which that great judge laid down in Roach v. Garvan, has been the rule which the court has adopted for its guidance, namely, the determination on the part of the court to discountenance any attempt to prejudice mankind against the merits of a case before it has been heard. I have not the slightest doubt that such an attempt has been made here, and that it has been made in the most offensive manner. An opinion has been pronounced by the author of this article (who sits down to examine these affidavits with a clear and decided bias) with all that boldness which persons under the screen of the anonymous, and having no responsibility cast upon them, think themselves entitled to indulge in. But those who have responsibility cast upon them, this court-and every tribunal which has to administer justice-is bound to protect every suitor from such an attempt to pervert the course of justice. I am not entitled to consider myself above being influenced by articles of this description, though I should hope I am. I am not entitled to think that the jury whom I may have to summon in the case are above such influences, though perhaps I ought to do so." 1

III. And when the publication is a copy from another paper, of matter contemptuous of a court, the publisher and printer of the second paper will be, together with the publisher of the first, guilty of contempt. The rule as to newspaper comments will not

1

2

2 Atk. 469.

Tichbourne v. Mostyn, 17 L. T. N. S. 5; L. R. 7 Eq. 55; 2 Id. The publisher of the "Pall Mall Gazette," having made a humble submission and apology, the vice-chancellor thought it sufficient for the purposes of justice to order him to pay the costs of the motion. A similar order was made with respect to the printer of another paper which had gone beyond a mere insertion of the article from the "Pall Mall Gazette," and the

extend to comments of any description on a matter that is pending, waiting for argument, and waiting for decision; but courts will not permit comments to be made on any documents whatever, which are before the writer and not before the court, but which are afterwards to come before the court, if such comments have a clear and distinct tendency to directing and swaying the mind of the court or jury, or whoever may have to determine the cause.1

2

112. It is a contempt for the solicitor of one of the parties to a suit to write letters, for publication in a newspaper, which may tend to influence the result. of the suits; so, for a party to print his brief, before the cause came on, was held a contempt of court, though there was nothing in the publication reflecting upon the court in any way.3

motions against the other papers were abandoned. Vid. also Tichbourne v. Tichbourne, 22 L. T. N. S. 55.

1 Tichbourne v. Mostyn, ubi supra.

3

2 Dan v. Eley, L. R. 7 Eq. 49.

Vid. per Lord Hardwicke, 2 Atk. 471; S. C., nom. Roach v. Garvan, 2 Dick. 794.

"that

"It is highly important," said Lord Romilly, M. R., the court should not allow steps of this sort to be taken by the officers of the court, in causes in which they are engaged, which possibly may have an effect favorable to their client, or unfavorable to the other side; and I may further say that if I am to go minutely into every sentence of a letter which is written in a public newspaper, to say this is questionable, and that is doubtful, and the like, it is imposing a task and a duty upon the court which it will be impossible to perform. There is one distinct line drawn, which is this: that gentlemen who are concerned for contending clients in this court, whether solicitors or counsel, should abstain entirely from discussing the merits of those questions in public print; if they do it at all, they ought to put their names to their communications. But to let the public suppose that it is merely done by a person who takes a great interest in, and has great knowledge of, the subject, and discusses it from a public point of view, when, if the fact were known, he is the solicitor of the defendant, and

113. And, it seems, not only will the truth or falsity of the publication make no difference1 in the

has the strongest possible interest in his suceess, is, in my opinion, highly reprehensible."

