with the relations between the two kinds of rates, as a relation, lies exclusively with Congress. It is manifest that the State cannot fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and intrastate charges without directly interfering with the former, unless it simply follows the standard set by Federal authority. This question was presented with respect to the long and short haul provisions of the Kentucky Constitution, adopted in 1891, which the court had before it in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27. The State court had construed this provision as embracing a long haul, from a place outside to one within the State, and a shorter haul on the same line and in the same direction between points within the State. This court held that, so construed, the provision was invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce because "it linked the interstate rate to the rate for the shorter haul, and thus the interstate charge was directly controlled by the State law." (See 230 U. S. pp. 428, 429.) It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this it may do completely, by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government of that commerce.

It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates, Congress is not bound to reduce the latter below what it may deem to be a proper standard, fair to the carrier and to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to interstate commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to interstate rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard as to these rates, and to forbid any discriminatory action by interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement of interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it establishes.

Having this power, Congress could provide for its execution through the aid of a subordinate body; and we conclude that the order of the Commission now in question cannot be held invalid upon the ground that it exceeded the authority which Congress could lawfully confer.

The Decree of the Commerce Court is affirmed.

Note.-Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, (1915). In this case the defendant, Hendrick, a citizen of the United States, resident in the District of Columbia, was tried before a justice of the peace in Maryland upon a charge of violating the motor vehicle law. The law of Maryland provided that any owner or operator of an automobile, nonresident of Maryland, who had complied with the laws of the state in which he resided, requiring registration of motor vehicles or licensing of operators, etc., might operate such machine over the highways for a certain period without paying the fees of registration etc. in Maryland; but residents of the District of Columbia were not included among those to whom this privilege was granted. Hendrick maintained the act was void because it discriminated against the residents of the District of Columbia and also because it attempted to regulate inter

state commerce. The Supreme Court held that the Maryland law was constitutional. In the absence of Federal legislation on the subject a state is free to prescribe uniform regulations reasonably necessary for public safety and order; it may regulate the operation of dangerous machines on its highways and charge for the use of valuable facilities. There is no descrimination because fees are imposed according to engine power.

Section 3.

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER THE CURRENCY.

THE LEGAL TENDER CASES.

HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD.

8 WALLACE, 603. 1869.

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In this case a certain Mrs. Hepburn made a promissory note, dated June 20, 1860, by which she promised to pay one Henry Griswold on February 20, 1862, the sum of $11,250. There was at the time the note was made, and at the time it fell due no lawful money of the United States but gold and silver coin. The note was not paid at maturity. On February 25, 1862, in a crisis of the nation, Congress authorized the issue of $150,000,000 of its own notes and enacted in regards to them "Such notes *shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports, etc.' These notes were issued on the credit of the United States alone. In March, 1864, suit was brought upon the note. Mrs. Hepburn tendered the United States notes issued under the act in satisfaction and payment of Griswold's claim. The tender was refused, and the money paid into court. On appeal from the State courts, the cause was brought into the United States Supreme Court.

CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE delivered the opinion of the court:

Applying the rule just stated (i. e., that statutes shall be construed so as not to be unjust and inequitable, if another sense, consonant with those principles can be given to them), there appears to be strong reason for construing the word "debts" as having reference only to debts contracted subsequent to the enactment of the law. For no one will question that the United States notes, which the act makes a legal tender in payment, are essentially unlike in nature, and being irredeemable in coin, are necessarily unlike in value, to the lawful money intended by parties to contracts for the payment of money made before its passage. Contracts for the payment of money, made before the act of 1862, had reference to coined money, and could not be discharged, unless by consent, otherwise than by tender of the sum due in coin. Every

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such contract, therefore, was in legal import, a contract for the payment of coin. (The court discusses the question whether Congress has power to make notes issued under its authority a legal tender in payment of debts, which, when contracted, were payable in gold and silver coin, and concludes the opinion as follows:) We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution. We are obliged, therefore, to hold that the defendant (Griswold) was not bound to receive from the plaintiff the currency tendered to him in payment of the note, made before the passage of the act of February 25, 1862.

KNOX v. LEE.

PARKER v. DAVIS.

