« AnteriorContinuar »
is referable to either cause, he died from accident, and streets and other public grounds for a period not ex. not from self-destruction.-TRAVELERS' INS. Co. OF ceeding 10 years, the conclusive implication is that HARTFORD, CONN., V. NICKLAS, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 906. such corporation is forbidden to contract for a longer
63. LIMITATIONS-Action against County.-An'action period. And where such corporation undertakes, by against a county to enforce a liability arising from au the passage of an ordinance, to contract with an elec. indebtedness of a former county charged upon the tric light company for an exclusive privilege to such new county by the act creating it is upon a specialty company for the use of its streets, and stipulating for created by the statute. As no liability against the new the lighting of the streets, etc., for 99 years, at a given county could arise from the original obligation alone, price per month, such ordinance is ultra vires and void, such obligation is but an element in the cause of ac and the contractual stipulations therein are equally tion, the statute being the other and indispensable ele void, and neither party can enforce them.-OITY OF ment; hence limitation against such action runs only
WELLSTON V. MORGAN, Ohio, 52 N. E. Rep. 127. from the creation of the new county, and not from the 73. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Improvements-Asmaturity of the original debt.-ROBERTSON V. BLAINE
sessments.-A judgment assessing the cost of an imCOUNTY, U. S. 0. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 90 Fed.
provement is void where the contract for the improveRep. 63.
ment was let nearly a month before the ordinance 64. LIMITATIONS - Alienating Wife's Affections.-A providing for the improvement and the special assess. complaint for alienating a wife's affections, stating ment was passed.-THALER V. WEST CHICAGO PARK that, four years before, defendant began to poison the COMMRS., III., 52 N. E. Rep. 116. wife's mind, does not show that it is barred by the two.
74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- Improvements-Ordi. years limitation, when it appears that the wife did not
nance.-An ordinance for the paving of a street which leave her husband, and declare she would no longer
provides that the curbstones shall be bedded upon flat live with him, until two weeks before suit commenced.
stones, without stating the kind of flat stones, fails to -BOCKMAN V. RITTER, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 100.
specify sufficiently the nature, character and descrip65. MARRIAGE-Evidence.- Where there are no im. tion of the improvements, and is void.-LUSK V. CITY pediments existing, an agreement and present consent OF CHICAGO, III., 52 N. E. Rep. 54. between the parties to then take each other as man
75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liability for Tort of and wife, followed by cohabitation, is sufficient to con.
Mayor.-A city ratifying the trespass of its mayor in stitute a valid common-law marriage in this State;
having electric wires torn down from where they had and, upon an examination of the testimony, it is held
a right to be is liable therefor.-COMMERCIAL ELECTRIC to be sufficient to sustain the finding of marriage made LIGHT & POWER CO. v. CITY OF Tacoma, Wash., 55 Pac. herein.-SHORTEN V. JUDD, Kan., 65 Pac. Rep. 286.
Rep. 219. 66. MÁSTER AND SERVANT-Compensation-Preferred 76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS – Powers-Encroach. Claims.-Services of plaintiff, who expected to be man. ment on Street.-A municipality has no power to con. ager of defendant's store, in going East with defend. fer on a person the rigbt to maintain a permanent enant, and assisting him in buying goods, are not within croachment on a street, exclusively for private use.3 How. Ann. St. $ 8749m, authorizing persons having SNYDER V. CITY OF MT. PULASKI, III., 52 N. E. Rep. 62. preferred claims for labor to join in chancery, in cases 77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements of fraud or assignment for the benefit of creditors.
