is payable at a future time and bears interest. But these circumstances do not, of themselves, change the character of the transaction from a deposit to a loan. We take judicial notice that many banks allow interest upon time deposits, and even in some cases upon open checking accounts on the daily balances. It is true that we have held a certificate of deposit such as this to be, in effect, a promissory note and negotiable as such. (Kavanagh v. Bank of America, 239 Ill. 404.) It does not, therefore, cease to be a certificate of deposit and the transaction is not transformed into a loan. It has still the distinguishing features of the bank deposit that it is payable only upon demand at the bank and on the return of the certificate properly indorsed. The borrower of money who executes a promissory note for it is bound to seek his creditor and pay him, and a bank is not different in this respect from an individual. But a bank is not obliged to seek its depositors and pay them. "Deposits are made in banks in accordance with universal commercial usage, which becomes a part of the law of the transaction. They are neither loans nor bailments in the strict sense of the term. A deposit is a transaction peculiar to the banking business and one that the courts should recognize and deal with according to commercial usage and understanding." (Elliott v. Capital City Bank, 128 Iowa, 275.) While the certificate of deposit is a promissory note and is negotiable, nevertheless the transaction out of which it arises is a deposit and not a loan. An ordinary deposit in the usual course of business, while it creates the relation of debtor and creditor, is not a loan to the bank. (Officer v. Officer, 120 Iowa, 389; Hunt v. Hopley, id. 695.) The word "deposit,” according to its commonly accepted and generally understood meaning among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and subject to check, but deposits not subject to check, for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand

or on certain notice or at a fixed future time.

(People

v. Belt, 271 Ill. 342; State v. Shove, 96 Wis. 1; Ellis v. State, 138 id. 513; State v. Cadwell, 79 Iowa, 432; State v. Sattley, 131 Mo. 464; Wilkins & Co. v. Arthur, 91 S. C. 163.) When the deposit was made by the plaintiff in error on June 3, 1913, he deposited $50,000 with the bank and received a time certificate of deposit, and at the maturity of that certificate he surrendered it to the bank, it was marked paid, he received a check for the interest and another certificate of deposit for $50,000; and this same course was followed at the maturity of each succeeding certificate. The books of the bank showed in the record of time deposits a charge of the certificate paid and a credit of the certificate canceled. When the bank borrowed money and gave notes the transactions were not included in the record of certificates of deposit but in the account of bills payable, and whenever money was borrowed it was done under the authority of the board of directors obtained for that purpose, but when certificates of time deposits were issued they were not subject to the directors' authorization. When the bank received deposits on certificates a record was made showing by whom the deposits were made, and it was the same general record as to demand and time deposits. Under the evidence this transaction was an ordinary deposit made in the usual course of business on a time certificate.

The first deposit was made on June 3, 1913. Was there a deposit of funds or money of the district on June II, 1914? On that day the plaintiff in error held the certificate of deposit of the bank for $50,000. He held it as treasurer of the sanitary district, to which the fund be-· longed, and was entitled to demand immediate payment of it. He presented the certificate and made a new contract of deposit with the bank, receiving another certificate which evidenced the new contract and surrendering the old .certificate. The relation of banker and depositor is not one

imposed by law but is voluntarily assumed. It is a matter of contract. A bank is not bound to receive deposits from anyone but may choose those whom it will accept as depositors and the terms and conditions on which it will accept deposits. When it issues a certificate of deposit it enters into a contract with the depositor. When the certificate of deposit of June 11, 1914, was issued a new contract of deposit was made between the bank and the plaintiff in error. The old certificate was taken up and canceled, the new certificate was issued and the entries on the books of the bank showed these transactions. The contract evidenced by the old certificate had then been performed. A new deposit had been made. If the plaintiff in error had deposited the certificate of another bank there could be no question about the deposit. The fact that the deposit consisted of a certificate of the bank receiving the deposit does not make the transaction essentially different. (State v. Shove, supra.) In either case the certificate was due and the plaintiff in error was entitled to receive the money. In the one case the certificate is deposited in the bank, which accepts it as so much cash and undertakes its collection instead of requiring the depositor to collect it and deposit the money; in the other the bank also accepts the certificate as so much cash, and, instead of insisting on paying the money through one agent to the holder and requiring him to deliver it to another agent for deposit, makes the proper entries in its books and issues the certificate showing the new contract of deposit. The cash was supposed to be present in the bank, and it was not necessary that it should be passed back and forth over the counter.

