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though very judicious in themselves, could not be serviceable in the plan we had adopted.
The peace, which has contributed so much to the happiness of Europe in general, has taken something from the entertainment of the curious and idle part of it. now deprived of those mighty events, of those astonishing revolutions of fortune, of those matters of anxious hope and fear, which distinguished the late troubled and glorious period. We do not, however, despair, by the continuance of our former industry, and the continuance of the public indulgence to it, of furnishing, from the occasional political transactions of each succeeding year, both foreign and domestic, something, which may not prove altogether unworthy of the reader's attention ; and which may supply the loss of the military materials.
State of Europe in the beginning of this year. Ill state of the British alliance.
Condition of the northern powers. War reaches to the southern. Family compact.
the beginning of the war between them. Advantages and disadvantages on each side. THE close of the year 1761 to war, which had long lurked in
left the affairs of all Eu- other powers under the veil of a rope, both military and po- neutrality: and have only been kept litical, in the most interesting situ- down sometimes by irresolution of ation, in which they have stood, temper in persons, and sometimes at perhaps any period of our mo- by want of system in politics. These dern history. The endeavours which ineffectual endeavours for peace had been made to bring about peace produced also many occasions of amongst the belligerent powers, quarrel and debate, that were absoserved only to increase their ani: lutely new. mosity. And at the same time they To the north there was no apbrought into light and exertion, pearance of relenting in any one those latent motives and dispositions of the powers engaged. It was VOL. V,
not to be expected, that the confe- of Westphalia ; that system, which deracy, which had held together so it hath been the great drift of polong, and under such difficulties and licy, and the great object of war disappointments, should now break to both France and Sweden in the to pieces, just at the moment when last century to establish and to con. the states which composed it seemed firm, and to the house of Austria conin a condition to reap the mature stantly to oppose. The destruction fruits of their unanimity and verse of the king of Prussia seemed to inverance. The king of Prussia was clude the destruction of the treaty of not in a state either to allure or to Westphalia ; because he is the only intimidate. Great Britian could not power in the empire capable of asincrease his subsidy, nor reinforce his serting the independency of its armies. The allied army in West- members, and supporting the declinphalia played a defensive, and, on ing credit of the Protestant cause. the whole of the campaign, a losing The total ruin of Saxony, with game; and there was nobody so san such circumstances of unpardonable guine as to think that Great Britian cruelty by that prince himself, and could increase her strength in Ger- the exhausted state of all the other many, where she paid already one Protestant members of the empire, hundred thousand men, and expend- have narrowed that interest more ed five millions annually.
and more to the single object of Although nothing seems more Prussia. As this interest was first certain in a general view of the po- formed in the empire, so its condilitical system, than that the king of tion there cannot fail of having the Prussia is not the natural and ne most sensible influence on all the cessary ally of this nation; yet his potentates of the same communion. fortune neither was, since the be. Even in this light, England had an ginning of the war, nor is it now a interest that the king of Prussia malier of indifference to us.
should not be entirely crushed by The late Mr. Shippen was of opi. the prevalence of a combination nion, that the power of France was composed in so extraodinary a manbecome an object of much less terror ner, ihat its success must :ecessarily since the growth of the power of produce a total revolution in the sysRussia. But he never imagined it ters of Europe, and draw on a series possible, that all the great conti- of consequences, which, though it nental powers of Europe should is impossible to particularize, must ever be united with France; and have undoubtedly been of the most that they should conspire to load important and alarming nature, her scalé, instead of balancing it. But there was an interest yet Ile never coulè foresee, what has nearer to us, the fate of our own actually happened in this war, that army in Germany, which could not this
very power of Russia could survive the destruction of the king co operate with France, and even of Prussia for an hour. These cirwith Sweden; and, what is full as cumstances rendered the prospect of extraordinary, that both these lat. the campaign in Germany very ter could co-operate with Austria to gloomy; as there was no sort of destroy in effect the system which ground to suppose that this prince, had been established by the treaty upon whose fate so many important
interests immediately depended, was formerly counterpoised, may, could hold out till the middle of possibly, not be so much a lasting summer. Besides, Denmark shew- change, as a temporary and excened no favourable dispositions to. tric deviation from the sphere in wards us : and Holland discovered which the house of Austria had for. evident marks of coldness, if not of merly moved, and into which it absolute alienation. Such was the seems so suitable to her natural and disposition of the powers in the permanent interest to return. The north.
