the estate to others, does not violate the statute against perpetuities, the children taking a vested estate, defeasible by condition subsequent. Shannon v. Pentz, 37 N. Y. S. 304, 1 App. Div. 331. A will gave a fund in trust to pay the income to testator's two grandchil dren, equally, for their respective lives, and on their several deaths in trust as to the corpus for the use of such of their children as should be living at their death, and the issue per stirpes of any who should be dead; and, in case either of said grandchildren should die without leaving any children or issue of any deceased child living at such death, or if, leaving such child or issue, all of them should die under the age of 21, without issue, then the part intended for the one so dying should go to the survivor of such grandchil dren. Held that, as the limitation over was not upon the death of issue generally, but the issue intended were only those of a child who had died in the lifetime of a grandchild, and either of the two alternative contingencies must happen within 21 years after the end of a life which was in being, the limitation was not too remote. In re Weinbrenner's Estate (Pa. Sup.), 173 Pa. St. 440, 34 Atl. Rep. 215. Testator devised land to his daughter "and the heirs of her body," but provided that, if she died "without issue," the property should revert back into testator's estate, "and be equally divided among my surviving lega. tees." Held, that the limitation over was not void for remoteness, and might therefore be sustained as an executory devise. Selman v. Robertson (S. Car.), 24 S. E. Rep. 187. Testator created, in favor of certain unborn beneficiaries, to take effect in a prescribed event, contingent, executory interests in a residuary fund in trust by executory devise and bequest in feesimple and in absolute ownership. Held, that the common-law rule against putting the freehold in abeyance, and against creating freehold estates to commence in future, does not apply, and that such equi table executory interests remain with the legal estate vested in the trustees, until the time comes for them to vest in right or in enjoyment, when they spring up as an original whole. Carney v. Kain (W. Va.), 40 W. Va. 758, 23 S. E. Rep. 650. In a will creating a trust fund, the income to be paid to a son of the testator during his life, and the principal to be paid over to his heirs, by the trustees after his death, a further provision that, in case of his death without living heirs of his body, the fund should be divided among other children of the testator, is good as an executory bequest, being limited upon a definite failure of issue of the first taker. Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566, 35 L. R. A. 360, 45 N. E. Rep. 173. A devise to testator's son D, "and his heirs forever, but, in case he should die without issue of his body, then the same shall go to the heirs of N, to them and their use forever," vests in D a fee, determinable on his dying without children surviving him; and hence the limitation over, being upon a definite failure of issue, is valid as an executory devise. Strain v. Sweeney (Ill. Sup.), 163 I11. 603, 45 N. E. Rep. 201. Testator bequeathed his property in trust to his executors to pay to his daughter an annuity of $600, and on her death to her children an annuity of $300 each until they arrived at the age of 25 years, at which time there should be paid to each child, as he arrived at that age, $10,000. If, at the death of the daughter, any of her children were of the age of 25 years, the said sum should be paid in lieu of the annuity. At the termination of the trust as to all the beneficiaries and remainder mea, the property should be divided among the grandchildren then living. Held that, as the trust might, in case children were born to the

