A mutual benefit insurance certificate was made payable by a husband to his wife and daughter and the wife died before the husband. Our supreme court held that the insurance created in the beneficiaries a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and the entire insurance went to the daughter. Unless the policy points out to whom the insurance money shall be paid in case the beneficiary dies before the insured, the appointment of the beneficiary is revoked by his death. Accordingly, where a policy was made payable to the two children of the insured and to "their guardians, executors, administrators and assigns" and the children died before the insured, the latter having made no change of beneficiaries, it was held, in a controversy between the administrator of the insured and the administrator of the beneficiaries, that the latter was entitled to the insurance on the grounds that the policy was not only to be paid to the beneficiary if they survived the insured, but also to "their guardians, executors, administrators and assigns.' A certificate in a mutual benefit association whose by-laws provided that policies were to be paid to "widow, child or children, mother, sister or sisters in order named," was made payable by the insured to his wife S, who died before he did, the insured remarrying after his wife's death; held, that death revoked the appointment of S as beneficiary and the second wife took under the policy to the exclusion of the children of the first wife.

Assignment. -The insured may, except where restricted by statute, as in the case of insurance for the benefit. of a married woman, or by the terms of the policy, change the beneficiary without the latter's consent, but until then the beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy. In mutual benefit societies, the statute prescribes who may be the beneficiary and a change of beneficiary must not be made to one not allowed by statute or by the by-laws or rules of the society. Our statute on this subject says: "Any member of such society (meaning a mutual benefit society) order or association, may name as his beneficiary any person or persons designated by the laws of such society, order or association or if the laws thereof permit, his insurance may be made payable to his estate. Any member may change the beneficiary named in his certificate or policy without the consent of

such beneficiary, by complying with the by-laws of the society, order or association which issued the same." This restriction applies only to mutual benefit societies. As to ordinary life insurance, our court has held that "a policy of insurance, obtained in good faith by a person having an insurable interest in the life of the person insured, may be assigned to any person, with the consent of the company. A policy of insurance is assignable like any other chose in action, unless prohibited by the terms of the policy or by statute. Where a mutual aid society was formed under section 1771 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin "for the purpose of mutual aid, in case of sickness, accident and death of its members or their families. . . ", and whose constitution declared the object of the organization to be, among other things, to establish a relief fund for the sick members and to pay $2000 to the heirs as directed by the member, upon sufficient proof of the death of such member in good standing, it has no authority under the statute, the articles of incorporation and its constitution, to issue a certificate to a person neither kindred to nor a member of a member's family. Where a member changed his certificate from his parents to a stranger, such change of beneficiary was inoperative. But the charter, constitution, rules and regulations of a mutual benefit association will be liberally construed to promote the benevolent purpose of the order, and where the purpose of the order was "to assist and give pecuniary aid to the widows and orphans of deceased members", it was held that a stepdaughter of a deceased member was an "orphan" of the deceased, and was a proper beneficiary.

In regard to changing the beneficiary in a policy issued by a mutual benefit association our supreme court has said: "It is now well settled that one who is insured in a mutual benefit association, and who wishes to change the beneficiary must make the change in the manner required by his policy and the rules of the association, and that any material deviation from this course will render the attempted change ineffective. It is equally well settled that there are many cases where literal and exact conformity with the requirements of the policy may be excused. In the case of Supreme Conclave vs. Capella, 41 Fed. Rep. 1, the subject is exhaustively reviewed, and the conclusion reached, that there were three exceptions to the rule of exact compliance: First, where

the society has waived strict compliance by issuing a new certificate without insisting on the performance of all the intermediate steps; second, where, by loss of the first certificate without fault, its surrender becomes impossible, a court of equity will not require an impossibility, but will treat the change as made if the insured has taken all the other necessary steps and done all in his power to make the change; third, where the insured has pursued the course required by the policy and the rules of the association, and done all in his power to make the change, but before the new certificate is actually issued he dies, a court of equity will decree that to be done which ought to be done, and will act as though a new certificate had been issued." Under the third class of cases just mentioned, the court held that where substantially all acts required to change the beneficiary had been done, but the new certificate had not issued, as the formal approval of the chief ranger had not been obtained, that the change of beneficiary will be considered as made.

Construction.-The same general rules of construction apply to life insurance policies which prevail in regard to fire insurance policies and the reader is referred to the subject of "Construction" under the head of Fire Insurance. In case of doubt or ambiguity, the language used (being the company's own language) must be most strongly construed against it. Forfeitures are only enforced where it appears that this is the plain intention and meaning of the contract.

Waiver.-Our supreme court in a recent case said, "The rule has been well established by authority that where, by failure of some exact performance, a forfeiture is imposed by one party by the strict terms of an agreement, conduct of the other sufficient to induce a belief that such strict performance is not insisted on, but that a modified performance is satisfactory and will be accepted as equivalent, will justify a conclusion that the parties have assented to a modification of the original terms and that their minds have met on the new understanding that a different mode of performance shall have the same effect--or, as it is often expressed, that the obligee has waived strict performance." A party cannot occupy inconsistent grounds or positions; one who relies upon the forfeiture of a contract cannot, at the same time, treat the contract as an existing, valid one, nor call upon the other party to the contract to do anything required by it.

We will give a few illustrations regarding waiver from Wisconsin decisions:

Where the insured had taken out two policies in the same company, and made a misrepresentation as to age in one of them, and the insurer, after having ample opportunity to discover the facts, levied assessments, it waived its right to cancel the policy.

When the insurer makes an assessment on the insured after the latter had failed to pay within the time prescribed, the insurer waived the right to forfeit the policy for not making prompt payment.

The insurer assured the insured that he would continue to be a member of the company if overdue assessments were paid, which was done. This was a waiver of the right to cancel the policy for the nonpayment of assessments.

When the company, by its agent, had induced the assured to believe that no forfeiture for nonpayment of the money to become due on her premium note would be incurred until a personal notice to make payment had been given to her by such agent, the forfeiture was waived, notwithstanding by the terms of the policy it was to become forfeited if the insured failed to make payment of her premium note when it became due, and by the terms of such note it became due at fixed periods.

"The principle is familiar if an insurance company receives and retains a premium, when it has knowledge of an act of forfeiture, until after loss has occurred, it will effectually waive the forfeiture... Doubtless, the act of which a waiver is deduced must be an intentional act, done with knowledge of the material facts, but it cannot be necessary that there should be an intent to waive. Such a rule would allow a secret intention to defeat the legal effect of unequivocal and deliberate acts."

Where the insurer asks for proofs of loss and the beneficiary goes to the expense and trouble of furnishing the same, this usually waives previous rights to forfeit the policy.

The insured had made the following written warranty: "I do hereby warrant that the answers as written to the above questions put by the medical examiner are full, complete and true, and the same shall be made a part of the herein referred to application for membership...." Nevertheless, where it was found by the jury that the defendant's grand

secretary, who took the application for membership, knew, before the applicant was received into membership, that he had taken the Keeley treatment for liquor habit, this was a waiver of the conditions in the application, in so far as the use of liquor was implied in the taking of such treatment.

But there was held to be no waiver of the right to forfeit a policy where the defendant company gave its members notice that plaintiff and eleven other members had died and called for a lump sum from each member to replenish its policy fund.

While a forfeiture of benefits contracted for may be waived, the doctrine of waiver or estoppel cannot be successfully invoked to create a liability for benefits not contracted for at all. Thus, a certificate excluding liability on account of suicide cannot be enlarged to cover such a case by the doctrine of estoppel or waiver.

SECTION III.

CASUALTY INSURANCE.

In general.-Companies now exist indemnifying against almost any peril of common occurrence in daily business and private life. Whenever there is a real and definite peril of loss from any cause, if the transaction be a legal one, this may be the subject of insurance. Accident insurance, although strictly speaking not casualty insurance, will be treated under this head.

In regard to casualty insurance in general, it must be remembered that the subject is one which has sprung up only in late years and policies have not as yet been as fully interpreted, as in fire and life insurance. The general principles of insurance govern casualty insurance. The same rules as to warranties and representations in an application or policy apply, and the effect of making the application a part of the insurance contract is the same as in life insurance. The same general rules of constructions also apply.

Accident insurance.-Accident insurance is an insurance against personal injury happening to the person insured, or death by some accident. The contract is entered into the same as a contract of life insurance and the reader is referred to that subject. An accident has been defined to be "an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause,