To wit, ("A Judicial Outrage." Here following the article, portions of which contained the alleged contempt.)

"Interrogatory Second.-If not, did you write in manuscript any part thereof?

"Interrogatory Third.--If not, did you see the same in manuscript, or in proof, before it was published? Interrogatory Fourth.-If not, were you or not the responsible editor of 'The Tribune' on the 14th day of April, 1864?

"Interrogatory Fifth.-If you did not write or see before publication the said matter, do you know who is the author, or writer, or composer thereof, or did you not know that it was to be published?

Interrogatory Sixth. If you know the said author or writer, please name him?

"A statement of the transactions in court, which were reported and commented on in 'The Tribune' followed, together with a disclaimer from the court of any complaint as to the editorial comments, but only as to what purports to be a report of the proceedings in court."

To these interrogatories Mr. Greeley filed the following statement:

"Horace Greeley, in the above-entitled proceedings referred to, protesting against the jurisdiction of this court over his person, and over the proceedings now being taken, and insisting that they are irregular and without warrant of law, and further insisting that he ought not to be asked, and cannot legally be compelled to answer questions upon a charge which is in its nature criminal, and for which he may be exposed to indictment, both as a misdemeanor for a contempt. as well as for a libel; and further insisting that the said article, in the order to show cause in these proceed

ings referred to, is not a report of the proceedings of a court, but, on the other hand, is simply an editorial criticism, based upon a report of such proceedings contained in a newspaper called 'The Evening Express,' published two days before said editorial article was published, to wit, on the 12th day of April instant. "For answer to the interrogatories filed and served on him, says that he is now, and ever since its foundation has been, the principal editor of the newspaper called The Tribune,' and is one of its proprietors, by being a stockholder of the corporation that publishes the same. That, as such editor and proprietor, he is subject to all the responsibilities that justly pertain to that relation. Believing that this avowal is a substantial answer to all the interrogatories propounded to him, he most respectfully declines to answer any questions that may expose any of his associates in the editorship and publication of said newspaper, to the discipline of this tribunal, preferring to abide the consequences, be they what they may."

The court being satisfied that no disrespect was intended, discharged Mr.Greeley.1

And see as to this subject generally ex parte Jones, 13 Ves. Jr., 237; Re Mayer, 2 Barnard, 43; Re Crawford, 188 J., 225 9. B.; Re Yates, 4 Johns. 317; 6 Johns. 337. As to contempts by publications reflecting on courts, &c., see Re Van Hook, 3 City Hall Recorder, 64; Re Spooner, 5 Id. 109; Re Strong, Id. 9; Birch v. Walsh, 10 Ir. L. R. 13; Re Van Saudan, 1 De Gex. 55; Re Crawford, 18 L. J. 225, Q. B.; ex parte Turner, 3 Mont. D. & G. 523; Rex v. Lee, 5 Esp. 123; Respublic v. Oswald, I Dallas, 319; Richmond v. Dayton, 10 Johns. 393; Folger v. Hoogland, 5 Id. 235; Re Bronson, 12 Id. 460; The People v. Freer, I Cai. 485; The People v. Few, 2 Johns. 290; Rex v. Hart, 1 Camp. 359; 1 Hawk. Pl. Cr., Ch. 73; Re Crawford, 13 Q. B. 613; Starkie on Slander, by Folkard, Ch. xxxvi; Moulton v. Clapham, Sir W. Jones, 431; March on Slander, 20; Hollingsworth v. Duane, J. B. Wallace, 77; Bayard v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 438.