daughter after testator's death, be extended beyond a life in being and 21 years thereafter, it was void, as contrary to the rule against perpetuities. Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149, 45 N. E. Rep. 259. A future estate or interest which may be destroyed at the will of the owner of the property cannot infringe the rule against perpetuities. Pulitzer v. Livingston, 89 Me. 359, 36 Atl. Rep. 635. The residuary clause of a will devised the rest of testator's estate to a church building society, requiring "as a condition of the vesting of this legacy that the said residuary legatee shall release all claim which it has against, and shall execute a release thereof." Held, that a present estate was intended, the condition requiring only that when the executors should put the legatee in possession it was to execute the required release, and the clause was not objectionable as creating a perpetuity by a condition precedent. Congregational Church Bldg. Soc. v. Everett (Md.), 85 Md. 79, 35 L. R. A. 693, 36 Atl. Rep. 654. A devise of land to be used by the devisee for a certain purpose "forever," and whenever the devisee shall cease to use the land for such purpose "the same shall revert to my heirs at law," gave the devisee a qualified fee in the land, and therefore the statute against perpetuities does not apply. Loughreed v. Dykeman Baptist Church & Society (Sup.), 40 N. Y. S. 586. A bequest to a trustee to pay the income to R until 45 years old, and then turn over the property to him, but if he should die before reaching the age of 45 years, leaving a widow, to pay one half of the income to her so long as she should remain his widow, suspends the power of alienation longer than two lives in being (1 Rev. St. p. 773, sec. 1), where R was not married at the time of testator's death, since he might marry some one who was not born at the time of testator's death. Durfee v. Pomeroy, 40 N. Y. S. 1022, 7 App. Div. 431. Testator, after making certain provisions for his daughter and his son, R, gave the residue of his estate to his executors in trust to pay one-half of the income to R until 45 years old, and then to transfer one-half of such residue to him, or to his children, if any, should he die before attaining the age of 45 years. The will further provided that should R die within the period, leaving a widow but no children, the widow should have onehalf of the income which R had enjoyed, so long as she remained his widow. Held, that testator's evident intent was to provide for his children during their lifetime, and to secure his property to his grandchildren, and therefore the provisions in favor of R's widow could not be withdrawn from the trust so as to take it out of the operation of the statute of perpetuities. Durfee v. Pomeroy (Sup.), 40 N. Y. S. 1022, 7 App. Div. 431. A devise in trust of realty and personalty to apply the income to the maintenance and education of testator's children, two of whom are minors, and to divide the property equally among the children, as soon as the youngest reaches the age of 21 years, will not fail because the trust estate is not made dependent on a life or lives in being, but on a term of years, since the court will imply an alternative, and make the trust terminable on the majority of the minor on whose life the suspension is limited, or his earlier death. Becker v. Becker (Sup.), 43 N. Y. S. 17, 13 App. Div. 342. Where, as to a devise over, a testator has expressed with clearness one limitation to take effect at a period far within the lawful limits, it will be held good as a remainder, though an alternative disposition be objectionable as an executory devise, on the ground of remoteness. Halsey v. Goddard, 86 Fed. Rep. 25. A devise limiting the remainder of a trust estate to the lawful heirs of the cestui que

trust is void, because contrary to the statute of perpetuities. Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 Atl. Rep. 153. A bequest of the use of one-twentieth of the remainder of the estate to A, at his decease to go to his legal heirs, is not obnoxious to the common-law rule against perpetuities. Healy v. Healy, 70 Conn. 467, 39 Atl. Rep. 793. Where land is devised to 17 persons for life, with six life estates in remainder, all but one of which will vest during the lives of said 17 persons, and the remaining one within 21 years after the death of a person alive at the testator's death, the devises are not void as creating a perpetuity. Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N. E. Rep. 556. A devise of land "to W, to be distributed by her among her descendants, children and grandchildren, according to her discretion," is not void as being within the rule against perpetuities. Woodbridge v. Winslow, 49 N. E. Rep. 738. Testator gave national bank stock to the bank's cashier, in trust to distribute the dividends to designated employees during the corporate existence of the bank, "either under its present charter, or by virtue of any renewals or extensions thereof." The bank was incorporated on June 19, 1865, for the period of 20 years, and its existence was extended 20 years under the federal law of 1882. Testator died in No. vember, 1891, and no law then or has since existed authorizing any further extension. Held, that the gift violated the rule against perpetuities, and was void, in that the trust might not be completely performed in 21 years. Siedler v. Syms, 38 Atl. Rep. 424. A devise to trustees, to hold and manage for 75 years, and annually pay the income to testator's children, does not violate the rule against perpetuities; the estate, both legal and equitable, being vested at once. In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 39 Atl. Rep. 879.

