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CASES ADJUDGED IN UNITED STATES

COURT OF CUSTOMS APPEALS

MALONE v. UNITED STATES (No. 2492.)

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WOOL ON THE SKIN INCLUDES LAMBSKINS.

The provision of paragraph 1102, Tariff Act of 1922, for “Wools on the skin” is as applicable to lambskins as to sheepskins. Accordingly, lambskins with the wool on, are not free under paragraph 1666, as “Skins of all kinds, raw

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United States Court of Customs Appeals, April 14, 1925 APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8828 (T. D. 40306)

(Affirmed.]

Toms ck & Washburn (Geo. J. Puckhafer of counsel) for appellant.

William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence and Oscar Igstaedter, special attorneys, of counsel), for the United States.

(Oral argument Mar. 26, 1925, by Mr. Puckhafer and Mr. Lawrence)

Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and Smith, BARBER, BLAND, and HATFIELD,

Associate Judges

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The importation in this case is thus described by the appraiser: The merchandise consists of lambskins with the wool on, not specially provided for, returned for duty at 30 cents per pound on the clean content under paragraph 1102, act of 1922." The importer claimed the merchandise to be free under paragraph 1666 or paragraph 1579 of said act. The Board of General Appraisers sustained the classification and the importer appeals.

No claim is made here under said paragraph 1579 and that ground of protest will therefore be considered as waived.

Said paragraphs 1102 and 1666 are as follows:

1102. Wools, not specially provided for, and hair of the Angora goat, Cashmere goat, alpaca, and other like animals, imported in the grease or washed, 31 cents per pound of clean content; imported in the scoured state, 31 cents per pound; imported on the skin, 30 cents per pound of clean content.

1666. Skins of all kinds, raw, and hides not specially provided for.

IT. D. 40845.

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There does not seem to be any ambiguity about the statutory language just quoted. Under said paragraph 1102, if wools, not specially provided for, are imported on the skin, they shall be liable to a duty of 30 cents per pound of clean content. Such language would include wool, whether attached to the skin of a sheep or a lamb; no tariff distinction is claimed to have ever been made between sheep's wool and lamb's wool. Under paragraph 1666, skins of all kinds, raw, which, of course, would include both lamb and sheep skin, if not specially provided for, are free. Thus all sheep's wool and lamb’s wool is dutiable and sheepskins and lambskins are free.

Appellant relies upon Goat & Sheepskin Import Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 178, T. D. 34254. In that case both parties litigant assumed that the issue was whether the term "sheepskins with the wool on,” in paragraph 676 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, included lambskins; the court was passing upon the issue thus made. The said tariff act contained the following paragraphs:

370. On wools of the third class and on camel's hair of the third class the value whereof shall be twelve cents or less per pound, the duty shall be four cents per pound. On wools of the third class, and on camel's hair of the third class, the value whereof shall exceed twelve cents per pound, the duty shall be seven cents per pound.

371. The duty on wools on the skin shall be one cent less per pound than is imposed in this schedule on other wools of the same class and condition, the quantity and value to be ascertained under such rules as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.

676. Skins of all kinds, raw (except sheepskins with the wool on), and hides not specially provided for in this section.

The court held that the evidence clearly showed that there was in trade and commerce a clear distinction between the meaning of the words "sheepskin” and “lambskin”; that this distinction had been retained in paragraph 451 of said tariff act, which paragraph in levying duties used the language, "sheep and goat skins (including lamb and kid skins)”; that because of this distinction, clearly indicated by the record and said paragraph 451, the word “sheepskins” in paragraph 676 did not include lambskins. That is as far as the case

It will also be observed that in the opinion filed in that case it is said (p. 179):

If the dutiable provisions, paragraphs 370 and 371, quoted supra, stood alone, unaffected by any other provisions of the tariff law, we might be justified in saying that the importation is in part at least of wool, that wool is made dutiable under these provisions, and therefore this merchandise should be accordingly rated for dutiable purposes.

Goat & Sheepskin Import Co. v. United States, supra, is not in conflict with the judgment of the court below, and said judgment is a ffirmed.

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UNITED STATES v. BROWN & Co. (No. 2511)' 1. RELATIVE SPECIFICITY—"Fish Sounds"-"BLADDERS."

The provision of paragraph 1523 and 42, Tariff Act of 1922, for "fish sounds” is obviously a more specific designation of fish sounds than the one of para

graph 1655 for “bladders.2. CONSTRUCTION-CHANGE IN LANGUAGE SIGNIFYING CHANGE IN MEANING

KNOWLEDGE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IMPUTED TO CONGRESS. Paragraph 34, tariff act of 1913, levied duty upon “prepared fish sounds." The corresponding paragraph (42) of the act of 1922 levies duty upon "fish sounds, cleaned, split, or otherwise prepared." In 1920, the United States Court of Customs Appeals, in United States v. Brown & Co., 10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 47, T. D. 38295, held that fish sounds which had been cleaned, split, and dried were not “prepared” under paragraph 34, tariff act of 1913. Knowledge of this decision must be imputed to Congress, and the change in language must be interpreted as manifesting an intention to meet it and to levy duty on cleaned, split, and dried fish sounds under paragraph 42, Tariff Act of 1922, taking them out of the provision for "Fish sounds, crude, dried *,” in free list paragraph 1523. This must be regarded as an exception deliberately made by Congress to the rule that cleaning and drying are not manufacturing processes.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, April 14, 1925

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APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 48203

(Reversed.]