12 WALLACE, 79 U. S. 457. 1871.

In the case of Knox v. Lee, a suit was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas by Lee to recover the value of certain sheep, which Knox had purchased at a confiscation sale held under the authority of the socalled Confederate States. Upon the trial of the case the judge charged the jury as follows: "It appears from the evidence that these sheep were confiscated as the property of an alien enemy, and sold under the authority of the so-called Confederate Government, March 7, 1863, and the defendant, Knox, in connection with others, perhaps, became the purchaser thereof. I have to say to the jury that such sale conferred no title whatsoever upon the purchaser or upon any one knowing that title was derived from this source." The plaintiff, Lee, during the trial, offered to prove the difference in value between specie (gold and silver) and United States currency generally known as greenbacks, for the purpose of showing that gold and silver had a greater value than greenbacks, and for the purpose of allowing the jury to estimate the difference between the two. The defendant, Knox, objected to this testimony on the ground that United States currency was made legal tender by law, and there was no difference in value between the two in law. The court sustained the objection and excluded all such evidence, saying to the jury:

"In assessing damages, the jury will recollect that whatever amount they may give by their verdict can be discharged by the payment of such amount in legal tender notes of the United States." Judgment having been given for the plaintiff, the defendant, Knox, sued out this writ of error to the Supreme Court.

The case of Parker v. Davis arose in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, upon a bill in equity filed by Davis to compel Parker to perform a contract to convey a lot of woodland upon the payment of a given sum of money. This contract was dated and the suit brought upon it prior to the passage of the Act of Congress of February 25, 1862, which provided for a paper currency. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts decreed that Parker should execute to Davis a deed of the land in question, upon Davis' paying into court the consideration money mentioned in the contract. pursuance of that decree, Davis paid the said sum into court in legal tender or treasury notes of the United States. The defendant refused to execute the deed, claiming that the money should be paid to the court in coin. The court then ordered that the plaintiff, Davis, should pay the specified amount in treasury notes of the United States. From this order the defendant, Parker, sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.

In

The Supreme Court on April 10, 1871, ordered that the two cases, together with others pending upon the same question, be heard upon the following propositions:

1. Is the Act of Congress, known as the Legal Tender Act, constitutional as to contracts made before its passage.

2. Is it valid, as applicable to transactions since its passage.

MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court:

The controlling questions in these cases are the following: Are the Acts of Congress, known as the legal tender acts, constitutional when applied to contracts made before their passage? And, secondly, are they valid as applicable to debts contracted since their enactment? These questions have been elaborately argued, and they have received from the court that consideration which their great importance demands. It would be difficult to overestimate the consequences which must follow our decision. They will affect the entire business of the country, and take hold of the possible continued existence of the government. If it be held by this court that Congress has no constitutional power, under any circumstances, or in any emergency, to make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts (a power confessedly possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the United States) the government it without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies, become indispensable, even if they were not when the Acts of Congress now called in question were enacted. It is also clear that if we hold the acts invalid as applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have taken place since their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout the country, great business derangement, wide-spread distress and the rankest injustice. The debts which have been contracted since February 25, 1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the existing indebtedness of the country. They have been contracted in

view of the Acts of Congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender, and in reliance upon that declaration. Men have bought and sold, borrowed and lent and assumed every variety of obligations contemplating that payment might be made with such notes. Indeed legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision it be established that these debts and obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; if, contrary to the expectation of all parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of the grossest injustice; all debtors are loaded with an obligation it was never contemplated they should assume, a large percentage is added to every debt and such must become the demand for gold to satisfy contracts that ruinous sacrifices, general distress and bankruptcy may be expected. These consequences are too obvious to admit of question. *

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The consequences of which we have spoken, serious as they are, must be accepted, if there is a clear incompatibility between the Constitution and the Legal Tender Acts. But we are unwilling to precipitate them upon the country unless such an incompatibility plainly appears. A decent respect of a coördinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Congress-all the members of which act under the obligation of an oath of fidelity to the Constitution. Such has always been the rule. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 123, the language of the court was, "It must be remembered that, for weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle, in construing constitutions by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and by every other court of reputation in the United States that an Act of the Legislature is not be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."

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With these rules of constitutional construction before us settled at an early period in the history of the government, hitherto universally accepted, and not even now doubted, we have a safe guide to a right decision of the questions before us. Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must be convinced that they were not appropriate means, or means conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, not appropriate in any degree (for we are not judges of the degree of appropriateness) or we must hold that they were prohibited. This brings to the inquiry whether they were, when enacted, appropriate instrumentalities for carrying into effect, or executing any of the known powers of Congress or of any department of the government. Plainly to this inquiry, a consideration of the time when they were enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important. It is not to be denied that acts may be adapted to the exercise of lawful power, and appropriate to it,