A devise of a remainder to testator's children that may be living 75 years after his death, and the legal descendants of any of his children then dead, such descendants to take such portion as their de ceased parent would have taken if then living, is void, as creating a perpetuity; the estate being contingent by reason of the uncertainty as to the persons who will take, which cannot be eliminated before the expiration of 75 years. In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 39 Atl. Rep. 879. A power of sale given to trustees, to be exercised 75 years after testator's death, is void, as violative of the law as to perpetuities. In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179, 39 Atl. Rep. 879. A bequest of a certain sum to a priest of a certain church, requiring the income to be used in ornamenting testator's burial lot, is invalid as a gift in perpetuity for a private trust. Sherman v. Baker, 40 Atl. Rep. 11. Testator, who, with his wife, was well advanced in years, and had but one child, grown to womanhood and married, gave, after termination of life estate to his wife, a life estate to his daughter, with remainder to the heirs of her body, with provision that if she die "leaving no heirs of her body, or should I at any future time fail to have heirs of my body," then the property shall go to a church; and further provision that the church is not to have any interest in the property till after the death of his wife and daughter, and not then unless his daughter dies, leaving no heirs of her body. Held, that by the words. "or should I at any future time fail to have heirs of my body," testator meant only his daughter, and such as might descend through her, and did not contemplate another line of heirs of his body; so that the devise over to the church did not contravene the law against perpetuities. In re Wells' Estate, 69 Vt. 388, 38 Atl. Rep. 83.

1. ADMINISTRATION-Administrator De Bonis Non.Under Horner's Rev. St. 1897, § 2240, inposing on an administrator de bonis non the same rights and liabilities as the administrator first appointed, he cannot bring a common-law action against the estate of his predecessor for a conversion of the trust assets. His remedy is under section 2458, which authorizes him to sue on the predecessor's bond for such misappropriation.ORMES' ESTATE V. BROWN, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 1005.

2. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.-The alteration of a note, before delivery, to make it conform to the intention of all the parties, does not release the sureties therein, though made without their knowledge.-MATTINGLY V. RILEY, Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 799.

3. APPEAL-Bill of Review.-The Code has abrogated the old remedy by bill of review on the ground of newly discovered facts. If the discovery is made before the expiration of one year after verdict or finding, a motion for new trial will lie (Rev. St. 1898, § 2879); if the discovery is not made until after the year has expired, there is no remedy, unless the newly-discovered facts show fraud or collusion, in which case a direct action will lie.-CROWNS V. FOREST LAND CO., Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 433.

4. APPEAL-Judgment.-A party cannot appeal from a judgment in his favor for a less sum than he claimed. -NORTHROP V. JENISON, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 187.

5. ASSIGNMENTS-Account Stated.-The offer to transfer a mortgage in payment of a debt is not an offer to compromise, so as to be inadmissible in evidence, in the absence of any such suggestion. A debtor who pays the debt to the original creditor, after notice of an assignment of the debt, is not absolved from lia. bility to the assignee.-FERGUSON V. DAVIDSON, Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 859.

6. ASSIGNMENT-Evidence-Notice.-In order that a notice to a debtor of an assignment of the debt should be effective, it must be so exact as to convince the debtor that he is no longer liable to the original creditor; and, where certificates of an architect are issued to a contractor, general information that the creditor was likely to borrow on the credit thereof, or mere suspicion that he might have made an assignment of them to others, is insufficient to render the debtor liable to persons to whom they were assigned.-SKOBIS V. FERGE, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 426.

7. ASSIGNMEnt for CREDITORS-Right of Foreign Assignee to Sue.-An assignee under a deed of assign. ment for the benefit of creditors, executed in Ohio, may, without executing bond in Kentucky, maintain an action in the courts of that State for the recovery of the possession of personal property which passed under the deed of assignment.-PEACH ORCHARD COAL Co. v. WOODWARD, Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 793.

8. ATTACHMENT-Dissolution.-A court is without authority to hear and determine a motion to discharge an attachment filed before judgment in the action, but not submitted until after judgment.-HERMAN v. HAYES, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 365.

