ceived from the Augusta Southern at the same rate that it transported those received from the Central of Georgia Railway. It is under this order that the joint tariff in question is made. The Wrightsville & Tennille Railroad Company is simply obliged to make the same joint rates with the Augusta Southern that it makes with the Central of Georgia. The complainants allege that the Southern States Freight Association is responsible for the continuance of the system and for the existence of the rate complained of. The testimony shows that several of the defendants who publish and participate in these rates never have been members of that Association, and that the Association itself, since the decision of the Trans-Missouri Case, has been dissolved. No finding is therefore necessary as to the scope and purpose of that Association.

No question is made by any of the defendants but that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the Act with respect to the rates complained of, except possibly the Georgia Railroad. The Georgia Railroad Company was made a party to these proceedings and was duly served with the complaint, but never appeared. The Central of Georgia Railway Company sets forth in its answer that there is no such corporation as the Georgia Railroad Company; that the Georgia Railroad, so called, was originally owned by the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company and was leased by that company to one William Wadley and his assigns for a term of years not yet expired; that he assigned a certain interest in that lease to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the remaining interest to the Central of Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, and that the last-mentioned interest is now claimed by the respondent company, the Central of Georgia Railway Company; that said assignees are operating said railroad under a joint management and under the name of the Georgia Railroad, and not the Georgia Railroad Company.

Nothing was said in the testimony upon this point. It appears that the railroad in question is operated as an independent line. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company is not a party to these proceedings.

Upon these findings to what relief, if any, are the complainants entitled?

The underlying cause of complaint is the system upon which

these rates are made, and the most important question is whether that system is in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act in the respect complained of, and if so, whether the Commission has power to correct such violation.

The position of the complainants seems to be that certain territory is tributary to the city of Savannah and that Charleston must not be allowed to enter this territory upon equal terms as to freight rates. This really amounts to saying that the rate should be determined by the distance. It has often been said that distance is an important element in the making of rates, and it has been held that a carrier would not be compelled to disregard distance in order to place two localities upon commercial equality. Commercial Club of Omaha v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 6 I. C. C. Rep. 647; Cincinnati Freight Bureau v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. 7 I. C. C. Rep. 180.

Upon the other hand, it often happens that distance is altogether disregarded, and it has been held that this may be proper within certain limits and under certain conditions. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. 2 I. C. C. Rep. 618, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 436. The proposition of the defendant is, however, that in this whole territory distance should be entirely obliterated. The mere fact that a town is situated at the junction of two railroads entitles that town to the same freight rate from Charleston and Savannah, no matter what the relative distance may be.

To put the question in a concrete form. Valdosta is 158 miles from Savannah and 413 miles from Charleston, yet the defendants claim that the rate from Savannah and Charleston should be the same. It is found that only 10 per cent of the fertilizer used in Valdosta during the year 1896 came from Savannah, the balance of it being brought from Charleston. Assuming that the cost of that article was the same at Savannah and Charleston, this would mean that nine tenths of all the fertilizer consumed in that vicinity was transported 413 miles while it might have been obtained by transporting it 158 miles. Now, the complainants say that this is wrong; that manifestly it costs much more to transport fertilizer from Charleston than from Savannah, and that somebody in the end must pay for that species of foolishness, if it be allowed to continue. Upon the other hand, the defendants urge that this system gives Valdosta the benefit of competi

tion in the markets of both Charleston and Savannah, and that so long as railroad companies are operated as private enterprises they may of right engage in any legitimate business which yields a profit.

Probably the true solution of this controversy is to be found in a mesne between the contentions of the two parties. It can hardly be said that a particular locality is entitled to describe about itself a circle and exclude its competitors from this area. Neither can it well be claimed that distance ought not to be a factor in the making of rates, and that a city is entitled to no benefit by reason of its advantageous position. The defendants themselves concede that there are limits beyond which this disregard of distance ought not to extend. Formerly Wilmington was not allowed to come into this common-point territory for the very reason that the distance was against that city. Finally that question was submitted to arbitration and the arbitrators determined that Wilmington might come into certain territory, but a line was established below which it could not go, and that city is to-day excluded from points south of this line solely on account of distance. However, we do not feel called upon to decide in this case whether the principle itself is right, nor whether the application of that principle is too extensive, for the reason that, if we determine that there is a wrong, we clearly have no power to correct that wrong.