-Assessments.-Under City and Village Act, art. 9, $ 50, LAWTON V. RICHARDSON, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 265.
providing that contracts for public improvements, to 67. MASTER AND SERVANT-Independent Contractors.
be paid for by special assessment, shall be let to the -A subcontractor is liable for the negligent acts of lowest bidder, in the manner to be prescribed by ordiservants of the contractor in hoisting material to be nance, there can be no assessment for a pavement 53 used by the subcontractor, since in doing such acts feet wide; the contract, therefore, under which it was they are the servants of the subcontractor.–PIONEER
constructed, having been made, and work having been FIRE PROOF CONSTRUCTION CO. V. HANSEN, III., 52 N. E. begun, before the passage of the ordinance authoriz. Rep. 17.
ing it, and while there was an ordinance merely au. 68. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.-A servant is thorizing a pavement 61 feet wide.-PELLS V. CITY OF not required to use diligence to discover defects not PAXTON, III., 52 N. E. Rep. 64. obvious in appliances furnished him, but may assume 78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Sewers.--A city which that the master has discharged his duty in furnishing ordered the construction of a sewer in a street under them.-TERRELL COMPRESS CO. V. ARRINGTON, Tex., 48 tracks of a railroad company whose easement in the S. W. Rep. 59.
street was dominant to the city's estate in such street, 69. MORTGAGEES-Duty to Pay Taxes.-As between must compensate the company for the cost to it of the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee, it is the strengthening the walls of the sewer in order to bear duty of each to pay the taxes; and one cannot acquire the weight of girders carrying the tracks over it, and a tax title on the mortgaged premises, as against the the cost of raising the tracks to overcome the eleva. other.-NORTON V. MYERS, Minn., 77 N. W. Rep. 298. tion of the sewer, since the construction of the sewer 70. MORTGAGES-Recording.-A mortgage which was
directly invaded a vested estate and was not a mere not recorded because it would impair the mortgagor's consequential injury entailed by the construction of credit is fraudulent as against a subsequent judgment
street improvements.-MAYOR, ETC. OF CITY OF BAL. creditor, who extended credit on the faith of the mort. TIMORE V. COWEN, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 900. gagor's apparently unincumbered title to the land. 79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street ImprovementBELCHER V. CURTIS, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 310.
Ordinance.-An ordinance providing that a street shall 71. MORTGAGE OF GOOD WILL AND FRANCHISES OF
be paved 15 feet each way from its center between NEWSPAPER.-A sale under a chattel mortgage cover. designated streets, and that the same shall be paid for ing a newspaper plant, and the circulation, franchises by special taxation, except at street crossings and op. and good will thereof,” vests the purchaser with the posite property owned by the city, is not objectionable, right to equitable relief against the mortgagor or its
as giving no rule of apportionment of the assessment, assigns, to the extent of restraining them from using
since its terms are a declaration that the improvement the name of such a newspaper, or from publishing and
shall be paid for according to frontage.-CRAMER V. circulating a newspaper by the same or a different CITY OF CHARLESTON, III., 62 N. E. Rep. 73. name as the newspaper or successor of the newspaper 80. NUISANCE-Ordinance.-The ordinary use of prop covered by the mortgage.-LAWRENCE V. TIMES PRINT. erty cannot be interfered with by assuming that it is a ING CO., U. 3. 0. C., D. (Wash.), 90 Fed. Rep. 24. nuisance per se.-STATE V. MARSHALL, La., 24 south.
72. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contracts for Light. Kep. 186. ing Streets.-Where a statute gives power to a munici. 81. PARENT AND CHILD-Injuries Resulting in Death. pal corporation to contract for the lighting of its -Under Rev. St. 1889, $ 4425, authorizing parents to sue
for damages for injuries resulting in the death of their minor child, if unmarried at its death, an allegation that deceased was a minor six years of age is a sufticient allegation that he died unmarried.-BAIRD V. CITIZENS' RI. CO., Mo., 48 S. W. Rep. 78.
82. PARENT AND CHILD-Services – Presumptions.The presumption that father and daughter, living together as a common family, did not intend that either should receive pay for services or board and comforts furnisbed the other, may be rebutted by an express contract to pay, or by facts and circumstances exclud. ing the intention that the services or things furnished were gratuitous.-COLLINS v. WILLIAMS, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 92.
83. PARTNERSHIP Accounting.-In an action for an accounting between alleged co-partners, it was unnecessary for plaintiff to offer to place defendants in statu quo respecting certain securities which they had dis. charged, where such securities were alleged to have been obtained from him by them through certain frauds practiced on him by them.-RICHARDS V. FRASER, Cal., 55 Pac. Rep. 246.