9. BILLS AND NOTES-Action on Note-Evidence.-In an action between an indorsee of a promissory note and the maker, the admissions or statements of the indorser, made subsequent to the indorsement, may not be received in evidence to impeach the validity or weaken the force of the indorsement or the transfer of title evidenced by it.-ZIMMERMANN V. KEARNEY COUNTY BANK, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 366.

10. BILLS AND NOTES Indorsement.-An indorsement of negotiable paper, "Estate of Wheeler, Wing, Executor," does not bind the executor individually, though the estate may not be bound.-GRAFTON NAT. BANK V. WING, Mass., 52 N. E. Rep. 1067.

11. BOARDS OF EDUCATION-Powers.-A board of edu cation has power to contract with an architect to prepare general drawings and specifications for a school house, as a preliminary to determining whether a building, and, if so, what kind, shall be constructed, although, for want of funds devoted to building purposes, it may at that time have no power to erect the building.-FISKE V. SCHOOL DIST. OF CITY OF LINCOLN, Neb., 73 N. W. Rep. 392.

12. CARRIERS-Goods-Connecting Lines.-A railroad bill of lading for cotton shipped from Texas to Liverpool provided that responsibilty on the part of such railroad should cease "upon delivery of said cotton to its next connecting carrier," and, in case of loss or damage, "that carrier alone shall be held liable there. for in whose actual custody" the cotton shall be at the time of such damage or loss. The railroad transported the cotton to New Orleans, and unloaded it on its own wharf, from which it was to be loaded upon the steam. ship of a connecting carrier, and gave notice to such carrier that the cotton was ready to be taken by it. The cotton was destroyed by fire while on the wharf, and before the arrival of the vessel. Held, that such loss occurred while the cotton was in the "actual custody" of the railroad company, and it was liable therefor, under the bill of lading.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. CLAYTON, U. S. S. C., 19 S. C. Rep. 421.

13. CARRIERS-Passenger - Imminent Danger.-The liability of a railroad company, where a passenger jumped from one of its cars when a collision seemed imminent, is to be measured by what a prudent person would have done under like circumstances.-CHITTY V. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. Co., Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 868.

14. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS Negligence - Ordinance. The violation of a municipal ordinance, regu lating the running of street cars, resulting in an injury to a passenger, cannot be made the basis of a civil liability by a mere allegation that such ordinance was in force and binding on defendant, since it must be alleged and proven that defendant agreed to be bound by the ordinance.-BYINGTON V. ST. LOUIS R. CO., Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 876.

15. CERTIORARI-Effect of Writ.-A writ of certiorari to review an order of a lower court merely suspends the execution of the order so as to prevent any act being done to enforce it, and the giving of notice of the entry of the order so as to set the time running within which to settle a bill of exceptions is not prevented by the issuance of the writ.-STATE V. BURNELL, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 425.

16. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Record-Notice.-A junior mortgagee, who takes his mortgage with actual notice of the existence of another mortgage upon the same

property, and with the understanding that the lien of his mortgage is subject to that of such former mortgage, is not entitled to precedence on the grounds that such former mortgage was not filed of record in the proper county recorder's office prior to the time that his mortgage was filed in such office.-WELLS, FARGO & Co. v. ALTURAS COMMERCIAL CO., Idaho, 56 Pac. Rep. 165.

17. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Signing in Blank.-On the issues whether a chattel mortgage in suit was executed in blank, with the understanding that the blanks should be filled by the mortgagee, and whether he exceeded the authority thus impliedly given, so as to avoid the instrument, the situation of the parties and all that was said when the authority was given are competent evidence.-SMITH V. JAGOE, Mass., 52 N. E. Rep. 1088.

18. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Title-Replevin.-On con. dition broken, the legal title to mortgaged chattels vests in the mortgagee, especially where he secures possession, though he is deprived of it again by a forthcoming bond.-CROCKER V. BURNS, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 199.

19. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Due Process of Law.-A State statute providing that whenever any railroad company shall discharge a servant or employee, with or without cause, it shall, on the day of discharge, under certain penalties, pay him the unpaid wages earned at the contract rate at the time of discharge, without discount on account of payment before such wages were payable under the contract of employment (Acts Ark. 1889, p. 76), does not operate as a deprivation of property without due process of law, where the railroad company is incorporated under the State laws, and the State constitution reserves to the legislature the power to amend or repeal all charters of incorporation.-ST. LOUIS, ETC. RY. Co. v. PAUL, U. S. S. C., 19 S. C. Rep. 419.

20. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - School Districts.-Under Const. art. 5, § 25, forbidding the legislature to pass local or special laws for the management of common schools, a law general in character, but designed to authorize particular school districts organized under the general school law to consolidate with others or ganized under special charter, is invalid, though it provides the method to be pursued by the electors in effecting the consolidation.-IN RE SENATE BILL, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 173.

21. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vested Rights.- Where a law imposing a new condition on a common-law right of action does not provide for existing rights of action, and yet uses general language applicable to such rights, the court must apply it, or not, to pre-existing rights, according as it shall judicially appear that a reasonable time was left after it took effect for the particular person affected to perform the condition.-RELYEA V. TOMAHAWK PULP & PAPER Co., Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 412.

22. CORPORATIONS Authority of Agent.-A foreign corporation, which consented that the general manager of its affairs in this country might buy land in his name as "trustee," in which name he was accustomed to transact its business, is liable for the price of the land, though its agent was to hold the title only until the formation of another corporation, to which the title was to be transferred.- HURST V. AMER. ASSN., Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 800.

23. CORPORATIONS-Contracts between Directors.-A corporation organized for the purpose of buying land and selling it out in lots is not bound by a contract be tween its president and secretary by which the secretary was to have a certain commission on each lot sold for the company, but is liable only for a reasonable commission on the amount actually received from such sales, the officers making the contract both being di rectors.-LOUISVILLE BLDG. ASSN. V. HEGAN, Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 796.

24. CORPORATIONS-Foreign Corporations-Process.Under Act 1887, ch. 226, authorizing suit against any

non-resident corporation found doing business in the State through any agency acting for it, by services on any person who represented the corporation when the transaction in suit occurred, an action does not lie where the corporation had ceased to maintain agencies in the State, though the agent who performed the transaction remained in the State, and was served.GUTHRIE V. CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY ASSN., Tenn., 49 S. W. Rep. 829.

25. CORPORATIONS-Liability for Services Rendered in Organization.-A corporation is liable for necessary services rendered in its organization, the benefit of which it has accepted.-FARMERS' BANK OF VINE GROVE V. SMITH, Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 810.

26. CORPORATIONS Stock. Assuming it to be the right of a stockholder in a corporation to examine the books thereof, it is not, as a matter of law, his duty to do so, after becoming a stockholder, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he has been defrauded in the purchase of such stock; he not being aware of any fact leading to a suspicion that he may have been so defrauded.-GERNER v. MOSHER, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 384.

27. COURTS-Supreme Court-Jurisdictional Amount. -Where several defendants were sued separately by the same plaintiff, and there was no consolidation, and separate judgments were rendered for plaintiff, and separate appeals taken, the amounts of the judgments cannot be aggregated so as to give the supreme court jurisdiction (Const. art. 6, § 12), though the same 18sues are involved, and the cases were tried together, and it was stipulated that they might be heard on one record, statement, and brief.-BRADLEY V. MILWAUKEE MECHANICS' INS. Co., Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 8€7.

28. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Homicide-Indictment.-An indictment for homicide, charging that accused feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought assaulted deceased with a pistol, which he feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought dis. charged at him, thereby feloniously, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought striking, penetrating, and wounding deceased, sufficiently charges that the wounding was felonious and deliberate.-STATE V. KINDRED, Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 845.

29. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Right of Adult Children to Sue.-Though Gen. St. ch. 57, § 3, giving a right of action to "the widow, heir or personal representative" of any person killed by the willful neglect of another, authorizes a recovery only where there is a widow or child, adult as well as minor children may sue. PENNSYLVANIA CO. V. MALIA, Ky., 49 S. W. Rep. 809. 30. DEED-Delivery-Unborn Person as Grantee.-An unborn child does not take under a deed to "I and his brothers and sisters," though I is the grantor's only living child, and there is expectation of another in a few days.-MORRIS V. CAUDLE, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 1036.

31. DEED BY INDIAN-Consent of President.-Where a deed by an Indian, who had no power of alienation without permission of the president of the United States, was recorded in Illinois without the president's permission indorsed thereon, the record is notice to subsequent purchasers, under Conveyancing Act Ill. § 30, that the grantor had at least attempted to convey. -LOMAX V. PICKERING, U. S. S. C., 19 S. C. Rep. 416.

32. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - Advancements.-A writing acknowledged the receipt of $500 by a son from his father, to be in full of all claims as heir against the latter's estate. The sum was to bear 6 per cent. interest from date. Held, that this was not an advancement as to the interest, and the father's estate could recover it. SLAUGHTER V. SLAUGHTER, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 994. 33. EASEMENT-Lease-Grant-License.-A letter conferring the "privilege" of building a logging railroad across the writer's land is not a lease, where it does not give exclusive possession of any part of the land, and

no rent is reserved, and no consideration is paid or promised for the right.-NOWLIN LUMBER CO. v. WILSON, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 338.

34. EASEMENTS-Obstructions of Light and Air.-The right of one to shut off air and light, from his neighbor's windows by building on his own lots is unaffected by his motive.-BORDEAUX v. GREENE, Mont., 56 Pac. Rep. 218.

35. EJECTMENT-Estoppel.-Where officers of a com pany, knowing that B claimed land which originally belonged to it under a tax deed, and had offered it for sale, and that defendants were logging all the lands they could purchase in that vicinity, at defendant's re quest fixed a price on its lands including the track claimed by B, but stated that it did not own the latter tract, it is estopped from asserting title, as against defendants, who purchased from B, since it had reasonable ground to apprehend that defendants would purchase of B after its disclosure.-Two RIVERS MFG. CO. V. DAY, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 440.

36. EJECTMENT Improvements-Color of Title.-A holding under an invalid certificate of homestead entry is not under "color of title," so as to entitle defendant in ejectment to recover, under Rev. St. 1878, § 3096, for improvements.-WHITCOMB V. PROVOST, Wis., 76 N. W. Rep. 432.

37. EVIDENCE-Declarations of Vendor Fraudulent Conveyance.-The general rule undoubtedly is that the declarations of a vendor of property, made after the sale, are not admissible for the purpose of invalidating it; yet, where the transfer is claimed to have been fraudulent, and the intent of the vendor is a material subject of inquiry, great latitude is allowed in showing the facts and circumstances surrounding the transac tion. In such case it is proper to show the acts and declarations of the vendor at the time of and immedi ately after the sale, for the purpose of establishing the intent with which it was made on his part.—HOOD V.. GIBSON, Kan., 56 Pac. Rep. 148.

38. EVIDENCE-Mental Unsoundness.-When the condition of mind of a person is shown to have been the same for a considerable period of time, an adjudication as to such condition at one date during the period is competent evidence when the act claimed to have been affected by such condition occurred at a prior date, upon the theory that it is reasonable to say that appearances determined at one time during the period to indicate insanity or incompetency, indicate the same at other times during such period, whether be fore or subsequent to the adjudication.-SMALL V. CHAMPENY, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 407.

39. EVIDENCE - Opinions.-One who has been em ployed in a fur store for six years, in part as a salesman, and knows the cost and selling price of all gar ments that have come into the store during that period, may give an opinion of the value of certain of the goods.-KNIGHT V. ROTHSCHILD, Mass., 52 N. E. Rep.