Valdosta is reached by one line of railroad from Savannah and by an independent line of railroads from Charleston. The rate from Savannah to Valdosta is fixed by the Railroad Commission of Georgia. If the railroads constituting the line from Charleston to Valdosta see fit to make the same rate from Charleston as is made from Savannah we have no power to order them not to do so, for it has always been understood that the Commission had no authority to fix a minimum rate. Re Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co. 2 I. C. C. Rep. 231, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 137.

If some point is taken to which both rates are interstate, like Montgomery, the result is still the same. Each line is an independent line and may fix its own rate wherever it pleases, and we have no power whatever over that rate when established. It is manifest that a wrong like that complained of in this case could not be corrected without authority to establish both the maximum

and the minimum rate. And we can establish neither. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. ed. 243.

But if the Commission has no power to correct a discrimination of this sort where the rate from Savannah is made by one line and the rate from Charleston is made by another line, has it not power to correct it where the same line makes both rates, and ought it not to do so? The Plant System extends from Charleston through Savannah to Valdosta. The rate by that system from both Charleston and Savannah to Valdosta is the same, although the distance from Charleston is almost twice as great. Should not this apparent wrong to Savannah be righted?

If this rate stood alone and were voluntarily made by the Plant System, it would probably be a discrimination against Savannah which ought to be corrected. But under the circumstances it is difficult to see how it can be called an unjust discrimination or how it works to the injury of Savannah. The rate from Charleston to Valdosta is fixed by an independent line. The distance through Savannah is but 275 miles as against 413 miles by that line. Unless the Plant System makes the same rate as is made by the circuitous line it can do no business whatever. Under these circumstances we think it may properly meet the rate from Charleston which is made by the longer line, and that it does not, in making and maintaining this rate, unjustly discriminate against the city of Savannah. If the rate from Charleston to Valdosta were in any way subject to control, our judgment might be otherwise.

The complainants insist that even though the common-point system of rate-making is consistent, nevertheless the defendants discriminate unduly against Savannah in the application of that system. They introduce certain tables which apparently show that Charleston has the benefit of a better rate into the territory of Savannah than Savannah has into the territory of Charleston. It is not clear that these tables fully sustain the contention of the complainants, since the average distances are not the same and the rate per ton per mile should not be the same for short as for long distances; but assuming that they do show that Charleston has such an advantage, that may well follow from the system and not from its unfair application. If the common points to which

Savannah and Charleston take the same rate are so located that upon the whole the distance is less from Savannah than from Charleston, then manifestly the result must be the one which the complainants say their tables demonstrate. In other words, the vice, if one is established, is that of the system, and not of its application; and we have already said that we cannot correct that fault.

But the complainants say that there are instances in which there is a manifest discrimination against Savannah in the making of these rates. For instance, Charleston is 115 miles distant from Savannah. To all stations in Georgia, not common points, a difference in rate of 50 cents per ton in favor of Savannah is made by the Plant System. It is urged that this difference is too little in view of the difference in distance.

To this we cannot assent. It is found that water competition between Charleston and Savannah compels the making of a rate of 80 cents per ton between those two cities. If 80 cents is a proper local rate, 50 cents cannot be said to be an unfair difference in the through rate from Charleston via Savannah to Georgia points. Looking merely to the cost of service, the Plant System would probably make more money in transporting fertilizer from Charleston to Burroughs upon the through rate of $1.38 than in transporting the same article from Charleston to Savannah upon a local rate of 80 cents and from Savannah to Burroughs upon an other local rate of 88 cents. The CharlestonSavannah rate is fixed by water competition; the SavannahBurroughs rate is fixed by law. These two rates being established, the through rate from Charleston to Burroughs is not an unreasonable one.

This difference in rate between Charleston and Savannah is maintained to all points, not common points, in the State of Georgia upon the Plant System, but when that line of railway crosses the southern boundary of Georgia and enters the State of Florida. this difference begins to diminish and finally disappears altogether.

If not in some way accounted for this would be a manifest discrimination against Savannah; but it is accounted for by the fact that the water rate on fertilizers from both Charleston and Savannah to Jacksonville, Fla., is the same, and must accordingly be the same at all intermediate points to which fertilizer can be