84. PARTNERSHIP Mortgages.-A partner, who had executed a note and mortgage to the firm to secure his debt to it, afterwards "gold and transferred his right, title, and interest in and to all the assets" of the firm to the other members. Held, to convey the title to the note and mortgage to the remaining members of the firm, so as to give them the power to enforce them without any other final adjustment of the partnership accounts.-CAMPBELL V. BANE, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 322.
85. PAYMENT-Voluntary Payment-Mistake.-Where a dispute as to the amount of rent due arose between a landlord and tenant, and the tenant, with full knowl. edge of all the facts, paid the amount claimed by the landlord, he cannot recover the disputed part of it back as paid under a mistake.-LAMB V. RATHBURN, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 268.
86. PLEADING - Statute of Frauds.-Where the bill does not show that an alleged agreement creating a trust was not in writing, an objection tbat the agree. ment is void under the statute of frauds, because pot in writing, cannot be raised by demurrer.-WHITING V. DYER, R. I., 41 Atl. Rep. 895.
87. POWER OF ATTORNEY Revocation by Death of Principal.-A power of attorney to convey land, not coupled with an interest, is revoked by the death of the principal, and a deed thereafter made by the attorney is void.-PACIFIC BANK V. HANNAH, U. 8. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 72.
88. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Bail Bond-Validity.Under Gen. St. $ 969, authorizing a discharge of sureties on a criminal recognizance on surrendering their principal to the sheriff before rendition of judgment on scire facias and payment of costs, they are entitled to a discharge on their offer to pay costs before such judgment, where their principal had escaped, and had been arrested by the sheriff under a different charge than that under which the recognizance was given, and had been surrendered by them to the sheriff after such arrest.-HUSTON V. PEOPLE, Colo., 55 Pac. Rep. 262.
89. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Guaranty-Notice of De. fault.-Where one gives a bond to a town conditioned for performance of another's contract to supply it with light, he is a surety, and not a guarantor, and hence is not entitled to notice of his principal's default.-TOWN OF SULLIVAN V. CLUGGAGE, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 110.
90. PRINCIPAL AND SYRETY-Release-Contract.-Sureties on a bond of a contractor for execution of his contract are released by his being required, without their knowledge, to do a higher and more costly class of work than contracted for.-SOUTHERN BRIDGE CO. v. BOGENSHOT, Tenn., 48 8. W. Rep. 97.
91. PUBLIC LANDS-Headright Certificates.-On an is. sue whether a partial location of a headright certifi. cate, made by one claiming it entirely, but whose source of title did not appear, inured to the exclusive
benefit of one of two joint owners of the certificate, an instruction, without evidence warrantying it, that the presumption is that a location in the name of two joint owners is made for both, is harmless, since a charge ground on the evidence would not be more favorable. -ESTELL F. KIRBY, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 8.
92. QUIETING TITLE Possession.-Complainant ac. quired title to the lands in suit by conveyance from one who had purchased them under a decree for taxes. At the date of the conveyance defendant was in possession by a tenant. Complainant procured the ten ant to yield possession to her without process. Held that, as defendant's title had terminated by operation of law, complainant's possession, necessary to enable her to maintain a bill to quiet title, was not wrongfully obtained.-LILLIE V. SNOW, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 241.
93. RAILROAD "COMPANY-Negligence.-An attempt to drive over a crossing ahead of a freight train, which was in plain view, and moving at about eight miles an hour, in spite of the warning of the flagman, given when the driver had abundant time to avoid the dan. ger, which results in a collision, wherein the driver was killed, is negligence sufficient to prevent a recov. ery.-HANSON V. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO., N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 868.
94. RAILROAD COMPANY – Negligence of TravelerLook and Listen.-The failure of a person about to cross a railway track, on a highway, at grade, to look and listen for an approaching train, or to stop for such purpose, where the view of the track is obstructed, or where there is noise which he may thus control, and which may prevent his hearing such train, is negli. gence, as a matter of law, which will bar a recovery for an injury resulting from a collision with a train at such crossing.-BLACKBURN V. SOUTHERN PAC. Co., Oreg., 55 Pac. Rep. 225.