1062.

40. EXECUTION

Exemptions-Insurance.-Proceeds of an insurance policy on exempt property are exempt. -WRIGHT V. BROOKS, Tenn., 49 S. W. Rep. 828.

41. EXECUTION SALE-Inadequacy of Price.-Mere in. adequacy of price, bid at an execution sale, is no ground for allowing the execution defendant to enforce his title after lapse of time for redemption, at least against a bona fide purchaser for value from the pur chaser at the sale.-PHILLIPS V. HYLAND, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 431.

42. FORCIBLE DETAINER-Demand.-Under Code Civ. Proc. § 2081, subd. 1, making one guilty of forcible de. tainer who, by force or threats, unlawfully holds possession of any realty, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise, a demand for possession is not essential to a recovery, though it was acquired peaceably.-MCCLEARY V. CROWLEY, Mont., 56 Pac. Rep. 227. 43. FRAUD-Circumstantial Evidence.-Plaintiff sued for money, which he claimed to have advanced to defendant after receiving it from defendant's husband,

who was dead when the suit was brought, in satisfaction of a debt contracted 17 years previously. Held, that evidence of plaintiff's straitened financial condi tion while defendant's husband had ample means was admissible to show that plaintiff's claim was fraudu. lent.-WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 419.

44. FRAUD-Election of Remedies.-One who has been induced to enter into a contract by fraudulent representations, and has sustained damages in its perform. ance, may waive the tort, and recover on the ground of implied contract.-HUGANIR V. COTTER, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 423.

45. FRAUD-What Constitutes-Evidence.-Where the lessor of land issues to the lessee, who agrees to erect a building thereon, a receipt for the first year's rent, which, however, was not paid, he does not thereby give the lessee a fictitious credit; and it cannot be said that a builder relied thereon in making a contract with the lessee to erect the building, so as to enable the builder to recover of the lessor, as for fraud, damages resulting from the fact that the building is not erected, and the lessee proves irresponsible.-MCCLURE V. CAMPBELL, Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 881.

46. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - Consideration. - A corporation applied to a bank for a loan, which was granted, on condition that it indorsed notes of one of its officers then held by the bank. Thereafter the corporation executed a chattel mortgage to the bank to secure the loan so made, and also its liability on the indorsement. Held, that the mortgage was not fraudulent as against other creditors, since the indorsement was for a valuable consideration.-SARGENT V. CHAPMAN, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 194.

47. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Evidence.-Where a creditor takes a mortgage from the debtor to secure a bona fide debt, or accepts property at a valuation equal to 75 per cent. of the inventory price in consideration of the debt, an inference of fraud is not justified.-CUN NINGHAM V. EAGAN, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 402.

49. GARNISHMENT-Property Subject.-Where plaint. iff in garnishment showed money in garnishee's hands, placed there by defendant in garnishment, the gar nishee could show that the money, though deposited with him by defendant, was deposited as stake money for a bet and as the money of a third person.-STADLER V. SMITH, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 420.

49. HOMESTEAD.-Under an admission that property in controversy is a homestead, and has been set apart as provided by law, it cannot be objected that the homestead did not allege its statutory value in the declaration of homestead.-MITCHELL V. MCCORMICK, Mont., 56 Pac. Rep. 217.

50. INFANTS-Civil Liability.-An infant who hires a team and buggy for a specified journey, and drives to another place, and in a different direction, takes upon himself all the consequences following therefrom. If the team is injured or the buggy is broken while being so driven, he is liable in damages for the tort, and his infancy is no protection to him.-CHURCHILL V. WHITE, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 369.

51. INJUNCTION - Execution.-Where an execution sale might becloud the title to land, equity may enjoin it, though the sale would pass no title to the purchaser. -ZIMMERMAN V. MAKEPEACE, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 991. 52. INNKEEPERS - Guests Negligence.-A notice, posted in the rooms of an hotel, directing guests to leave their "valuables" in the hotel vaults, does not apply to mineral specimens in a guest's trunk.-BROWN HOTEL CO. V. BURCKHARDT, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 188.

