be unwarrantably crippled. For the purpose of showing to what extent either one of these courses would affect the revenue of that company, statements were introduced showing the present revenue upon business from Cincinnati and Louisville and other Ohio and Mississippi river crossings to intermediate stations between Atlanta and Macon, and what the revenue would be upon that business if the rate was reduced to the Macon rate. These statements cover, as do the previous ones, the year ending March 31, 1893. From these it appears that this railway company during that year derived from such business passing through Atlanta and destined to intermediate stations between Atlanta and Macon $2,950.02. Had this freight been transported upon the basis of the Macon rate, the amount received would have been $1,722.47. The revenue derived from such business passing through Atlanta and Carrollton during the same time to Macon was $22,850.61. Both Atlanta and Carrollton business would be affected by the Griffin rate, for the reason that business via both those points passes through Griffin en route to Macon. The total funded debt of the Central of Georgia Railway Company is $45,220,000 and its capital stock is $5,000,000. The funded debt is distributed as follows:

Various mortgage bonds..

First preferred income bonds

Second preferred income bonds..

$30,220,000

4,000,000

7,000,000

4,000,000

Third preferred income bonds..

In 1896 the income and expenses were as follows:

The payments upon the funded debt were 5 per cent interest

.

on $30,220,000 mortgage bonds, and 14 per cent on $4,000,000 of first preference income bonds.

The railway lines covered by the foregoing statements are 1123 miles in length. The total capitalization is $44,715 per mile, and the funded debt $40,263 per mile.

It did not appear what the original cost of the construction of these railway lines was, nor what their present cost of construction would be. It appeared that the system of rate making which is attacked in this complaint prevailed upon the other lines entering Macon, but it did not appear to what extent.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact are the complainants entitled to relief?

1. The claim that the rate to Griffin is "in and of itself unreasonable" is not sustained. The burden of proving that issue is upon the complainants, and this burden they have not met.

2. Do the rates unjustly discriminate against Griffin in favor of Macon? That they discriminate clearly appears from the findings of fact. Every inhabitant of Griffin who buys a barrel of flour or a can of beef pays more for it than as though he resided in Macon. The complainants are absolutely prohibited from competing upon equal terms with the Macon wholesaler outside the limits of the city of Griffin itself. This sort of discrimination is intolerable, and should under no circumstances be permitted unless justified by necessity. Competition is alleged as the justification. Plainly water competition cannot be successfully invoked, for the only water competition is from the east, and Griffin enjoys substantially the same eastern rate as does Macon.

Macon has five competing railroads. Griffin has two. The two lines which enter Griffin are among the most powerful and active in the south. Both these lines by their connections directly reach Louisville and Cincinnati, and compete directly for the business upon which the obnoxious rates are charged. Why, then, does Macon enjoy the benefit of this competition while Griffin does not? Apparently for no other reason than that the railways interested arbitrarily determine that Macon shall be a 'basing point," and that Griffin shall not be; competition shall be given its effect at Macon, and shall not be given its effect at Griffin. No other reason is suggested, and no other reason is possible.

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rates attacked; but the carriers insist that there is such competition between the eastern markets and Macon, which either does or might affect these rates. Assuming and that fact is not found that ocean competition controls the rate between New York and Macon, still that rate is materially higher than the rate from Ohio River points. If the rate from the last-named points to Macon were raised to equal the New York rate, and the Griffin rate reduced to the New York rate, the revenues of the defendants would be increased rather than diminished, unless that change in rates operated to divert considerable quantities of traffic from the western to the eastern markets. There is nothing to show that this would happen to any considerable extent, and taking the character of the freight which is now brought from Ohio River points and which consists largely of products produced in the west and not in the east we do not well see how this could be true.

As to the rates which Captain Day testified he would be willing to make from Savannah and Brunswick to Hawkinsville, it is sufficient to say that no freight is actually transported by water at the present time over that route; and there is, therefore, no competition of that sort. The mere existence of a water-way which might afford an avenue for such transportation is not enough. There must be actual competition by water and this competition must dictate the rate. A railroad rate so low as to drive water transportation out of existence cannot be justified by showing the possibility of water competition. The law as interpreted by this Commission permits railroads to meet, not to extinguish, such competition.

The defendants also rely upon competition between railroads and markets. This competition does undoubtedly exist in a most active form and is the controlling factor in making the Macon rate; but that it creates such dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions as will justify the carrier in charging more for the short than for the long haul without an order of this Commission is no longer an open question with us. It was said in the original case, Re Louisville & N. R. Co. 1 I. C. C. Rep. 31, 81, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 278, that there might be exceptional cases in which competition between carriers subject to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce would create such dissimilarity. No case of that sort was then before the Commission. No such