95. RAILROAD COMPANY-Preferential Liens for Labor and Materials.-The doctrine of the federal courts which recognizes the claims of those furnishing labor or supplies necessary to keep a railroad a going con. cern as entitled to priority of payment over its mort. gage indebtedness is applicable to telegraph and tele. phone lines, which are given the power of eminent do main, and otherwise recognized as important public agencies of modern business and commerce.-KEELYN V. CAROLINA MUT. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO., U. S. 0. C., D. (8. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 29.
96. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Local Prejudice.-After the expiration of the term at which an order for removal was made by the circult court on the ground of local prejudice, such order cannot be reviewed on a motion to remand on the ground that the evidence on which it was based was insufficient.-PARKS V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., U. S. O. C., W.D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 3.
97. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Local Prejudice-Discretion of Court.-The amount and manner of proof required to authorize the removal of a cause on the ground of local prejudice under the acts of 1887 and 1888 must be left to the discretion of the court passing on the appli. cation, and after the term has expired at which an or. der of removal on such ground was made it cannot be reviewed, and the cause remanded, on the ground that the showing was insufficient.-CROTTS V. SOUTHERN Rr. Co., U. S.C. C., W. D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 1.
98. REPLEVIN-Bond.-The failure of the court to en. ter judgment for defendant against plaintiff and sure. ties on the bond, in an action of replevin decided ad. versely to plaintiff, does not preclude defendant from recovering from plaintiff the value of the property replevied.-NORWOOD V. INTERSTATE NAT. BANK OF TEX ARKANA, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 3.
99. RES JUDICATA-Voluntary Nonsult.--A matter is not res judicata, though litigated in the courts of a State, and passed upon by its supreme court, where, after such decision is made, and the case remanded the plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit, as permitted by the State law, and no final judgment is entered.UNION BANK OF RICHMOND, VA., V. BOARD OF COMMRS.
OF OXFORD, N. CAR., U. S. C. C., E. D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 7.
100. SALE-Conditional Sale.-Under one contract of sale, providing that the title should not pass until pay. ment of the price, property was sold for resale, and delivered at different times, and part payments were made from time to time. One general account was kept, and the part payments were credited thereon, and not on any particular goods. Before full payment of the price, the vendee resold it in payment of a preexisting debt. Held, that the title remained in the original vendor, the purchase for a pre-existing debt not being a purchase for value in due course of busi. ness.-HENCH V. EACOCK, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 85.
101. SALE-Conditional Sale-Resale.-Where an orig. inal seller consents to a sale by his immediate pur. chaser to another, and that the latter shall assume the payment of the purchase money, he becomes the "original purchaser," within Act 1889, ch. 81, § 1, pro. viding that, where personal property is sold on condi. tion that title remain in the seller till consideration is paid, the seller, after regaining possession for default in payment, shall, within a certain time, have a pub. lic sale thereof, and in default thereof, unless it is waived, the "original purchaser" may recover of him the part of the consideration paid.-TSCHOPICKY. LIPPINCOTT, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 128.
102. SALE-Fraud-Rescission.-An instruction that the seller of machinery might rescind and replevy it if the buyer did not, at the time of the sale, intend to pay for it, is not misleading because of its omission to state the rights of intervening bona fide purchasers, where the right to recover was elsewhere stated to be subject to the condition that the property had not passed to such a purchaser.-HACKER V. MUNROE, HI., 52 N. E. Rep. 12.
103. SALE-Lunatics-Liability for Price.-A lunatic, who has purchased merchandise, cannot escape liability for the price, where the contract of sale was fair, and was made by the seller in ignorance of the buyer's lunacy, and the seller cannot be placed in statu quo.FLACH V. GOTTSCHALK CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 908.
104. SALE-Rescission-Misrepresentation.-A managing partner representing to a seller to the firm that it had a cash capital of a certain sum, wbich was de. posited in a bank by a co-partner, does not make a misrepresentation justifying a rescission of the sale, though his agreement with his co-partner precludes him from drawing out more than half such sum.STANDARD HORSESHOE CO. OF SOUTH WAREHAM V. O'BRIEN, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 898.
