ment was not intended to secure, and it does not secure to citizens of one state the privilege of deceiving and defrauding the public and committing an offense against society in another state by means of interstate traffic; and it is within the power of a state, without violating any right secured by the federal constitution, and without infringing the authority of the general government, to exclude from its markets any compound manufactured in another state, which has been artificially colored or adulterated so as to cause it to look like an article of food in general use, and the sale of which may, by reason of such coloration or adulteration, cheat the general public into purchasing that which they may not intend to buy, although such manufactured compound may be in itself a wholesome article of food, and has been recognized by congress as a legitimate article of commerce, and has been shipped from the state where it was manufactured into another state and offered for sale in the original package, marked and stamped as required by the laws of the state where it is offered for sale, and the manufacturer has complied with all the requirements of a federal statute regulating the sale of such manufactured article.81 But, while a state in the execution of its police powers has the right to enact such legislation as it may deem proper, even in regard to articles of interstate commerce, for the purpose of preventing fraud or deception in the sale of any commodity, and to the extent that it may be fairly necessary to prevent the introduction or sale of an adulterated article within the limits of the state, yet the state has no right to absolutely prohibit the introduction within its borders of an article of commerce which is not adulterated and which in its pure state is a healthful and wholesome article of food, simply because such an article in the course of its manufacture may be adulterated by dishonest manufacturers for purposes of fraud and illegal gain, and the inspection and analysis of the article for the purpose of detecting the adulteration would be difficult and burdensome.82 Nor can a state (31:508); Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103 (23:819); Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 482 (39:223); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U. S. 285, 338 (43:702); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683 (27:442). 81 Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 482 (39:223). 82 Schollenberger V. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 30 (43:49). make discrimination against the products and industries of some of the states in favor of its own products or those of other states.83 The states may, in the exercise of the police power, legislate with reference simply to the public convenience, subject, of course, to the condition that such legislation be not inconsistent with the federal constitution, nor with any act of congress passed in pursuance of that instrument, nor in derogation of any right guarantied or secured by it.84 Legislative enactments of the states, passed under their admitted police powers, and having a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health and safety of the people, but which by their necessary operation affect to some extent or for a limited time the conduct of commerce among the states, are yet not invalid by force alone of the grant of power to congress to regulate such commerce; and, if not obnoxious to some other constitutional provision or destructive of some right secured by the fundamental law, are to be respected in the courts of the union until they are superseded and displaced by some act of congress passed in execution of the power granted to it by the constitution. Local laws of the character mentioned have their source in the powers which the states reserved, and never surrendered to congress, of providing for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, and are not, within the meaning of the constitution, and considered in their own nature, regulations of interstate commerce simply because, for a limited time or to a limited extent, they cover the same field occupied by those engaged in such commerce. Such a law, although in a limited degree affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a needless intrusion upon the domain of federal jurisdiction, nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered in its own nature, is an ordinary police regulation designed to secure the well-being and to promote the general welfare of the people within the state by which it was established, and therefore not invalid by force alone of the constitution of the United States.85 83 Brimmer v. Rebam, 138 U. S. 78, 82 (34:862); Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62, 66 (35:638); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 322 (34:455); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 459 (29:691); Han nibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 473 (34:527). 84 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U. S. 285, 338 (43:702). 85 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. § 62. Quarantine laws enacted by the states. While it is true that the power vested in congress to regulate commerce between the states and with foreign nations is a power complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations other than those prescribed by the constitution, and that where the action of the states in the exercise of their reserved powers comes into collision with it the latter must give way, yet it is also true that quarantine laws, although they affect foreign and interstate commerce, belong to that class of state legislation which is valid until displaced by congress; and the legislation of congress bearing on the subject does not purport to abrogate, and has not abrogated the quarantine laws of the several states, but, on the contrary, has, from the foundation of the government down to the present time, recognized the state systems of quarantine regulations, and is subject to and in aid of them. The matter of quarantine is one in which the rules that should control and govern may in many respects be different in different localities, and for that reason may be better understood and more wisely established by the local authorities.86 § 63. State action incidentally affecting foreign and interstate commerce.-While it is true that the federal and state governments are independent of each other, and each is supreme within its constitutionally appointed sphere of action,87 and the constitution has vested in the former the exclusive power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, yet it is also true that the two governments constitute one composite governmental system, both acting, often simultaneously and at the same place, upon the same public interests and private rights, and upon subjects and instrumentalities of foreign and interstate commerce; and, accordingly, by inevitable necessity, resulting from the inherent and essential nature of the system, the execution of the municipal and police powers of the state incidentally affect foreign and interstate commerce, but it is held by the settled decisions that such state action is not a S. 299, 317 (41:166); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U. S. 285, 338 (43:702), and authorities there cited. 86 Compagnie Francaise v. State Board of Health, Louisiana, 186 U. S. 380, 401 (46:1209); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 21 (44:347); Morgan's R. R. & Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 455, 467 (30:237). regulation of foreign and interstate commerce, "within the meaning of the constitution," where the state regulation has a real and substantial relation to matters which are the subjects of legitimate state control, and does not go beyond the necessities of the case.s 88 87 Ante sec. 17. 88 Compagnie Francaise v. State Board of Health, Louisiana, 186 U. S. 380, 401 (46:1209); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U. S. 285, 338 (43:702); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 317 (41;166); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 729 (18:96); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. CHAPTER III. THE BASES AND SOURCES OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTERED IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE § 64. Two systems of laws administered in the circuit courts of the United States. As a corallary of the dual system of government in this country, there are two systems of laws and jurisprudence administered in the circuit courts of the United States, namely: 1. The constitutional, and statutory law and treaties of the United States, and the body of jurisprudence which has been erected upon them as a foundation by the judicial decisions. 2. The constitutional, and statutory law, and the common law of the several states, and the body of jurisprudence which has been erected on them as a foundation by the judicial decisions of the highest courts of the states;2 to 1 U. S. Const. art. VI, paragraph 2; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 516 (16:173). 2 Original judicary act, sec. 34 1 U. S. Stat. at L. ch. 20, pp. 73, 79; U. S. R. S. sec. 721; Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Pet. 175 (9:677); Fitch v. Creighton, 24 How. 159 (16:596); Beaureguard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497 (15:469); Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196 (18:322); Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (10:865); United States V. Reid, 12 How. 361 (13:1023); Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (20:591); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (10:274); Hinde v. Vattier, 5 Pet. 398 (8: 168); Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276 (22:536); Walker v. Beal, 9 Wall. 743 (19:814); Kendall v. Creighton, 23 How. 90 (16:419); Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S. 526 (28:816); Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35 (17:755); Equator M. & S. Co. v. Hall, 106 U. S. 86 (27:114); Smeed V. Wister, 8 Wheat. 690 (5.717); Orvis v. Pow |