of parties produced scarcely a ripple among the postal clerks. Over half the men in the service had been appointed under the civil-service law, wholly without regard to politics, and all were doing their duty faithfully wholly without regard to the political complexion of their superior officers, as is always the case in a classified office, where, as a matter of experience, it has been found that just as faithful service is rendered by the men who politically disagree with their superiors as by those who are politically in accord with them. The postal clerks had nothing to fear from the change of administration. They continued to do their work fairly and honestly, and they were left unmolested. In the case of the railway mail service the classification acted like magic in putting a nearly complete stop to changes for partisan reasons. It was remarkable to note in 1893 the complete absence of the unseemly exhibitions which accompanied the wholesale removals of railway-mail clerks in 1889.

The opponents of the law often advance two entirely inconsistent arguments against it, one being that the law really does not work to prevent political changes, and the other being that it does so work, and that the men who are not changed with a change of parties in the administration will not render as good service to the Government as new incumbents who agree with the party in power in political principle. The facts given above completely refute the first charge, and the absurdity of the second is shown at a glance by a comparison between the work of the railway mail service, where the employés are appointed and retained on nonpolitical grounds and the work of the fourth-class postmasters who are changed mainly for partisan reasons after each change of administration. The railway-mail clerks form a body of the most intelligent and highly-trained Government officials in the whole service and perform with the utmost efficiency and fidelity a range of duties far more difficult than those performed by the fourth-class postmasters.

Complaint is sometimes made that the Commission is expensive and brings no money return to the Government. As a matter of fact the Commission, with its present force, costs the Government about $42,000 a year, and has about 44,000 positions in the classified service over which it exercises supervision. These positions are in the main withdrawn from the degrading influences of the spoils system, and the Government, therefore, pays about a dollar a year for each individual thus withdrawn from the spoils system and put in the classified service. Secretary Windom gave it as his experience that, under the old system, prior to a change of administration the work of the clerks in his Department fell off nearly a half, and that it took the successors of those who were changed at least six months to learn their duties. Accepting the average salary of a Government clerk as about $800, this would mean, in Presidential years at least, that nearly half this salary was wasted, no return being obtained by the people for the

amount paid out. If this would happen to be true throughout the classified service, it would seem that one effect of the civil-service law is, in Presidential years, to save to the Treasury a very large sum of money for the very small sum, in comparison, which the enforcement of the law costs. On mere financial grounds, therefore, the system is of the greatest benefit to the tax-paying citizens, while the benefit on moral grounds, the purification of our politics resulting from the removal of one of the most degrading of the evils which tend to corrupt our public life, is simply incalculable.

The Commission has been very greatly hampered during the last year by the insufficiency of the appropriations made for its support. The amount appropriated for traveling expenses was so small that a large number of examinations, scheduled for various parts of the country, had to be abandoned, to the disappointment of many applicants and the detriment of the service. No increase at all of clerks was provided for, notwithstanding the fact that the work of the Commission had been nearly doubled by extensions of classification. At present more than half of the Commission's force in Washington consists of men and women detailed to it from the various Departments. In some cases the people thus detailed are sent from the Departments because they are poor workers and are not wanted there. Moreover, they are disposed to hold themselves responsible to the Departments and not to the Commission. They are of no benefit to the Departments whatsoever, because all their work is done for the Commission, and yet they are not of the value they would be to the Commission if they were borne on its rolls and entirely subject to its discipline. The number detailed from each Department and their total compensation is as follows:

The Commission takes this occasion heartily to acknowledge its obligations to the heads of the several Departments for these details, and especially to the Secretary of Agriculture for the generous response which he has made to the Commission's call for help.

If appropriations shall be made in accordance with the estimates which the Commission has submitted it will be possible to transfer all these detailed clerks to the rolls of the Commission and enable it to

so organize its force as to greatly increase its efficiency and keep abreast of its work, which, during the summer, fell nearly six months in arrears, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts put forth to keep it up. There is no hardship to the Commission individually in the failure of Congress to make adequate appropriations to carry on its work in the most satisfactory manner. The hardship comes to the individuals who take the examinations, but whose papers can not be promptly marked, and who are kept for months in uncertainty as to the results of their examination and what chance they stand for appointment.

A further hardship comes to the applicants in the various States and Territories through the inability of the Commission, on account of inadequate appropriations for traveling expenses, to hold as many examinations throughout the country near to the homes of the applicants as they otherwise would, thus compelling many applicants to travel long distances, at great expense, or forego the examination altogether. Another result will be to make it extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible, to maintain an equitable apportionment to all the States and Territories, as the law contemplates. Of course examinations can be held in Washington and near-by places at little cost, and a sufficient number of eligibles be thus obtained to supply all the demands of the departmental service; but the far-away States would suffer in their apportionment, and the railway mail service would be greatly hampered in not being able to obtain men residing near the lines of road on which they would be required to serve. The law will not be defeated by any failure to make suitable appropriations for traveling expenses and for clerical help, because the appointments will still have to be made from the registers of the Commission, and those registers will be kept supplied with eligibles, but they will not be evenly distributed through the country, as they heretofore in the main have been.