105. SALE Warranty - Notice – Waiver.-Where a seller warranting machinery was notified of detects, and on his promise to remedy them the buyer executed notes for the price, he cannot, on failing to remedy, complain that the notice of defects was not given, nor the machinery returned, in the time or manner stipu. lated for, nor insist that the use by the buyer there. after was a ratification of the sale, though it was stipulated that it should be.-C. AULTMAN & Co. v. RICHARDSON, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 86.
106. SALE-Warranty-Notice of Breach.-Where one bought a machine on an agreement that a warranty thereof would be considered fully satisfied unless the buyer gave the seller and the agents from whom they purchased written notice within 10 days after trial and its failure to fulfill the terms of the warranty, and the buyer gave the agent selling it a verbal notice of defects, and he, acting for the seller, undertook to remedy them, no other notice is required, since notice to the agent was notice to the principal.-PORT HURON ENGINE & THRESHER CO. V. SMITH, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep.
108. TRUSTEES Appointment. – Appointment of trustees by the holder of the debt secured by the trust deed, on failure of the trustee pamed therein to act, being authorized by the deed, is valid.-PERRIN V. TRIMBLE, Tenn., 48 8. W. Rep. 125.
109. USURY-What Law Governs.-A usurious building and loan note negotiated in Texas is governed by the laws of that State, though executed and performable in another State, according to the laws of which it would not be ugurious.-PEOPLE'S BUILDING, LOAN & SAVING ASSN. V, BESSONETTE, Tex., 48 8. W. Rep. 52.
110. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure.-A petition to foreclose a vendor's lien described the land as a certain square, and referred to a certain deed as containing a better description. The deed described the square, and, in addition thereto, an adjoining rectangle. Held, that the reference in the petition did not enlarge the description therein so as to embrace the rectangle, within the rule that, where a description by metes and bounds is followed by a reference to some other writing for a further description, the latter cannot be looked to to enlarge the former.-SANGER V. ROBERTS, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 1.
111. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure-Limitations.--Rev. St. 1895, art. 3358, providing that "every action other than for the recovery of real estate, for which po lim. itation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, and not afterwards," does not apply to an action to foreclose a vendor's lien on real estate, reserved in the deed of the property, since, by article 3356, suits evidenced by or founded on written con. tracts are required to be brought within four years after accrual of the cause of action.-FLEWELLEN V. COCHRAN, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 39.
112. VENDOR AND PURCHASER – Fraud-Estoppel.Where, in an action for the price of land, the defendant seeks to recoup his damage for plaintiff's fraudu. lent representations as to value, but does not seek to rescind the sale, the fact that defendant paid a part of the price, and accepted a deed, with knowledge of the fraud, does not estop him from setting up fraud as a defense.-MORMAN V. HARRINGTON, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 242.
113. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Liens-Assignment.The assignee of a purchase-money note, which was a first lien on the land, was also the assignee of a me. chanic's lien judgmeat, which was inferior to the equi. table title ot the purchasers under trustee's sale of the vendee's interest, and he afterwards assigned the me chanic's lien judgment, the transfer eontaining no covenants of warranty or representations that the vendor held no other lieps on the land. Held, that the assignment did not carry with it the legal title represented by the purchase-money note.-DAVIS V. HERTMAN, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 50.
114. VENDOR AND PURCHASER--Sale of Land-Rescis. sion.Where a buyer contracts for the purchase of, and pays part of the consideration for, land for which a good title is to be furnished, he may recover the consideration so paid, if the seller declares that he cannot furnish a good title, and rescinds the contract.- ELDER v. CHAPMAN, III., 52 N. E. Rep. 10.
115. WITNESS-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The reason for the rule which precludes an attorney or counsel from dieclosing transactions or conversations between bimself and his client ceases as to the contents of written instruments after they have been executed by the client, and neither such general rule nor the statute of New York (Code Civ. Proc. $$ 835, 836) prevents a counsel who prepared a codicil to the will of a client, since deceased, which codicil has been destroyed, from being required to state, if within his knowledge, whether such codicil was executed, and, if so, its contents, though he cannot, under the statute, be required to testify as to the transactions or conversations leading up to its execution.-FAYERWEATHER V. Ritch, U.S. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 90 Fed. Rep. 13.
107. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Verbal Contract.-Specific performance of a verbal contract will not be de. creed where the contract is not clearly established.CUPPY V. ALLEN, III., 52 N. E. Rep. 61.
Central Law Journal. that of other States, the reasoning and con
clusion of the Maine court is of argumenta
tive value. The common schools, they say, ST. LOUIS, MO., JANUARY 27, 1899.
are not for the purpose of instruction in the theological doctrines of any religion or of
any sect. The State regards no one sect as The United States District Court for the superior to any other, and no theological views Eastern District of Wisconsin has recently, as peculiarly entitled to precedence. It is no in the case of In re Bruss-Ritter Co., decided part of the duty of the instructor to give the. a question of some perplexity as to the time ological instruction, and, if the peculiar tenet of the taking effect of the new bankruptcy of any particular sect were so taught, it law, the court holding that the intention of would furnish a well-grounded cause of comthe act, to have force and effect from the plaint on the part of those who entertained date of its passage, is expressly declared in different or opposite religious sentiments. the concluding paragraphs, and that with the But the instruction bere given is not in fact, purpose of congress thus established to have and is not alleged to have been, in articles of the law take effect from July 1st, the proviso faith. No theological doctrines were taught. to postpone the filing of petitions thereunder The creed of no sect was affirmed or denied. in voluntary cases one month, and involuntary The truth or falsehood of the book in which cases four months, cannot operate to nullify the scholars are required to read was not asthat purpose for a reasonable preparatory serted. No interference, by way of instructime so directed for commencing the proceed tion, with the views of the scholars, whether ings, and that while it is probably true that derived from parental or sacerdotal authority, the authority granted to congress by the con is shown. The Bible was used merely as a book stitution to establish uniform laws on the sub in wbich instruction in reading was given. But ject of bankruptcy cannot be exercised by the reading the Bible is no more an interference mere abolishing or suspension of State in with religious belief than would reading the solvency provisions without furnishing a sys- mythology of Greece or Rome be regarded as tem of remedies in their place, yet such sys- interfering with religious belief or affirming tem is provided by this act, and the fact that the Pagan creeds. A chapter in the Koran petitions may not be received before the time might be read, yet it would not be an affirmafixed is a mere regulation of procedure, the tion of the truth of Mohammedanism, or an time and manner of commencing actions be interference with religious faith. The Bible ing always subject to regulation, and in no was used merely as a reading book, and for sense can it be held that the remedies of the information contained in it, as the Koran suitors which are presumably adequate and might be, and not for religious instruction. complete, are thereby impaired.
If suitable for that, it was suitable for tbe purpose for which it was selected.
No one The reading of the Bible in public schools was required to believe, or punished for disas a supplementary text book of reading belief, either in its inspiration or want of inwhere the teacher is not allowed to make spiration, in the fidelity of the translation or comments and where the reading takes place its inaccuracy, or in any set of doctrines deat the close of school sessions from which' any ducible or not deducible therefrom. A simipupil may be excused, on application of pa lar view was entertained by the Suprema rents, has been declared by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Moore v. Monroe, 64 sowa, Court of Michigan in Pfeiffer v. Board of 367. In treating of the effect of the provisEducation, not a violation of any of tbe pro ion in the several State constitutions corvisions of the Michigan constitution. This responding to that under discussion, Judge view is in harmony with the leading adjudi-Cooley, in the work above cited (Constitucated cases on the subject. The question tional Limitations), says, at page 470: "The came before the Supreme Court of Maine as American constitutions contain no provisions early as 1854. Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. which probibit the authorities from such 398. Though the provisions of the constitu solemn recognition of a Superintending Provtion of that State differed substantially from idence in public transactions and enterprises
as the religious sentiment of mankind in erence to the rules of the board, which provide spires, and as seems meet and proper in finite
that members can be expelled for misconduct. beings. Whatever may be the shade of religious belief, all must acknowledge the im
ANIMALS-HUMANE SOCIETY-KILLING ANI
MALS.-In Goodwin v. Toucy, 41 Atl. Rep. 806, portance of recognizing in important human
decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Conaffairs the superintending care and control of
necticut, it was held that section 3670 of the the great Governor of the Universe, and of General Statutes of Connecticut, providing that acknowledging with thanksgiving His bound an agent of the humane society may destroy any less favors, or bending in contrition when animal in his charge" when, in bis judgment
and that of two reputable citizens, such animal apvisited with the penalties of His broken laws.