53. INSURANCE - Arbitration Waiver.-An insurer, failing to appoint an appraiser to assist in adjusting a loss by arbitration, according to a provision of the policy, after insured had twice requested him to do so, and then agreeing to a submission not in accordance with the policy, thereby waives a condition of the policy requiring a determination of the amount of the loss by arbitration.-SCHOUWEILER V. MERCHANTS' MUT. INS. ASSN., S. Dak., 78 N. W. Rep. 356.

54. INSURANCE-Indivisible Contract.-A policy of insurance on a building and contents, the premium being distributed part to each species of property, is a single, indivisible contract, and under a general forfeit ure clause in the policy, if one part of the risk is affected, the entire risk is affected. What bars a rem. edy on the policy as to one part of the property, bars the remedy as to all.-WORACHEK V. NEW DENMARK MUT. HOME FIRE INS. CO., Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 411.

55. INTOXICATING LIQUORS.-Where a liquor license was issued, an appeal then taken, and the license sus. pended, the appeal finally determined in favor of the applicant, and the license reissued, held, following the principle of former cases, that the licensee was entitled to repayment of such proportion of the license fee as the time when his enjoyment of the license was suspended bore to the license year.-CITY OF AUBURN V. MAYER, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 462.

56. IRRIGATING DITCH-Wrongful Diversion-Injunc. tion.-Land owners appropriating water from a ditch for irrigation may have the ditch owner restrained from diverting the water, where it is shown that they were compelled, solely by reason of the scarcity of the water when the ditch was not entitled to its full sup ply, to prorate with other consumers water which they needed to make their lands productive, and to all of which they were entitled under appropriations prior to those of such other consumers.-BROWN V. FARMERS' HIGH LINE CANAL & RESERVOIR CO., Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 183.

57. IRRIGATION-Appropriation of Waters.-A priority to waters for irrigation confers no right to appropriate them for storage in any greater quantity or at any other time than they could be appropriated for irrigation, as against another appropriator, whose right is subsequent to the appropriation for irrigation, but prior to that for storage.-COLORADO MILLING & ELEVATOR CO. V. LARIMER & WELD IRR. Co., Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 185.

58. JUDGMENT-Fraud - Impeachment.-A judgment of the county court in a settlement by an executor may be impeached for fraud in a suit in equity.-ANDERSON V. ANDERSON, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 1038.

59. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-Where, in a previous suit, the validity of a tax deed was determined, but one of the issues on which its invalidity was predicated was not passed on, such remaining issue cannot be urged in a subsequent suit attacking the validity of the deed, since res judicata applies not only to points on which the court announces its judgment, but to every point involved in the litigation.-DONNELL V. WRIGHT, Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 874.

60. JUDGMENT-Revival-Presumption of Payment.The lapse of 14 years after the entry of a judgment, and before a proceeding to revive is instituted, without issuance of an execution, raises the presumption of payment. This presumption, however, is not conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the judgment has never been paid.-WITTSTRUCK V. TEMPLE, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 456.

61. JUDICIAL SALES-Appraisement.-The provision of the statute for the deduction of prior liens in ap. praising lands for judicial sale is solely for the benefit of the plaintiff, and the failure to observe the law in that regard cannot be successfully urged by the defendant as a ground for vacating the appraisement, or as an objection to confirmation.-BALLOU V. SHERWOOD, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 383.

62. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Cancellation of Lease.Where a landlord refuses to cancel a lease, and notifies the tenant he will hold him for the rent, he is not com. pelled to take possession on the tenant's quitting the premises, and try to rent them.-PATTERSON V. EMERICK, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 1012.

63. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Contracts of Sale.-The relation between a vendor and a vendee in possession becomes that of landlord and tenant, on the vendee's refusal to pay installments of the price because of the