131. Courts cannot be permitted to be scandalized by statements and comments tending to weaken their authority, merely because those statements are published by a newspaper in giving its readers the news of the day. And if a prisoner convicted of murder and sentenced to death, while on the scaffold, and before his execution, makes a speech, reflecting upon his trial, a newspaper may not be justified in publishing a report of his speech.' If a highwayman shall, at the gallows, arraign the justice of the law, and of those who condemned him, he who publishes (the highwayman's language) shall not go unpunished.2 "The defendant's excuse," said the court, “in such a case is indeed entitled to be received at its fullest value; but since the wrong and injury consist, not in the intention, but in the printed word reaching the eye of the reader, the disavowal of bad intent cannot do away with the pernicious effect against which it is the aim of these proceedings to guard."

3

But neither, on the other hand, will the court travel behind the publication to search for a bad intent, even if the publication were intended to be contemptuous of the court, but is not so in fact, the court will not punish for the intention.*

4

Lord Erskine committed to prison the committee of a lunatic and his wife for having published a

1 See Sandford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20, and the same commented on post, in chapter on newspapers. In this case the language reflected on one of the prisoner's counsel, not upon the court. Townshend on Slander and Libel, p. 375. Here was a literal exemplification of Butler's lines;

2

3

4

"No rogue ere felt the halter draw

With good opinion of the law."

1 Read. Stat. Law, 151; Dig. L. L. 32.

People v. Freer, 1 Caine, 485.

People v. Freer, 1 Caine, 485, 518; Bayard v. Passmore, 3 Yeates, 439; Morrison v. Moat, 3 Edw. Ch. 25.

pamphlet, with a dedication to the lord chancellor, reflecting upon the conduct of certain persons acting, in the management of the affairs of a lunatic, under orders from the court of chancery. His lordship committed also the printer; holding that ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet would not excuse him.1

1

132. Even wide insinuations will sometimes be construed into a contempt at common law. In 1788 an information was granted against the members of the corporation of Yarmouth, for having entered upon their books an order, stating "that the assembly were sensible that Mr. W. [against whom an action had been brought for a malicious prosecution, and a verdict returned for £3,000 damages, which the court refused to disturb,] was actuated by motives of public justice, of preserving the rights of the corporation to their admiralty jurisdiction, and of supporting the honor and credit of the chief magistrate; and therefore they vote him the sum of £2,300." "Nothing," said Buller, J., "can be of greater importance to the welfare of the public, than to put a stop to the animadversions and censures which are so frequently made on courts of justice in this country. They can be of no service, and may be attended with the most mischievous consequences. Cases may happen in which the judge and the jury may be mistaken: where they are, the law has afforded a remedy and the party injured is entitled to pursue every method which the law allows, to correct the mistake.. But when a person has recourse; either by a writing like the present, by publications in print, or by any other means, to calumniate the proceedings of a court of justice, the obvious tendency of it is to weaken the administration of justice, and in consequence to sap

the very foundation of the constitution itself.. They say that W. was actuated by motives of publicjustice,' &c. But the judge and jury who tried the cause, confirmed as to their opinion by the court of common pleas, have said that-instead of his having been actuated by motives of public justice, or by any motives which should influence the actions of an honest man-he had acted from malice. These opinions are not reconcilable; if the one be right, the other must be wrong. It is, therefore, a direct insinuation that the court had judged wrong in all they have done in this case, and it is therefore clearly a libel on the administration of justice. . ... The defendants have, indeed, said that they never meant to reflect on the public justice of the country; but that, alone, is no answer to this application. Where particular allegations are made, in applying for an information, some answer must be given. If the thing charged be capable of different explanations, it is fair to take the defendants' explanation in their affidavits, that they did not intend anything wrong; but if it be only capable of one interpretation, we are not to be guided by such a general answer. I am of opinion that the information should go against all."1

When the common council of New York city— being enjoined, by a preliminary injunction, from certain official action passed resolutions declaring the injunction illegal, proclaiming a determination to disregard it, and imputing dishonesty to the judge who granted it; the resolution was held a contempt.2

1

2

Rex v. Watson, 2 T. R. 199.

People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263; affirming People v Compton, 1 Duer. 512. See also Morrison v. Moat, 4 Edw

25.