Bourbon Compact is of a different The southern powers of Europe, nature; and it seems to have at whose total unconnection with ihe length produced that entire union causes, and whose great remoteness between the French and Spanish from the seat of war might appear monarchies, which was so much sufficient to ensure their tranquil. dreaded on the death of Charles II. lity, began to enter into action with and which it was the great purpose a spirit equal to that of any of the of the treaty of partition, and the parties who had from the beginning war of the grand -alliance, to preacted as principals ; new fuel was vent. We have seen it take place heaped upon the fire of contention, in our days, comparatively with which had wasted so many nations, very little notice: so much greater just as it seemed to be on the point is our present strength ; or so much of expiring.
greater was the apprehension in That alliance between the branch- those days, than the danger of the es of the house of Bourbon, of actual event in the present. which we have spoken last year, It was a bold push in France to and which is so well known by the attempt, and an uncommon success name of the Family Compact, is to procure, towards the close of an one of the most extraordinary trans- unfortunate and disgraceful war, an actions of this, or perhaps of any alliance of this kind. France could time. It has already produced some not have expected from the most effects answerable to its design; it fortunate issue of her affairs, an admay produce others still more im- vantage so great as that which she portant; and on the whole must be derived froin her uncommon disconsidered as an event of the most tresses. It is some time since the extensive, lasting, and alarming in- jealousy of her power has began to fluence.
abate. But in fact her security, and The treaty of Vienna in 1750, probably too her power, will be between France and Austria, has greatiy increased by this very circertainly contributed not a little to cumstance. Instead of forming such give that new turn to affairs, by an object as alarmed mankind, and which almost all the discourses against which all Europe used to that have hitherto been writien on unite, she is herselí become the centhe interests of princes, are ren ter of an alliance, which extends dered erroneous, and of little use from the northern to the southern in future speculations. That trea- extremity of Europe ; and she was, ty, however, though it seems en in this war, actually united with tirely to have disjointed the ancient Russia, Sweden, Austria, the emsystem of alliance by which France pire, Spain, and Naples; to say
nothing of Denmark, with which mally engage not to make, or even she had also some connections. to listen, to any proposal of peace
With other nations, however, her from their common enemies, but ties are comparatively slight; but by mutual consent; being resolved, the engagements of the Bourbon in time of peace as well as in time Compact form rather an act of in- of war, each mutually to consider corporation than an alliance. It the interests of the allied crown contains stipulations hitherto un it's
to compensate their seveo heard of in any treaty. By the ral losses and advantages, and to act 23 and 24th articles, the subjects of as if the two monarchies formed only the several branches of the house one and the same power. The king of Bourbon are admitted to a mu- of the Sicilies, and the infant duke tual naturalization, and to a parti- of Parma are comprehended in this cipation of such privileges ard im- treaty. munities, as if they were natural Here is the model of the most born subjects of the countries of perfect confederacy. There is but their respective sovereigns. The one restriction to the extent of this direct trade to America forms the scheme; but this particular restriconly exception to this comprehen- tion is a key to the whole treaty; sive community of interests. The as it shews, in the most satisfactory tenor of this article is of infinite manner, against what object it was consequence to the general trading principally directed. For by the interests of Europe; all the states 8th article it is provided, that Spain of which, by the 25th article of the shall not be bound to succour same alliance, are excluded from France, when she is engaged in a any prospect of obtaining similar war in consequence of her engageadvantages.
ments by the treaty of Westphalia, This forms a civil union in al. or other alliances with the princes most the strictest sense; the politi- and states of Germany and the cal union is even inore perfect. By north,' unless
maritime power the 1st and 16th articles, the two take part in those wars, or France be monarchs of France and Spain agree attacked by land in her own coun. to look upon every power as their try. This exception of the mari. enemy, wbich becomes an enemy time powers indicates sufficiently of the other; that a war declared that the tendency of this article is to against either, shall be regarded as affect England, and serves to point personal by the other: and that, out clearly, though obliquely, to when they happen to be both en the other powers of Europe, that gaged in a war against the same their connection with England is enemy or enemies, they will wage the great circumsiance which is to it jointly with their whole forces; provoke the enmity of Spain. and that their military operations It should seem that this treaty shall proceed by common consent, alone, when once its true nature and with a perfect agreement, came to be discovered, if no other
By the 20th article, they agree se existed, would have been sufreciprocally to disclose to each other ficient to justify Great Britian in a their alliances and negociations. declaration of war against a monarBy the 17th and 1811, they. for- chy which had united itself in so