The

The letters published in this case were anonymous. suit was to restrain the infringement of a patent-one of the issues raised being as to the novelty of the plaintiff's invention—and the letters written by the defendant's solicitor stated facts tending to disprove the novelty of the invention. On the appearance of the first letter, the plaintiff wrote to the editor referring to the suit, and suggesting that the writer of the published letter was an interested party. Notwithstanding this, the editor, besides refusing to insert the plaintiff's letter,. as containing personal imputations, afterwards published a further anonymous letter from the defendant's solicitor, knowing that he was a solicitor, but not knowing that he was the solicitor in the pending suit. A motion was made to commit the editor, also, for a contempt of court, but the motion was refused; the editor, however, having to pay his own costs. Lord Romilly said: "The case of the editor of a newspaper is very different from that of persons who write letters to the paper for publication. His duty is simply to take no part in matters purely personal between individuals, or in matters. which are the subject of a lawsuit. But it often happens that private matters are so mixed up with public matters, into which it is his duty to enter, that it is very difficult to draw the distinction between them. In this case, if the editor had inserted Mr. D.'s (the plaintiff's) letter, I should have thought that there was nothing in his conduct calling for the interference of the court; but he did not insert it, and afterwards, with notice that a suit was pending, with the knowledge that the author of the letters was Mr. C., and that Mr. C. was a solicitor-which ought to have induced him to inquire further, and ascertain the exact position which Mr. C. occupied-he allowed further letters on both sides to be published. I am inclined to think, by what the plaintiff told him, he was put upon inquiry whether Copper Cap' (the nom de plume of the letter-writer) was connected with the suit." His lordship, having taken time to consider the matter, said, on a subsequent day: "As regards the case of the editor, I think that he did not show quite the forbearance towards Mr. D. that he might have done, considering how materially interested Mr.

' Hollinsworth v. Duane, Wallace, 77.

offense, but even if it be neither true nor false, it may be contemptuous-as where the matter consists of an

advertisement.1

The publication, in a newspaper, of an advertisement offering a reward for evidence tending to establish one side of a controversy pending before the court, is a contempt of court, as tending to produce false evidence; 2 and Lord Hardwicke once committed a person who published an advertisement relating to an answer in a chancery suit; saying that his reason for committing was "not only for the sake of the party injured by such advertisement, but for sake of the public proceedings in court, to hinder such advertisements which tend to prepossess people as to the proceedings in the court." s And it seems that even pendency of the litigation will not be deemed necessary, to give courts jurisdiction to punish where the contempt is flagrant.

4

D. was in the matter; and that he might have made some little excuse for the warmth which Mr. D. showed upon the subject. At the same time there is nothing I can find against the editor for which I can require him either to make an apology or to pay the costs of this motion; but, for the reasons I stated on the last occasion, I cannot give him costs. That is out of the question. He has certainly shown a tendency to decide against Mr. D.; but I also feel for the difficult position in which an editor is placed in such cases. But, as I said before, with respect to him I can make no order."

1 W. Bl. Com. 285; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas, 319; In re Benson & Mitchell, 12 Johns. 460.

2 Pool v. Sacheverel, 1 P. Wms. 675.

I

1 Mrs. Farley's Case, 2 Ves. Sr. 520.

* Shortt, 378.

"It is a reproach to the nation," said the lord chancellor (Parker), in that case, "and an insufferable thing, to make a public offer in print to produce evidence; and is tantamount to saying, that such persons as will come in and swear, or procure others to swear such a thing, shall have £100 reward, and this in a cause now depending here. If £100 is to be

In the last quoted case the court1 granted a commitment, observing that such an advertisement tended to the subornation of witnesses, was very dangerous, and not only criminal, but "a means of preventing justice in a cause now depending."

It will be noticed that, were it not for the words above given in quotation marks, the ruling of his lordship would go to characterize the offering of the reward in the advertisement, and not the advertisement itself (a proceeding in the nature of a subornation), as the offense in this case.

114. The true liberty of the press requires the amplest and most unrestricted right of every man, not only to maintain and possess, but to publish, if he will, his own opinions. But, as we have seen (in our inquiry concerning the laws of libel), it is due to the dignity and peace of society to possess a supervisory power over the motives of such publications, to be exercised when necessary to distinguish between those opinions, expressed in the interests of good manners, of the reformation of individuals, or of institutions, and with an eye solely to the public good; and those which are intended to defame (as in the case of libel), or to delude and prejudice. To opinions of the latter description it is impossible that any good government should afford protection and impunity.

allowed, the same reason will hold as to the allowing of £500 or £1,000. And though the intention of the person so advertising may be innocent (and I, knowing the man, believe it was so, inasmuch that if a court may be said to have inclinations or impressions from thence, I must own, I should be influenced by my knowing Mr. Pool to be an honest man), yet the justice of the court nay, the justice of the nation, being concerned in so public a case, I cannot dismiss the party, though his counsel offer to pay costs to the other side, but in justice and for example's sake, he must stand committed." Parker, L. C.

1