pears to be injured, disabled, diseased past recoy. No principle of constitutional law is violated
ery, or unfit for any useful purpose," does not auwhen thanksgiving or fast days are appointed, thorize him to take an animal properly hitched on when chaplains are designated for the army a street, and kill it, however bad its condition may and navy, when legislative sessions are opened be, it not being abandoned or cruelly treated or with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, having any contagious disease; but, to authorize
, or when religious teaching is encouraged by
must have taken it, and the owner, neglected to the general exemption of the houses of relig
retake it after a reasonable time therefor, under ious worship from taxation for the support section 3667, providing, when any person arof the government."
rested for cruelty to animals is at the time in charge of a vehicle drawn by an animal cruelly treated, an agent of the socieiy may take charge
of it, and shall give notice to the owner, and care NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
for it till the owner take charge of it, provided he shall take charge of it within sixty days, and
there shall be a lien on it for such care; or, unASSOCIATION EXCHANGES - EXPULSION OF MEMBERS—By Laws–VALIDITY.—The Supreme charge of any animal found abandoned. neg.
der section 3668, authorizing such agent to take Court of Illinois decides, in Greene v. Board of
lected, or cruelly treated, requiring him to give Trade, 51 N. E. Rep. 599, that a rule of the Chi
notice to the owner, and permitting him to procago Board of Trade, providing that when any
vide for it till the owner take charge of it, and member commits any grave offense, or act of dis
declaring the expenses of such care a charge honesty involving the association, the board of
against the owner. directors shall appoint a committee from their number to make a preliminary investigation as to whether charges should be preferred to the BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT board, is not unreasonable and against public -PURCHASERS FOR VALUE-STOLEN PROPERTY. policy; that when a committee of the board of - It is held by the Court of Chancery Appeals of directors of the Chicago Board of Trade makes a Tennessee, in Whiteside v. First National Bank, preliminary investigation of charges against a 47 S. W. Rep. 1108, that purchaser, for value, bemember of the Board of Trade, to determine fore maturity, and in due course of trade, of nego whether a trial of such charges shall be had, the tiable paper indorsed by the payee in blank, from member is not entitled to notice of such prelim one who has stolen it, acquires a title good even inary investigation; that the fact that charges against the owner; that negotiable paper, taken against a member of the Chicago Board of Trade without notice, before maturity, as collateral seare preferred by a member of the board of di curity for a loan made at the time, is held by the rectors which is to try the member upon such taker as an innocent holder; that where stolen ne. charge is no ground for enjoining such trial; that gotiable paper was transferred to an innocent a rule of the Chicago Board of Trade that a holder as collateral security, the court will not, member being tried before the board of directors for the purpose of defeating his title, presume that for violation of the by-laws of the board shall the loan secured by it was usurious, even where not be allowed to be represented by professional the lender testified that he did not remember the counsel is not unreasonable or against public rate of interest, and that where one whose reputapolicy; that the fact that a member of the Chi tion in the community was good, who had therecago Board of Trade by virtue of his member tofore held a responsible public office, negotiated ship has made contracts between customers does paper of one who was a surety on his official bond, not prevent the board from expelling such mem and with whose sons he shared the same office, the ber for violation of its rules, as such contracts fact that such person was insolvent and indebted can be enforced by the customers in their own to the transferee bank, of which the other transnames; and that customers dealing with a mem feree was president, and wherein the borrower's ber of the Chicago Board of Trade are conclu paper had been protested, was not sufficient to put sively presumed to have dealt with him with ref the transferees on inquiry as to his title.