The defendant in error argues that the condition of the bond covers only funds of the district coming to the plaintiff in error's hands after the execution of the bond, which were deposited by him officially as treasurer of the district and which could be withdrawn only by a check signed by him as treasurer. The language of the condition an

swers these contentions. The funds referred to were funds. and moneys coming into the hands of the plaintiff in error as treasurer of the Sanitary District of Chicago from any source, at any time. There is no limitation of the language. The obligee of the bond is J. A. McCormick, treasurer of the Sanitary District of Chicago, and the condition refers to deposits which the obligee may make of the funds of the district. The evidence shows that the funds belonged to the district, and nothing is said in the bond as to the name or form in which the deposits should be made. They were made in the name of John A. McCormick, treasurer, and evidence was admissible to show that the funds were those of the district. The bond says nothing as to the name, form or method in which deposits should be made or withdrawn, except that the bank was required to pay out the funds in accordance with the warrant, check or direction of McCormick as such treasurer. The bank was also required by the condition to account for and pay over all moneys received by it as such depository. The language does not restrict the deposit to a checking account, for it provides for paying out by warrant, check or direction of McCormick as such treasurer, which in the case of a certificate of deposit might be by indorsement. Such a condition does not restrict the liability to a checking account. (Board of Court House Comrs. v. Irish American Bank, 68 Minn. 470.) Moreover, the bank was also required. by the condition to account for and pay over all moneys received by it as such depository, and this obligation was subject to no restriction.

The defendant in error insists that by the certificate of June 11, 1914, an extension of time was granted to the bank without the surety's knowledge or consent, and that the latter was thereby released. The doctrine referred to has no application here. The bond did not restrict the character of deposits to be made, and time deposits, as well as those payable on demand, were within its contemplation.

The contention is made on behalf of the defendant in error that the deposit of the funds of the sanitary district and the taking of the certificate of deposit in the form in which it was taken constituted an embezzlement of the funds of the district. Section 81 of the Criminal Code provides, in substance, that if any public officer shall use, by way of investment or loan, for his own use, except as authorized by law, any portion of the money, funds or securities intrusted to him for safe keeping, disbursement, transfer or other purpose, he shall be fined or imprisoned or fined and imprisoned. It is argued that the word “Treas." in the certificate is merely descriptive of the person; that the obligation is only to the plaintiff in error personally, and that the deposit in his own name was a conversion of the funds of the district. The case of Estate of Ramsay v. Whitbeck, 183 Ill. 550, is supposed to sustain this contention. It was decided in that case that an agreement by the State Treasurer to deposit public money in banks in consideration of the allowance of interest to him personally was a violation of this section as well as against the public policy of the State. While the word "Treas." did not constitute a statement that the funds were those of the sanitary district and that the deposit was for its account, it does tend to disprove any inference, if any such inference would otherwise arise, that the deposit was an investment or loan by McCormick for his own use, and the inference is shown to be wholly without foundation when it appears, as it does from the evidence, that the interest was accounted for as it was received, to the sanitary district. The plaintiff in error, as treasurer, was entitled to receive the funds of the district and was personally, liable as an insurer for their safe keeping. The failure of a bank in which he might deposit them would not relieve him from responsibility, nor would the loss of them by theft or robbery, if he undertook to keep them in his personal custody. (People v. McGrath, 279 Ill. 550.) If the obligation of the certificate is