Early in the present year the Secretary of Agriculture, by direction of the President, so amended the classification of the Department of Agriculture as to include within its provisions the employés of the Weather Bureau, whether serving in Washington or elsewhere. Comparatively few appointments have been made to that service through the examinations of the Commission since its classification. It is, therefore, impossible at this time to make any statement derived from experience as to what the ultimate effect of the classification upon that service will be. No apprehension is, however, felt that it will not be beneficial.

During the last year the Commission has made some inquiry into the hours of labor, methods of appointment, tenure of office, etc., of various foreign countries, compared with our own. This inquiry was undertaken at the request of the Hon. David B. Henderson, member of Congress from Iowa, and was carried on through the courtesy of the State Department, for which the Commission takes this opportunity of expressing its grateful appreciation. The State Department prepared

and sent out to the various consuls a circular, requesting information upon the questions raised. Very many of the consuls sent in elaborate replies, and a sufficient number of these have been received to allow of a tolerably full comparison between the conditions obtaining in the civil service of our own and of foreign countries. The information is of lasting value, and accordingly the Commission will transmit these reports for publication in the appendix in full. The Commission appends herewith abstracts of the most important of them, prepared in a form suitable for ready comparison.

In commenting upon the administration of the civil service in foreign countries as compared with its administration in the United States, the Commission submits the facts as to the United States merely to facilitate this comparison, and refrains from any remark upon the hours of labor, the periods of vacation, and kindred matters, inasmuch as a Commission of Congress has at present these matters under consideration. Nor does the Commission, in view of the existence of this Congressional Commission, deem it to be its duty to discuss such questions as that of compulsory insurance to provide for clerks when super annuated.

In reference to the questions of appointment, tenure of office, dismissals, and retirement, it may be said, as the first generalization, that the facts show that the more barbarous the nation the more nakedly the spoils system is applied in its political life, and that the gradual adoption of a merit system, such as that which is established by the civilservice law of the United States, is one of the tests of a nation's progress in civilization.

In parts of the civil service in this country the spoils system may be seen very nearly in its ideal state. The spoils theory, the theory that in governmental contests "to the victor belongs the spoils," is that government officers who by any means get control of the machinery of government are entitled to use the offices, not in the interest of the people at large but for the advancement, pecuniary and otherwise, of themselves and their friends. The logical application and extension of this theory-and, of course, if it have any merit at all it should be applied logically and extensively-is that public servants should be allowed to make profit out of public offices in any and every way possible. This is exactly what is done in Morocco. In Turkey the system, though very bad, shows a slight advance; the country seems feebly striving, at least, to make a pretense of approach towards civilized ideas; however, the Morocco, or spoils theory of appointments and removals is still largely dominant. A long stride forward is seen in the Republic of Colombia, for though in this Republic the spoils system as yet prevails, there are evident signs of progress, which will undoubtely become more manifest as the country leaves farther behind it the stage of incessant revolutionary disturbance and civil war waged for private ends.

The countries of Europe show a very great advance, which is marked much in proportion to the standard of civilization attained in the dif ferent lands. The methods of administration are in some respects most perfect in the free Republic of Switzerland, as is entirely fitting, since the merit system is essentially democratic, and from its very nature that which would be acceptable to a self-respecting, intelligent people, really proud of its liberty and understanding what liberty means. There are very many features which obtain in the civil service of other English-speaking countries, notably in the newer English-speaking democracies, such as New Zealand and Australia, which deserve the careful attention of our public men. These democracies have abolished the spoils system, and are just so far ahead of our democracy. It is by no means a matter of pride that the United States should at present be occupying, as regards the abolition of the spoils system, a position, in some respects, intermediate between Oriental despotisms on the one hand and free republics like Switzerland on the other.

The spoils system is a mere indefensible remnant or survival of barbarism complicated with some of the least desirable traits which accompany certain developments of civilization. In the unclassified service, taken as a whole, the governmental methods of the United States do not materially differ from the methods of Colombia; and indeed in part do not differ very radically from those of Turkey, and they are so utterly indefensible from the standpoint of decency and morality that it is difficult for a man of ordinary intelligence who wishes well to his country to discuss the arguments advanced in their favor with anything like tolerance. As above pointed out, the logical result of the spoils system is the method obtaining in Morocco, where the man pays for his appointment and uses it as a means for making money. This is precisely what is done in extreme cases in the spoils system here. Two years ago, for instance, the Commission found in the course of an investigation into one branch of the unclassified service in Washington that in some cases it still was the custom for men who had influence in some of the offices to sell their influence and procure appointments upon the receipt of money, the appointees of course seeking to reimburse themselves so far as practicable from the general public.

At its best the spoils system is a fruitful source of corruption in national life and is potent in degrading politics and preventing decent men from taking part in them. At its worst the system degenerates into a mere corrupt scramble for plunder, taken part in by men who, with all the vices of medieval freebooters, and pursuing the same methods, yet lack the one virtue of physical courage which these freebooters were required to possess.

In the classified service, on the other hand, a man enters the public service on his merits, after fair trial, in comparison with others of his fellow citizens, and is retained as long as he honorably serves the public. Under this system the only test is a man's usefulness to the public: