of the supreme court to re-examine and revise, upon writ of error, the final judgments and decrees of the highest courts of the states involving a federal question, when that question is decided adversely to the federal right claimed in the manner prescribed by the federal statute. This appellate jurisdiction is granted. directly, and not mediately, by the constitution to the supreme court.1

§ 419. Same Power of congress to regulate the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court.-While it is true that the appellate jurisdiction of the federal supreme court over the courts of the states in cases arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, was derived directly and not mediately from the fundamental law, yet it is also true that that instrument vested in congress the power to regulate the exercise of that appellate jurisdiction. The second clause of the second section of the third article of the constitution, after distributing to the supreme court original jurisdiction in two classes of cases, provides that: "In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the congress shall make;" and, in the exercise of this power, congress has, beginning with the twenty-fifth section of the original judiciary act, by statute more fully and clearly defined this appellate jurisdiction, and established regulations for its exercise, which by amendments and judicial construction, have been matured and crystalized into a well-defined system;2 and a writ of error

1 U. S. const. art III. secs. 1, 2; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264448 (5:257); Martin v. Hunter's Lesees, 1 Wheat. 304-382 (4:97); Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506-526 (16:169); Twitchell v. Common

wealth, 7 Wall. 321-327 (19:223); Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418433 (20:449).

21 U. S. Stat. at L. ch. 20, sec. 25, pp. 73-79; 14 U. S. Stat. at L. ch. 28, sec. 2 p. 386; 18 U. S. Stat. at