William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States.

Allan R. Brown for appellees.

(Oral argument Mar. 24, 1925, by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Brown)

Before Graham, Presiding Judge, and SMITH, BARBER, BLAND, and HATFIELD,

Associate Judges

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The merchandise in this case is admittedly fish sounds, cleaned and split, imported at various dates in 1922 and 1923, after the Tariff Act of 1922 became effective. It was returned for duty at 25 per centum ad valorem as "fish sounds, cleaned, split, or otherwise prepared,” under the following provision of paragraph 42 of the Tariff Act of 1922:

Casein glue, agar agar, isinglass, and other fish sounds, cleaned, split, or otherwise prepared, and manufactures, wholly or in chief value of gelatin, glue or glue size, 25 per centum ad valorem.

The importers claim the goods in question to be free of duty under paragraph 1523, or alternatively under paragraph 1655 of said tariff act. Said paragraphs are as follows:

1523. Fish sounds, crude, dried, or salted for preservation only, and unmanufactured, not specially provided for.

IT. D. 40846.

1655. Sausage casings, weasands, intestines, bladders, tendons, and integuments, not specially provided for.

The importers do not insist here upon their claim under paragraph 1655, and it is therefore not seriously considered by this court. In any event, the goods being concededly fish sounds, would not be as specifically described by the designation “bladders,” found in paragraph 1655, as they would be under either paragraph 1523 or 42.

It is contended by the importers that the goods imported, having been subjected to no processes except that of cleaning, splitting, and drying, are not to be considered as "prepared,” but as crude and dried fish sounds, and in support of this contention the importers cite and rely upon United States v. Brown & Co., 10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 47, T. D. 38295, and other authorities cited therein.

Prior to the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1922, in succeeding tariff acts, fish sounds were generally classified in two classes, crude fish sounds being usually free, and prepared fish sounds dutiable. Paragraph 23, tariff act of July 24, 1897; paragraph 23, tariff act of August 5, 1909; paragraph 34, tariff act of October 3, 1913.

Under these succeeding tariff acts, the courts, passing upon the dutiable status of this class of goods, held that cleaning and drying were not processes of preparation. This line of authority is well summed up in United States v. Brown, 10 Ct. Cust. Appls. 47, T. D. 38295, where the court held that the splitting and cleaning of fish sounds was not a preparation and would not bring the articles in question within the purview of paragraph 34 of the tariff act of October 3, 1913, which provided for “prepared” fish sounds. The opinion in that case was filed February 21, 1920.

The Congress, in preparing the Tariff Act of 1922, departed from the language formerly employed, and inserted, in defining what should be considered as dutiable fish sounds, the language “cleaned, split, or otherwise prepared.” It is contended by the importers that the insertion of this language does not vary the construction to be placed upon the word “prepared," and that fish sounds, cleaned and split, are still to be considered as not prepared. If this be true, what does the added language mean? To so hold would be to render such language meaningless. It must be assumed the Congress was fully cognizant of the decision of this court in United States v. Brown, supra. The reasonable deduction to be drawn from the added language is that Congress intended to meet and cover the point decided in that case, and to provide that if fish sounds were cleaned or split, they should be considered as dutiable. The words “cleaned, split, or otherwise prepared,” if given a reasonable interpretation, must mean, in this connection, that if the sounds are either cleaned or split or prepared in any other way, they are dutiable under paragraph 42, at 25 per centum ad valorem, and we so construe the language.

The court is well aware of the uniform holdings in customs cases as to the meaning to be attached to the word "prepared," and does not desire to be understood as departing from such holdings except as to the particular subject matter passed upon in this case. Here the Congress has deliberately established a rule as to what shall be considered a method of preparation as applied to the particular commodity in question, namely, fish sounds. It is the duty of the court to interpret this language in conformity with its manifest intent.

The judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is reversed.

UNITED STATES v. Bloch & Co. (No. 2470) *

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1. PARAGRAPH 218, TARIFF Act of 1922—ILLUMINATING ARTICLES.

The provision of paragraph 218, Tariff Act of 1922, for illuminating articles of glass or paste or glass and paste, does not include all such as are used in any way in artificial illumination, but excludes such as are not commonly and chiefly so used. Whether, if chiefly used in producing a decorative illumination, an

article might be included, is not decided. 2. GLASS ORNAMENTAL CANDLESTICKS.

Decorated and colored blown-glass candlesticks, chiefly used for decorative purposes empty or holding real or imitation plain or ornamental unlighted candles, and but seldom, if ever, used to hold candles for practical lighting, are not classifiable at 60 per centum ad valorem with the illuminating articles of paragraph 218, Tariff Act of 1922, but at 55 per centum with the blown-glass articles of the same paragraph. Probably if used for practical lighting purposes, they would still not be dutiable with the illuminating articles named in the paragraph, though this is reserved.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, April 14, 1925

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8852 (T. D. 40393)

(Affirmed.)

William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Fred J. Carter, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States.

Sharretts, Coe & Hillis (Edward P. Sharretts on the brief) for appellees.

10ral argument Mar. 26, 1925, by Mr. Hoppin)

Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and Smith, BARBER, BLAND, and HATFIELD,

Associate Judges
BARBER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

Paragraph 218 of the Tariff Act of 1922 contains various provisions for the classification and assessment of duty upon articles composed wholly or in chief value of glass or paste and combinations thereof.

IT. D. 40847.

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